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1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the basic assumptions of traditional efficient market paradigm is that 
investors make rational and optimal decisions. By contrast, behavioral finance 
offers an alternative paradigm for the efficient market theory and argues that 
investors are prone to make irrational and suboptimal decisions that are affected 
by their basic human psychology and emotions. The literature offers several 
definitions for these less sophisticated investors: irrational investors, noise 
traders6, retail investors, or small investors. There is a vast number of studies 
analyzing the impact of irrational investors’ behavior on asset prices and pricing 
efficiency in the market. For example, irrational investors tend to trade in herds, 
either buying or selling, depending on the current state of their sentiment 7  
(Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Barber, Odean and Zhu 2009). Change in the irrational 
investors’ sentiment and its’ effect on market liquidity can have an impact on asset 
prices and pricing efficiency if more rational investors are unable, due to limits to 
arbitrage8, to counterbalance the change (Barberis and Thaler 2002). 
As a warning example, Baker and Wurgler (2007) write that during the tech boom 
in the late 1990s many contrarian arbitrageurs misinterpreted the magnitude of 
the effect of the sentiment of irrational investors on asset prices and the length of 
time that effect was sustained. It was a misinterpretation that later forced some of 
those contrarian arbitrageurs into bankruptcy. Hence understanding the 
composition and predictability of irrational investor sentiment and its effect on 
asset prices is an important topic to study, which in turn makes the subject of 
irrational investors’ sentiment an issue of practical significance. 
The effect of irrational investors’ sentiment on asset prices has already been 
extensively studied in the literature, and several studies (see, e.g., Fisher and 
Statman 2000; Lemmon and Portniaquina 2006) find an association between the 
sentiment of irrational investors and future equity market returns. As Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) state: “Now the question is no longer, as it was a few decades ago 
whether investor sentiment affects stocks prices, but rather how to measure 
investor sentiment and quantify its effects.” In a recent study by Da, Engelberg, 
and Gao (2015), the authors raise some key concerns over why previously used and 
more traditional investor sentiment measurements might be insufficient, and a 
6 Shleifer and Summers (1990) define noise traders as a not fully rational investors. 
7 Baker and Wurgler (2007) define investor sentiment as a belief about future cash flows 
and investment risk that is not justified by the facts available.  
8 Baker and Wurgler (2007) find that the effect of sentiment is especially strong on stocks 
that are more difficult to arbitrage; like small, young, unprofitable, volatile, non-dividend 
paying, and distressed stocks. 
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new internet search-based investor sentiment is needed. They argue that the 
internet search-based investor sentiment captures the sentiment of irrational 
investors in a timelier fashion. 
The decision making of irrational investors is not only affected by the status of their 
current sentiment; the irrational investors also tend to be overconfident. Daniel 
and Titman (1999), and Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that irrational investors 
take too much credit for their success, leading them to become too overconfident 
about their skills. For example, irrational investors generally have long equity 
market positions and thus have benefited from the historical upward price trend, 
making them confident about their abilities (Gervais and Odean 2001). As a 
consequence, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) note that irrational 
investors place too much weight on the information they collect themselves, also 
known as private information, and overestimate the precision of that information. 
In contrast, Daniel et al. (1998) argue that irrational investors ignore, or at least 
underweight, the information that conflicts their views.      
The well-documented overconfidence of irrational investors can also have a value 
decreasing effect on their wealth. Both Barber and Odean (2000) and Deaves, 
Lüders, and Luo (2009) report that overconfident investors tend to trade too 
aggressively, which according to Barber and Odean (2000) leads to decreasing 
long-run portfolio return performance. The authors find that high (low) turnover 
group has a net return of 11.4 (18.5) percentage points and Barber and Odean 
(2001) report that excessive trading reduces men’s (women’s) net returns by 2.65 
(1.72) percentage points 9 . According to Baker and Nofsinger (2002), more 
overconfident investors increase their risk-taking and get surprised more often 
than they anticipate; because they are too certain and confident about their private 
information. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) also report that overconfident 
investors tend to neglect to diversify their portfolios appropriately, which also has 
a wealth diminishing effect.  
The impact of overconfidence of irrational investors on asset prices and pricing 
efficiency is not only limited to the equity market. The effect of irrational investors’ 
overconfidence can also be found in the derivatives market. Feldman and Roy 
(2005), Chen and Sabherwal (2019) argue that the most overconfident investors 
prefer to operate in the option contract markets because they want to maximize 
the financial leverage when they make investment decisions based on their strong 
private information expectations. Both Feldman and Roy (2005) and Lakonishok, 
Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2006) list the call option buyers as the most 
9 Men are considered generally being the more overconfident gender (Barber and Odean 
2001).  
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overconfident class of investors. The overconfident investors also prefer trading 
with option contracts, whose underlying assets are more speculative: like low-
book-to-market stocks (Lakonishok et al. 2006). As a consequence, Bauer, 
Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009) find that irrational investor10 tends to perform 
poorly on average in the options market and prefer out-of-the-money options 
especially.  
As Chen and Sabherwal (2019) write “The options market was supposed to create 
an efficient venue for investors to transfer risks so that risks are better allocated to 
meet investors’ different risk preferences and therefore enhance overall utility. 
However, the presence of overconfident investors may create additional risks not 
only in the equity market but also in the options market.” Hence, Chen and 
Sabherwal (2019) argue that some of the observed mispricings in the options 
market can be caused by the overconfident investors and it’s something that 
practitioners need to account for when operating in the derivatives market.  
The current dissertation addresses the research path of Da, Engelberg, and Gao 
(2011) and Da et al. (2015) and empirically tests if a new small investor sentiment 
that is inferred from the popularities of specific Google search terms affects asset 
prices, both on the aggregate and cross-sectional levels. The first essay analyzes 
the effect of changes in irrational investors’ market attention and sentiment on 
future S&P 500 index returns. The study employs information inferred from the 
popularity of given Google search terms as a potential tool to gauge small investor 
sentiment and market attention. The study uses Google searches to measure 
investors’ attention (positive or negative) toward the U.S. equity market in general 
and its’ effect on future S&P 500 index returns. The choice of search terms ensures 
that they also represent the sentiment and beliefs of small and irrational investors. 
The choice of search terms was “bear market,” “bull market,” “market crash,” and 
“market rally.” The selection makes it possible to capture irrational investors’ 
information retrieval from the Internet that is related to their current beliefs about 
the U.S. equity market. The study finds that an increase in positive (negative) 
information retrieval in Google is associated with positive (negative) future returns 
on the S&P 500 index. 
The second essay analyzes the effect of unexpected changes in a new U.S. small 
investors’ sentiment on future U.S. equity market returns and the subsequent size 
premium. I chose to use the search volumes of Google search terms such as “bull 
market,” and “bear market” to measure the sentiment. The selection of Google 
10 Chuang and Susmel (2011) argue that individual investors are more overconfident than 
institutional investors.  
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search terms is made so that they share similar terminology as used in the AAII 
(The American Association of Individual Investors) survey. The study’s proposed 
small investor sentiment measurement should capture the attitude of small 
investors to the U.S. equity market in a timelier fashion. Also, the general effect of 
investor sentiment on cross-sectional asset prices should be stronger for stocks 
that are more difficult to value and arbitrage, like small-sized stocks, as suggested 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The study finds that an unexpected increase in 
optimism (pessimism) of U.S. small investors is associated positively (negatively) 
with the next week’s equity market return and subsequent size premium.  
The third essay further analyzes the effect of unexpected changes in the new U.S. 
small investors’ sentiment on future U.S. equity market returns on the cross-
sectional level. It analyzes the cross-sectional association between unexpected 
changes in the new U.S. small investor sentiment and future returns of stocks 
sorted by their book-to-market ratio; value premium. The study finds that an 
unexpected increase in optimism (pessimism) in the sentiment predicts positive 
(negative) subsequent value premium.  
The dissertation also continues the research path of Feldman and Roy (2005), 
Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2006), Bauer, Cosemans, and 
Eichholtz (2009), and Chen and Sabherwal (2019) by empirically testing the ex-
ante pricing and historical performance of various option contracts that are traded 
in the Nordic financial electricity market.  As Chen and Sabherwal (2019) state, 
part of the reported mispricing in the option market can be caused by the 
overconfident investors.  
The fourth essay analyzes the ex-ante pricing of quarterly option contracts that are 
traded in the Nordic financial electricity market. The objective of the essay is to 
empirically analyze if quarterly option contracts are ex-ante mispriced, which 
could be potentially caused by overconfident investors who operate in the market. 
The analysis involves evaluating the performance of two covered option strategies 
on the Nordic financial electricity market; where one option strategy focuses on 
the ex-ante pricing of call options, and the other focuses on the ex-ante pricing of 
put options. The study finds that the covered option strategy that uses short call 
(long put) option positions have a lower (higher) performance measurements, 
accompanied by the negative (positive) average historical return. As Chen and 
Sabherwal (2019) suggest, the mispricings may be partly caused by the 
overconfident investors.     
The fifth essay analyzes the seasonality in the ex-ante pricing of quarterly option 
contracts that are traded in the Nordic financial electricity market. The objective 
of the essay is to empirically analyze if seasonality exists in option pricing among 
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the market participants. The analysis involves conducting dynamic delta option 
strategies for the short call and long put option positions. The dynamic delta option 
strategies uncover if a call or put options traded in the market are ex-ante over- or 
underpriced. The study finds some seasonality effect on the ex-ante pricing of 
quarterly option contracts. The call options are ex-ante over (under)-priced for the 
winter (summer) quarters and put options are ex-ante overpriced for the winter 
quarters. The results show that some seasonality exists in the pricing, and the 
effect is stronger for the winter quarters. Also, in this case, as Chen and Sabherwal 
(2019) suggest, the mispricing may be partly caused by overconfident investors 
who operate in the market.     
As a whole, the purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to analyze further the 
irrational behavior of investors and its impact on asset prices. The dissertation 
focuses on two different forms of the irrational behavior of investors on two 
different financial markets and reports its findings in five individual essays. The 
three first essays analyze the effect that changes in the sentiment of U.S. small 
investors have on U.S. equity market returns. The study introduces a new U.S. 
small investor sentiment measurement and tests its effect on future U.S. equity 
market returns, on the aggregate and cross-sectional levels. The last two essays 
analyze the potential existence of investors’ overconfidence in the Nordic financial 
electricity market by empirically analyzing the ex-ante pricing of call and put-
option contracts using various option trading strategies. 
This doctoral dissertation consists of the introduction chapter and five individual 
essays. The remainder of the introductory chapter is organized as follows: Section 
2 describes the contribution of each essay and the dissertation as a whole. Section 
3 provides a brief discussion of the theoretical fundamentals of this dissertation. 
Section 4 then briefly summarizes the five essays of this dissertation. 
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2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The objective of the dissertation is to explore the effects of irrational investors’ 
sentiment or overconfidence on asset prices. It makes two main contributions to 
the financial literature. The first is to investor sentiment literature, as the 
dissertation analyzes if changes in irrational investors’ sentiment influence future 
U.S. equity market returns on both the aggregate and cross-sectional levels. The 
dissertation suggests a new measurement of U.S. small investor sentiment. The 
new small investor sentiment should capture the changes in U.S. small investor 
sentiment in a timelier fashion than the more traditional ones by utilizing the 
information retrieval by the small investors from their internet searches. 
The second contribution of the dissertation is that it empirically analyzes the ex-
ante pricing of derivative contracts traded in the Nordic financial electricity 
market. As the previous literature suggests, the existence of overconfident 
investors can lead to mispricing in option markets (see, e.g., Chen and Sabherwal 
2019). This dissertation empirically analyzes if quarterly option contracts in the 
Nordic financial market are ex-ante mispriced, which could suggest that 
potentially some overconfident market participants exists. A more detailed 
discussion about the individual contribution of each essay is given below.   
The first essay contributes simultaneously both to the investor sentiment and the 
market attention literature. In the former case, the essay complements traditional 
small investor sentiment studies; such as Solt and Statman (1988), Otoo (1999), 
and Fisher and Statman (2000). It also adds to a recent and specific strand of 
literature that utilizes information inferred from the popularity of Google search 
terms to test their association with future aggregate equity market returns (see, 
e.g., Da et al. 2011, Vozlyublennaia 2014 and Da et al. 2015). Da et al. (2011) use
information on Google search volumes to measure investor attention to individual
U.S. stocks and the association with future stock returns. The essay incorporated
in the dissertation uses Google searches to measure investors’ attention (positive
or negative) directed at the aggregate U.S. equity market in general and the effect
on future S&P 500 index returns.
The second essay contributes especially to the existing finance literature related to 
small investor sentiment and cross-sectional equity market returns (see, e.g., 
Baker and Wurgler 2006), by utilizing information from the new U.S. small 
investors sentiment measurement on the future size premium. It also 
complements the studies that examine the association between Google search 
popularities and future equity market returns (see, e.g., Da et al. 2011, 
Vozlyublennaia 2014, and Da et al. 2015). Da et al. (2015) develop a new market-
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level investor sentiment that is based on the Google search volumes for search 
terms such as “recession,” “unemployment,” and “bankruptcy.” The study in this 
dissertation incorporates that idea of Da et al. (2015) and relates it specifically to 
small investor sentiment on the U.S. equity market. 
The third essay further contributes to the existing finance literature related to 
small investor sentiment and cross-sectional equity market returns (see, e.g., 
Baker and Wurgler 2006), by utilizing the information from the new U.S. small 
investor sentiment measurement on the subsequent value premium. It also 
complements the studies that examine the association between Google search 
popularities and future equity market returns (see, e.g., Da et al. 2011, 
Vozlyublennaia 2014, and Da et al. 2015). 
The joint findings from the three first essays, which document an association 
between investor sentiments inferred from Google search volumes and future 
returns of U.S. stock market, pave the way for future research that studies their 
usability as a base for profitable investment strategy.    
The fourth essay contributes to and extends the strand of finance literature that 
analyzes the performance of option strategies on the equity market (see, e.g., 
Whaley 2002, Feldman and Roy 2005, Hill, Balasubramanian, Gregory and 
Tierens 2006, Kapadia and Szado 2007, Ungar and Moran 2009).  
Some of the previous literature11 on derivatives contracts traded in the electricity 
market focus more on their use as risk management tools. Some of the previous 
literature 12  focuses on empirically analyzing the ex-ante pricing of derivative 
contracts (futures and forward contracts) traded in the Nordic financial electricity 
market. The fourth essay of the dissertation focuses on analyzing the ex-ante 
pricing of quarterly option contracts traded in the Nordic financial electricity 
market.  
The fifth essay contributes to the literature by empirically analyzing the seasonality 
in the pricing of quarterly option contracts. Only a few previous studies13 examine 
the pricing of electricity option contracts in the Nordic markets, but they focus on 
the pricing from more a theoretical perspective and feature less empirical work. 
The empirical analysis of the ex-ante pricing of forward and futures contracts 
traded in the Nordic financial electricity market is a topic that has been covered 
11 See Shawky, Marathe and Barrett 2003; Fleten, Bråthen and Nissen-Meyer 2010; 
Frestad 2012 
12 See Kristiansen 2007; Botterud, Kristiansen, and Ilic 2010; Wimschulte 2010; Gjolberg 
and Brattested 2011; Lucia and Torró 2011; Weron and Zator 2014; Smith-Meyer and 
Gjolberg 2016 
13 See Benth and Schmeck 2014; Benth and Detering 2015; Schmeck 2016. 
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more extensively. 14  The fifth essay especially contributes to the literature by 
extending the empirical analysis from the forward and futures contract market into 
the option contract market in the Nordic financial electricity market. It also 
contributes to the literature by extending the theoretical analysis of pricing option 
contracts in the Nordic financial electricity market to make that analysis empirical 
and consider the seasonality effect.  
The joint findings from the last two essays suggest that some mispricing and 
seasonality exists in the pricing of quarterly option contracts. Which could suggest 
that the market participants are overconfident about the precision of their private 
information, leading them to misprice the financial assets. 
 
                                                        
14 See Kristiansen 2007; Botterud, Kristiansen, and Ilic 2010; Wimschulte 2010; Gjolberg 
and Brattested 2011; Lucia and Torró 2011; Weron and Zator 2014; Smith-Meyer and 
Gjolberg 2016. 
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3 THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS 
This section provides a brief theoretical background to the dissertation. Section 3.1 
addresses how the beliefs and overconfidence of irrational investors affect asset 
prices in general. There follows a more detailed discussion of the association 
between small investors’ sentiment and their market attention and asset prices. 
Section 3.2 addresses the overconfidence of irrational investors and asset prices 
and is followed by a more detailed discussion of the ex-ante pricing of electricity 
derivatives. 
3.1 Effect of irrational investors’ beliefs and sentiment 
on asset prices 
In past decades, the behavioral finance paradigm has challenged the key 
assumptions of the traditional finance framework, which includes a key 
assumption that investors base their decision-making on rationality. If some 
irrational decision-making were to exist in the market that affects asset prices, 
more rational investors were to intervene and balance the asset prices back to their 
fundamental level (Thaler 1999). However, the behavioral finance literature 
challenges this assumption by stating the following (see, e.g., Barberis and Thaler 
2002): 
i.) The biased beliefs and preferences of irrational investors can influence asset 
demand causing mispricing in financial assets. 
ii.) Due to limits to arbitrage, more rational investors are unable to balance the 
mispricing caused by irrational investors. 
Hence, the interaction of irrational beliefs and behavior of a specific subset of 
investor and simultaneous limit to arbitrage for more sophisticated investors can 
lead to an event where asset prices deviate from their more fundamental level. 
In their seminal work, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) state 
that so-called noise traders15 are prone to erroneous stochastic beliefs16, or a 
sentiment in a more general context, that can cause asset prices to deviate from 
their fundamental value. However, the unpredictable nature of noise traders’ 
                                                        
15 Shleifer and Summers (1990) define noise traders as a not fully rational investors. 
16 Baker and Wurgler (2007) define the investor sentiment as a belief of about future cash 
flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts in hand. 
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sentiment reduces the incentive for rational arbitrageurs to bet against them17, 
hence allowing some mispricing to exist in the financial market. 
In efficient market theory, arbitrage in financial markets is considered costless and 
riskless; however, in a more realistic context, arbitrage tends to be risky and costly, 
and accordingly arbitrageurs cannot fully offset the impact of irrational investors 
on asset prices, that is the behavior of irrational investors impacts on asset prices 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Generally, arbitrageurs face risk from three sources. The first source is a 
fundamental risk, where negative news related to the asset position the 
arbitrageurs hold can have a negative outcome. The second source of risk is a 
noise-trader risk, where the behavior of noise traders can worsen the mispricing. 
The third source of risk is time: If the arbitrageurs had unlimited time to wait for 
the mispricing to correct, they could more aggressively bet against irrational 
investors; however, in some cases, the arbitrageurs are working with other 
investors’ money and might face a withdrawal/liquidate risk at the worst time, 
especially if the mispricing has moved against the arbitrageurs (Ilmanen 2011). 
Where the limits to arbitrage are one of the two major pillars of behavioral finance 
literature, the second pillar of behavioral finance leans on basic human psychology 
(how the investors form their beliefs and preferences). It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to introduce and explain all of them in detail; hence, its focus is 
on the essential ones that help the reader to understand the dissertation better. 
3.1.1 Investor sentiment and asset prices 
As mentioned previously, the classical finance paradigm generally assumes that 
neither the behavior or sentiment of irrational investors affects asset prices. 
However, the seminal work of De Long et al. (1990) introduces a model where two 
types of investors exist in the market, irrational investors (or noise traders) and 
rational arbitrageurs. The rational arbitrageurs have rational expectations about 
asset prices, whereas the irrational investors’ form expectations about asset prices 
that are subject to their stochastically changing sentiment 18 , which is not 
supported by fundamentals. In some periods, irrational investors’ expectations 
about the asset prices are more optimistic (pessimistic) than those of rational 
arbitrageurs. This difference in the expectations then creates trading in the 
                                                        
17 Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that the effect of sentiment is especially strong on stock 
that are more difficult to arbitrage; like small, young, unprofitable, volatile, non-dividend 
paying and distressed stocks.       
18 According to Black (1986) investor sentiment can represent trading on noise rather 
than on news.  
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financial market. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that sentiment-based demand 
shock by irrational investors and simultaneous limits to arbitrage can cause 
mispricing among assets. When irrational investors experience a negative 
(positive) sentiment shock, they sell (buy) equities to (from) rational arbitrageurs. 
Therefore low (high) sentiment will generate downward (upward) price pressure 
in short-term. This liquidity shock can have a short-term effect on returns, as 
suggested by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993). 
What then is investor sentiment, how can it be measured, and does it affect asset 
prices? In the previous literature, investor sentiment is traditionally measured by 
three alternative methods. The first is a market-based investor sentiment 
measurement. These measurements include the likes of VIX19, put-call ratio20, a 
discount of closed-end funds21 , and mutual fund data22. The second method is a 
survey-based investor sentiment measurement. These measurements include the 
likes of the AAII survey23, consumer confidence surveys24 , and the Investors 
Intelligence survey 25 . The third method is a composite investor sentiment 
measurement26combining the information from some of the previously mentioned 
investor sentiment measurements into a single measurement. 
Some previous studies find that survey-based investor sentiments are associated 
with future equity market returns. For example, Fisher and Statman (2000) find 
that a high (low) level of small investor sentiment (the AAII survey) during the 
present month is associated with negative (positive) returns for the S&P 500 index 
for the following month. Schmeling (2007) also finds in the more global context 
that the level of small investor sentiment (Sentix) is negatively associated with 
future equity market returns. Verma and Soydemir (2006) report that a one-
standard-deviation increase in small investor sentiment (the AAII survey) in the 
U.S.A. has a positive effect on future equity market returns in the U.S.A. and the 
U.K. For the consumer confidence surveys, Charoenrook (2005), Lemmon and 
                                                        
19 Whaley 2000; Simon and Wiggins III 2001; Giot 2005. 
20 Simon and Wiggins III 2001; Wang et al. 2006. 
21 Lee et al. 1991; Chen et al. 1993; Swaminathan 1996; Neal and Wheatley 1998; Elton et 
al. 1998; Brown and Cliff 2005. 
22 Neal and Wheatley 1998; Brown et al. 2003; Brown and Cliff 2005; Frazzini and 
Lamont 2008; Beaumont et al. 2008; Feldman 2010; Ben-Rephael et al. 2012.  
23 De Bondt 1993; Fisher and Statman 2000; Brown and Cliff 2004; Verma and Soydemir 
2006; Kurov 2008; Verma and Verma 2008; Verma and Soydemir 2009. 
24 Otoo 1999; Fisher and Statman 2003; Jansen and Nahuis 2003; Charoenrook 2005; 
Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006; Schmeling 2009; Zouaoui et al. 2011. 
25 Solt and Statman 1988; Clarke and Statman 1998; Fisher and Statman 2000. 
26 Baker and Wurgler 2006; Baker and Wurgler 2007; Baker et al. 2008; Ho and Hung 
2009; Kurov 2010; Yu and Yuan 2011; Baker et al. 2012; Beer et al. 2012; Stambaugh et 
al. 2012; Huang, Jiang, Tu and Zhou 2015.  
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Portniaquina (2006) and Schmeling (2009) find a negative association between 
and future equity market returns and consumer confidence. 
Some previous studies also document a link between market-based investor 
sentiment measurements and equity market returns. For example, Lee et al. 
(1991), Swaminathan (1996), and Neal and Wheatley (1998) find that discounting 
closed-end funds is associated with future equity market returns. Results from 
Neal and Wheatley (1998), Brown and Cliff (2005), Frazzini and Lamount (2008), 
Beaumont et al. (2008), Edelen et al. (2010), and Feldman (2010) suggest that 
investor sentiment inferred from mutual fund data is also associated with equity 
market returns. 
Also, investor sentiment that is inferred from the derivative market has been 
reported to contain information that may help to predict future equity market 
movements; for example, Whaley (2000), Simon and Wiggins III (2001), and Giot 
(2005) document a negative relationship between VIX and stock market returns. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) show that investor sentiment does not just affect 
aggregate stock market returns. The authors document a relationship between 
investor sentiment and subsequent cross-sectional stock returns. They argue that 
the effect should be stronger for those stocks that are more prone to the behavior 
of irrational investors, and are also more difficult to value and arbitrage; like small 
or potentially financially distressed (high book-to-market ratio) stocks. 
However, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015) raise some important reasons why 
market-based or survey-based investor sentiment measurements might be 
imprecise, and a new search-based investor sentiment measurement might be a 
good solution. First, the market-based sentiment might be the equilibrium 
outcome of many different economic forces and hence not purely reflect the 
current investor sentiment. Second, some survey-based sentiments are conducted 
on too low a frequency, such as every month. Third, respondents might not answer 
survey questions truthfully, especially if the incentive for telling the truth is low. 
Fourth, the search-based sentiment method reveals real attitudes rather than just 
inquiring about them, as is the case with survey-based sentiments, and can also be 
conducted in higher frequency. 
Da et al. (2015) find that increased market-level investor sentiment (known as 
FEARS), constructed by aggregating the popularities of Google search term such 
as “recession,” “unemployment” and “bankruptcy,” predicts return reversals, 
increasing volatility and mutual fund flows from equity funds to bond funds. Also, 
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several other studies 27  find that information inferred from the popularity of 
various Google search terms is linked to subsequent equity market returns. 
3.1.2 Investor attention and asset prices 
In an efficient market, the current asset price should be the present value of its 
future cash flows. The current asset price should also reflect all currently available 
information and react only if new information reaches the market. However, 
according to Hirshleifer (2001), investors have only limited attention, memory, 
and processing capacities, which forces the investors to focus on a specific subset 
of information. Barber and Odean (2008) find that the more limited attention 
mentioned tends to make individual investors (the irrational investors) more likely 
than institutional investors (the rational investors) to buy stocks that grab their 
attention, creating a demand shock for such stocks28. 
Huberman and Regev (2001) find that an article published in a Sunday edition of 
the New York Times, related to the development of a new cancer-battling drug 
caused a given company’s stock price to increase substantially. An interesting fact 
is that the same information had already been released through various sources 
(including the Times itself). The authors argue that the public attention that the 
stock in question was given increased the value of stock substantially even without 
genuinely new information being released. Fang and Peress (2009) also find a link 
between media coverage and future stock returns. The authors find that stocks 
with higher media coverage earn lower risk-adjusted returns due to overpricing. 
The linkage is especially strong for those stocks more influenced by the behavior 
of irrational investors. 
In recent years, information inferred from Google searches has been used to 
capture investors’ levels of stock market attention. Vozlyublennaia (2014) states 
that high market attention, inferred from Google searches, for market indices (S&P 
500, Dow, and Nasdaq) forecasts negative returns for the indices for the following 
two weeks. Furthermore, Chen (2017) finds that the popularity of Google searches 
market indices is associated with stock market returns in a more global context. 
Several studies29 also report that a similar association is also evident between the 
                                                        
27 Da et al. 2011; Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang 2011; Bank, Larch and Peter 2011; Takeda 
and Wakao 2014;Vozlyublennaia 2014; Tantaopas, Padungsaksawasdi and 
Treepongkaruna 2016; Chen 2017  
28 Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2002) find and argue that stocks with extremely high 
trading volume capture the attention of investors, leading to subsequent positive excess 
return.  
29 Da et al. 2011; Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang 2011; Bank, Larch and Peter 2011; Takeda 
and Wakao 2014 
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popularity of Google searches and returns of individual stocks; hence, small 
investors’ sentiment can be measured by incorporating their market attention as 
illustrated by the Internet searches they conduct as illustrated by Da et al. (2015). 
3.2 Overconfidence 
Daniel and Hirshleifer (2015) argue that overconfidence is another irrational 
behavior of investors, that also plays a key role in their financial decision-making. 
The authors define overconfidence as a tendency of investors having mistaken 
valuations and believing in them too strongly. The authors' accent that the effect 
of overconfidence on asset pricing is more substantial when the market is illiquid 
and short-selling is difficult and costly. When the short-selling is constrained, 
pessimist investors find it more difficult to trade based on their views than optimist 
investors do. Thus, the asset pricing reflects more the views of over-optimistic 
investors, resulting in equilibrium overpricing. (Miller 1977.) In line with the 
arguments of Miller (1977) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (2015), Hirshleifer (2001) 
argue that investors tend to misprice financial assets that have sparse information, 
and the mispricing becomes apparent only ex-post.  
Daniel and Hirsleifer (2015) argue that in standard rational expectations 
framework, investors process information perfectly, and thus asset prices are 
always rationally discounted to their expected payoffs. In contrast, biased belief 
model assumes that investors make mistakes when they form expectations about 
asset payoffs. For example, overconfident investors tend to overestimate the 
precisions of positive private information that they perceive30. Thus, they pay too 
high price for the asset initially, which later in the future leads into return reversal. 
Daniel, Hirsleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2002) show that investors’ 
overconfidence is associated with negative long-lag autocorrelations in returns.    
3.2.1 Ex-ante pricing of electricity derivatives 
In the literature on commodity forward contract ex-ante pricing, two primary 
types of models exist. The first is the so-called no-arbitrage or cost-of-carry model. 
In principle, it assumes that the forward contract can be synthesized by taking a 
physical position on the underlying asset and holding it until the expiration day. 
                                                        
30 Chuang and Lee (2006) find that overconfident investors tend to overreact to private information 
and underreact to public information. Also, overconfident investors tend to underestimate the 
associated risk and trade more in riskier assets. Daniel, el al. (1998) show that if investors are 
overconfident, they overweight their own private information at the expense of ignoring publicly 
available information.  
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Since electricity is practically nonstorable, the literature on pricing electricity 
forward contracts mainly relates to the second model. The second model focuses 
more on the difference between the forward price and the expected future spot 
price. The difference between the forward price and the expected spot price is also 
known as the forward premium. The forward premium can be affected by hedging-
pressure, for example, causing the forward premium to be positive or negative 
depending on which side the hedging-pressure is coming from (Longstaff and 
Wang 2004). 
Fama and French (1987) represent the forward premium with the following two 
models: 
 
(1)  ܨ(ݐ,ܶ)െ ܵ(ݐ) =  ܧ௧[ܲ(ݐ,ܶ)] + ܧ௧[ܵ(ܶ)െ ܵ(ݐ)] 
where the difference between the current forward price and current spot price can 
be expressed as the sum of an expected premium and an expected change in the 
spot price. The expected premium can then be expressed as follows: 
 
(2)  ܧ௧[ܲ(ݐ,ܶ)] = ܨ(ݐ,ܶ)െ ܧ௧[ܵ(ܶ)] 
where the expected premium can be viewed as a biased estimate of the forward 
price for the future spot price.  
Several studies have empirically investigated the existence of a forward premium 
in the Nordic financial electricity market. For example, Botterud, Kristiansen, and 
Ilic (2010), Gjolberg and Brattested (2011), Lucia and Torró (2011) find a positive 
and statistically significant forward premium. Also, Gjolberg and Brattested (2011) 
and Lucia and Torró (2011) find seasonal patterns in the forward premium. 
Whereas Weron and Zator (2014) find that the forward premium is also dependent 
on the holding period. However, in a recent study by Smith-Meyer and Gjolberg 
(2016), the authors find that since the year 2008, the forward premium has been 
diminishing. 
In the equity market, one relatively popular option strategy that utilizes irrational 
investors’ overconfidence bias is the so-called covered call-option strategy31. This 
strategy involves the rational investor writing a call option against a long position 
                                                        
31 Feldmand and Roy (2005) and Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson and Poteshman (2006) list 
call option buyers as the most overconfident class of investors. 
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in an underlying asset already owned. By writing the call option, the option writer 
enables an irrational investor to buy a financial asset that they are overconfident. 
For example, Whaley (2002) finds that a covered call-option strategy that writes a 
one-month at-the-money call option against a currently held long position on the 
S&P 500 index improves the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolio when 
compared to the situation where the investor holds only a long position on the S&P 
500 index. Several other studies also document that the covered call-option 
strategy outperforms investing only in the index32. 
To empirically test if a specific option contract traded in the market is ex-ante 
under- or overvalued, Black and Scholes (1972) and Galai (1977) use the following 
model: 
 
(3) (οCെ C୴οV)െ  (Cെ C୴V)rοt, 
where ¨&LVWKHFKDQJHLQRSWLRQYDOXH&v is the delta value of the option contract; 
¨9 LV WKHFKDQJH LQ WKHYDOXHRI WKHXQGHUO\LQJDVVHW&vV gives the number of 
XQGHUO\LQJDVVHWVWRDFKLHYHDFRPSOHWHKHGJH¨WLVWKHWLPHLQWHUYDOand r is the 
interest rate. The option position is maintained throughout the life of the option. 
If a statistically significant positive profit can be made by buying (shorting) the 
option contract, the result suggests that the option contract in question is 
undervalued (overvalued). 
The equation described above serves the purpose of maintaining the delta 
neutrality over time and for every single day. Every day the underlying asset V is 
bought or sold (depending on the change in Cv) so that the delta neutrality can be 
maintained, and the process continues until the option contract matures. On the 
maturity day, the positions are liquidated so that the dollar return can be 
calculated (see, e.g., Black and Scholes 1972; Galai 1977). 
                                                        
32 Feldman and Roy 2005; Hill, Balasubramanian, Gregory and Tierens 2006; Kapadia 
and Szado 2007 
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4 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS 
This dissertation consists of five individual essays that are briefly discussed in this 
section. Two of the essays are co-authored, and three are single-authored. All five 
essays are published in peer-reviewed journals. 
Essay 1: “Changes in investors’ market attention and near-term stock market 
returns” was published in 2016 in the Journal of Behavioral Finance, Volume 17 
Issue 1. 
Essay 2: “Small investors’ internet sentiment and return predictability”. Review of 
Behavioral Finance. Forthcoming. 
Essay 3: “Internet search-based investor sentiment and value premium”. Finance 
Research Letters. Forthcoming. 
Essay 4: “Covered option strategies in the Nordic electricity markets” was 
published in 2015 in the Journal of Energy Markets, Volume 8 Number 3. 
Essay 5: “Dynamic delta option strategies in Nordic electricity markets” was 
published in 2018 in the Journal of Energy Markets, Volume 11 Number 4. 
4.1 Changes in investors’ market attention and near-
term stock market returns 
This essay examines the association between changes in irrational investors’ (i.e., 
small investors’) market attention and sentiment and returns of the S&P 500 
index. It measures small investors’ market attention and sentiment as indicated by 
the popularity of the Google search terms “bear market,” “market crash,” “bull 
market,” and “market rally.” The Google search terms “bear market” and “market 
crash” (“bull market” and “market rally”) proved more related to the negative 
(positive) sentiment. The purpose is to examine if changes in the small investors’ 
sentiment, inferred from their information retrieval (market attention) from the 
Internet, is associated with S&P 500 index returns. I argue that public information 
retrieval by individuals is an element of stock price formation; that is irrational 
investors use Google to look for information to support their decision-making 
when trading. Hence the increase in positive (negative) information retrieval 
related to small investors’ sentiment is associated with positive (negative) future 
returns of the S&P 500 index. The results indicate whether the behavior of 
irrational investors and especially their market attention and sentiment, have a 
statistically significant effect on asset prices or not. 
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The essay’s hypotheses are mainly based on the earlier findings of Da et al. (2011). 
The authors find that increased investor attention, measured via Google search 
volumes for stock tickers of Russell 3000 companies, predicts higher returns of 
the given company for the following two weeks. Also, Da et al. (2011) find that 
increasing Google search volume for the stock tickers of IPO companies predict 
higher first-day IPO returns. The concern with the market attention measurement 
used by Da et al. (2011) is that it is one-way, that is, all attention is good. Whereas 
the essay referred to here extends the study of Da et al. (2011) more toward small 
investors’ two-way sentiment on the overall equity market, that is it measures the 
positive and negative market attention and sentiment separately, as in Tetlock 
(2007). 
The data used to measure the investor attention consist of the weekly search 
popularity of the Google search terms “bear market,” “bull market,” “market 
crash,” and “market rally” in the United States. To analyze the effect of investor 
attention on stock market returns, this essay uses weekly returns and volumes of 
the S&P 500 index. The sample consists of 404 weekly observations, starting from 
January 2004 and ending on February 2011. 
The authors use several statistical methods to empirically estimate the association 
between the popularity of given Google search terms and future returns of the S&P 
500 index. First, the study employs a vector autoregression model to capture the 
interdependence between S&P 500 returns and lagged changes in the popularity 
of a given Google search term. Second, using the results from vector 
autoregression, the authors employ a Granger causality test, which indicates if the 
lagged changes in the popularity of a given Google search term contains some 
information that might predict the future S&P 500 returns. Third and finally, the 
study employs regression analysis to examine the statistical association between 
the variables of interest. 
The study finds that an increase in the popularity of the Google search terms “bear 
market” and “market crash” (“market rally”) predict negative (positive) returns for 
the S&P 500 index for the forthcoming week. Hence, it appears that overall, the 
behavior of irrational investors does affect asset prices. 
4.2 Small investors’ internet sentiment and return 
predictability 
This essay examines the association between unexpected changes in U.S. small 
investor sentiment and future equity market returns and size premium in the U.S. 
The small investor sentiment in the essay is inferred from the popularity of the 
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Google search terms “bull market” and “bear market” or their spread. This new 
small investor sentiment is known as Small Investor Internet Sentiment (SIIS)33. 
The unexpected change in the SIIS is proxied as the first-order autoregressive 
model, where the residuals are considered to be the unexpected changes in the SIIS 
as in Peltomäki et al. (2017). The results will indicate whether the behavior and 
beliefs of irrational investors and especially their sentiment, have a statistically 
significant effect on asset prices. 
Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015) construct a market-wide investor sentiment that is 
inferred from the popularity of Google search terms such as “recession,” 
“unemployment,” and “bankruptcy.” They argue that search-based investor 
sentiment has several advantages over the more traditional sentiment measures. 
First, market-based sentiment measures might be the equilibrium outcome of 
several different economic forces and therefore not entirely reflect true investor 
sentiment34. Second, survey-based sentiment measures can be conducted at too 
low a frequency. Third, the respondents in survey-based sentiment measures 
might not answer truthfully35. 
This essay contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it proposes a novel 
measurement of small investor sentiment. Second, it extends the study of Da et al. 
(2015) toward small investor sentiment on the equity market. Third, it examines if 
information inferred from the Google search volumes is related to the cross-
sectional returns of companies sorted by their size, the size premium. 
The study offers hypotheses based on the theory proposed by De Long et al. (1990) 
and the findings of Fisher and Statman (2000), Verma and Soydemir (2006), 
Baker and Wurgler (2006), Barber and Odean (2008), Yuan (2015). According to 
De Long et al. (1990), so-called noise traders or irrational traders can affect asset 
prices if more rational investors are unable to correct the asset prices due to limits 
to arbitrage. Barber and Odean (2008) find that irrational investors tend to be net 
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks; which makes the attention-grabbing stocks 
                                                        
33 We argue that the SIIS captures the small investor sentiment since Google search 
volumes do not differentiate investors by the size of their portfolio. By numbers, there 
should be more small investors in the market than institutional investors.  
34 D’Avolio (2002) finds that shorting stocks can be too costly for investors. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) argue that even more sophisticated 
investors might be reluctant to bet against the market due to reputations concerns. The 
Internet search-based investor sentiment is free from these constraints.    
35  Singer (2002) argues that people have little incentive to answer survey questions 
carefully or truthfully, especially if questions are sensitive. For example, Da et al. (2015) 
argue that possibility of job loss might be a sensitive topic for the respondent to answer in 
a survey, but it can show up search volumes such as “unemployment”. Da et al. (2015) argue 
that answers from surveys cannot be externally and objectively verified, as can be done for 
the Internet search-based investor sentiment. Brown and Cliff (2004) report that the 
average number of respondents in AAII survey is only 137.   
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vulnerable to liquidity shock as described by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang 
(1993). Such liquidity shock, in turn, causes the price of attention-grabbing stocks 
to deviate from their fundamental value, that is, the rational investors are unable 
to balance the liquidity shock caused by irrational investors. Yuan (2015) finds that 
during market-wide attention events, investors increase the attention they pay to 
their portfolio and rebalance it, leading to increased trading. Yuan (2015) also 
finds that certain front-page news events increase selling orders from individual 
investors. Moreover, Kumar and Lee (2006) find that small investors tend to trade 
in concert. 
The arguments of the study are as follows: First, past aggregate returns attract 
small investors’ attention, as do terms such as bear market and bull market used 
in the financial media. Second, the small investors then use Google to look for 
information on such terminology or the news related to it, causing an unexpected 
change in search volumes. Third, the small investors then form their short-term 
equity market sentiment based on the information searched for, on which they 
then act, which leads to decisions on whether to sell or buy to rebalance their 
current portfolio. Finally, this then causes an irrational liquidity shock to the 
equity market, leading to negative or positive market movements. This effect 
should be stronger for small-sized companies since they tend to carry more noise-
trading risk. The effect should also be stronger after extreme returns of large-sized 
companies, since those returns, and their corresponding terminology, are more 
likely to be reported in the financial media that catches the attention of small 
investors. 
As suggested by Fisher and Statman (2000) and Verma and Soydemir (2006), the 
authors also expected that U.S. small investor sentiment affects future U.S. equity 
market returns. Moreover, as suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2006), the study 
also anticipated that the effect of sentiment is stronger for those stocks that are 
harder to arbitrage, like small-stocks. 
The data used in this essay consist of a measure of the weekly search popularity of 
the Google search terms “bear market” and “bull market” in the United States. To 
analyze the effect of unexpected changes in the SIIS on equity market returns and 
size premium, this essay uses size portfolios of the bottom 30 % and top 30 % 
companies by market equity 36 . The sample consists of a total of 704 weekly 
observations, starting from January 2004 and ending on June 2017. 
                                                        
36 Portfolio returns are downloaded from Kenneth R. French Data Library: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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The study measured the unexpected changes in the SIIS from the AR(1)-process, 
where the residual is considered the unexpected change in SIIS. To test for possible 
interdependence between equity market returns and the unexpected SIIS, the 
study employs a vector autoregressive model. To further analyze the association, a 
pairwise Granger causality test was conducted between the equity market returns 
and the unexpected SIIS. The authors also ran ordinary least square regressions, 
with several control variables as suggested by Da et al. (2015) to capture the effect 
that the unexpected changes in SIIS had on future equity market returns. 
Results from Table 3 suggest that unexpected changes in the SIIS contain more 
information that helps to forecast future portfolios returns than unexpected 
changes in AAII37 do. The UE[SIIS] generally needs a shorter lag structure to 
forecast the future portfolio returns and also has a higher statistical significance. 
The UE[SIIS_Bear] is also the only explanatory variable that helps to forecast the 
future size premium.  
The empirical findings suggest that unexpected change in the SIIS when inferred 
from the search popularity of “bear market” is negatively associated with the next 
week’s stock market returns. A one-standard-deviation unexpected increase in the 
search volumes of “bear market” is associated with a 17 (13) basis points lower 
return for small (large)-sized companies and 15 basis points lower size premium 
for the forthcoming week. 
An unexpected change in the SIIS, when measured as the popularity difference 
between “bull market” and “bear market” (the spread), is positively associated with 
the next week’s stock market returns. A one-standard-deviation unexpected 
increase in the spread is associated with a 13 (12) basis points higher stock market 
returns for small (large)-sized companies and eight basis points higher size 
premium for the forthcoming week. 
As reported earlier, the findings suggest that the effects of unexpected changes in 
the SIIS are stronger for small-sized companies.  As Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
report, stocks that are more difficult to arbitrage, like small-sized companies, are 
more affected by the sentiment and Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) find that small 
stocks are disproportionally held by the small investors.  The effects of unexpected 
changes in the SIIS are stronger when large-sized companies experience highly 
negative returns. Hence, it is possible to argue that overall, the behavior of 
irrational investors affects asset prices. 
                                                        
37 Also AAII-sentiment is measured every week.  
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4.3 Internet search-based investor sentiment and value 
premium 
This essay examines the association between unexpected changes in U.S. small 
investor sentiment and future equity market returns in the U.S.A. The essay 
focuses particularly on the cross-sectional return difference between companies 
sorted by their book-to-market ratio38—the value premium. The essay also infers 
the small investor sentiment from the popularity of the Google search terms “bull 
market” and “bear market” or their spread. The popularity of searches is limited to 
cover only the United States and its finance-related searches. The unexpected 
change in sentiment is proxied as the first-order autoregressive model as in 
Peltomäki et al. (2017). The study hypothesizes that an unexpected change in the 
sentiment represents a shift in noise traders’ sentiment that creates a liquidity 
shock in the market (see, e.g., Campbell et al. 1993). The effect should be stronger 
for those stocks that are more prone to the behavior of irrational investors and are 
also more difficult to value and arbitrage; like potentially financially distressed 
(high book-to-market ratio) stocks. 
The theoretical background of this paper is based on two theories39 of how the 
behavior of small investors can affect asset prices. The first theory is the 
association between small investor sentiment and asset returns. The second theory 
is the association between market attention of small investors, measured by 
Google searches, and asset returns. De Long et al. (1990) present a theory 
suggesting that the investor sentiment of so-called noise traders can affect asset 
prices if more rational investors are unable to balance the asset prices because of 
limits to arbitrage. Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual investors are net 
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, causing the price of such stocks to deviate 
from their more fundamental value. That causes the attention-grabbing stocks to 
face a liquidity shock as described by Campbell et al. (1993). Campbell et al. (1993) 
argue that if irrational investors desire to trade for the stock for exogenous reasons, 
the more rational investors demand a higher expected return to accommodate the 
fluctuation in irrational investors’ demand.  According to Yuan (2015), small 
investors are not just net buyers but also net sellers, and small investors increase 
their attention and trading during market-wide events. Yuan (2015) finds that 
small investors can increase their selling during certain front-page news events.    
We argue that: market-wide events capture small investors’ attention. For 
example, terminology such as the bear market and the bull market can be used in 
financial media, and it captures small investors’ attention. Then small investors 
                                                        
38 Stocks with high (low) book-to-market ratio are considered as a value (growth) stocks.    
39 Discussed also in the previous paper.  
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use Google searches to look for information, causing an unexpected change in the 
search volumes. The small investors rebalance their sentiment and act accordingly 
in the market, causing a liquidity shock to the equity market. To accommodate the 
increased demand of small investors, rational investors demand a higher expected 
return. The effect of investor sentiment should be stronger for stocks that are also 
harder to value and arbitrage, like value stocks, as suggested by Baker and Wurgler 
(2006).    
The data used in this essay consist of the weekly measure of the Google search 
volumes relating to the terms “bear market” and “bull market” in the United States. 
To analyze the effect of unexpected changes to the sentiment on value premium, 
the authors sorted companies into decile portfolios by their book-to-market 
ratios40. The sample consists of 704 weekly observations, from January 2004 to 
June 201741. To test the effect of unexpected changes in the sentiment on the value 
premium, the authors use a predictive regression model with same set of control 
variables as Da et al. (2015): news-based measure of economic policy uncertainty 
(EPU)42, the CBOE volatility index (VIX) and Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) 43  
business conditions index.  As an additional control variable, the authors also use 
a news-based measure of US Equity Market Uncertainty Index (EMU), for textual 
analysis of U.S. equity market uncertainty.   
The study’s findings include that an unexpected increase in optimism (pessimism) 
in the sentiment predicts positive (negative) subsequent value premium. A one-
standard-deviation unexpected increase in pessimism predicts six basis points 
lower value premium for the next week. An unexpected increase in the optimism 
of one standard deviation predicts a nine basis points higher value premium for 
the next week. An unexpected increase in the spread of one standard deviation 
predicts an 11 basis points higher value premium for the next week. 
4.4 Covered option strategies in the Nordic electricity 
market 
This essay examines the risk-adjusted performance of two option strategies on the 
Nordic financial electricity market. Amundsen and Bergman (2006) report that 
since liberalization the Nordic electricity market during the period of 1991 – 2000, 
the competition in the market has increased and profit margins have been 
                                                        
40 Portfolio returns are downloaded from Kenneth R. French Data Library 
41 The base date for the Google search volume time series is January 2004. 
42 Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). 
43 Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti (2009) 
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squeezed 44 . Fridolfsson and Tangerås (2009) find no evidence of systematic 
exploitation of system-level market power in the Nordic electricity market.  
The analyzed option strategies are called covered call and protective put-option 
strategies. The covered call-option strategy consists of a long position on a 
quarterly forward contract and a simultaneous short position on a quarterly call-
option contract, whose underlying asset is the quarterly forward contract itself. 
The protective put-option strategy consists of a long position on a quarterly 
forward contract and a simultaneous long position on a quarterly put-option 
contract, whose underlying asset is also the quarterly forward contract. 
The purpose was to empirically analyze if the given option strategies produce 
positive or negative risk-adjusted returns. The results provide more information 
about the ex-ante pricing of quarterly option contracts that are traded in the 
Nordic financial electricity market. Furthermore, the results enhance the 
knowledge of the potential overconfidence bias among the market participants in 
the Nordic financial electricity market. 
This essay contributes to the literature by extending the studies of Whaley (2002), 
Feldman and Roy (2005), Hill, Balasubramanian, Gregory, and Tierens (2006), 
Kapadia and Szado (2007), and Ungar and Moran (2009) from the equity market 
to the financial electricity market. Moreover, the study complemented previous 
studies45 on the derivatives traded in the financial electricity market that focused 
more on their capabilities for risk-reduction, and less so on the return potential 
and its related overconfidence of market participants. 
The data consist of daily settlement prices for financial forwards (quarterly 
contracts) and their corresponding option contracts in the Nordic financial 
electricity market. For option contracts, the study adopts different levels of 
moneyness. The moneyness levels range from 10 % out-of-the-money to 10 % in-
the-money. The data period is from November 1999 to February 2012, with 
approximately 252 trading days per year. The authors chose quarterly contracts 
for their liquidity and seasonality and calculated the risk-adjusted performance of 
different strategies by way of annualized Sharpe ratios and Jensen’s alphas. The 
study includes a review of how the different moneyness levels and holding periods 
                                                        
44 According to Fingrid (2019), about 70 % of total spot electricity consumption in the 
Nordics is traded through an exchange, the annual value being in billions of euros. Whereas 
the value of financial derivatives market contracts traded is up to five to six times as large. 
Besides electricity buyers and sellers, also investment banks and risk management 
consulting companies operate in the financial derivatives market.    
45 See Shawky, Marathe and Barrett 2003; Fleten, Bråthen and Nissen-Meyer 2010;  
Frestad 2012 
Acta Wasaensia     25 
affect the performance, and what are the possible underlying reasons for the risk-
adjusted-performance. 
The results from the empirical part of the study suggest that the protective put 
strategy outperforms both the naked long forward strategy and covered call 
strategy 46 . However, the absolute performance of both strategies is also 
conditional on the moneyness levels and holding periods used47. The protective put 
strategy seems to generally perform better than the covered call strategy in rising 
and declining market environments48. 
The reported findings suggest that some mispricing exists in the Nordic financial 
electricity market, which might due to that, some of the market participants are 
too overconfident about their private information.  
4.5 Dynamic delta option strategies in Nordic electricity 
markets 
This essay examines the performance of two dynamic delta option strategies on the 
Nordic financial electricity market. The performances of dynamic delta option 
strategies are compared to the benchmark case of the so-called static futures 
strategy. The dynamic delta option strategy is constructed by writing (buying) 
quarterly call (put) option contracts and simultaneously also selling their 
underlying asset, a quarterly futures contract. The static futures portfolio is 
constructed by selling the quarterly futures contract alone 49 . The amount of 
quarterly futures contracts sold in portfolio one (the dynamic delta option 
strategy) is determined so that the risk level of portfolio one is equal to portfolio 
two (the static futures strategy). The risk level is measured with the Greek Delta. 
                                                        
46  Although Sharpe ratio is an adequate performance measurement when returns are 
normally distributed, Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) find that the ranking of hedge fund 
performances (with non-normal return distributions) stays virtually the same regardless 
what performance measurement is used. Also, Pedersen and Rudholm-Alfvin (2003) 
report a high rank correlation between different performance measurements.  
47 We follow the methodology of Lo (2002), equations 9 and 18, to calculate the standard 
errors for Sharpe ratios. We do not correct for autocorrelation since the first-order 
autocorrelation varies only between 0.04 and 0.07. We use bootstrapped standard errors 
to test statistical significance of Jensen’s alphas. 
48 As Israelsen (2005) notes in his study, using the Sharpe ratio as a performance rank for 
equity funds with a negative excess returns can be cumbersome. By contrast, the author 
suggests an alternative performance ranking measurement; modified Sharpe ratio. The 
modified Sharpe ratio uses exponent in the denominator as an additional variable to 
control for the negative excess returns. Although, utilizing the modified Sharpe ratio does 
not alter the conclusions when one strategy has a positive and other strategy has negative 
Sharpe ratios.    
49 The set up reflects the dilemma that electricity sellers face.  
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Due to time-variation in the Greek Deltas of option contracts, portfolio one trades 
the futures contracts daily to maintain a fixed and comparable risk level50. 
The purpose is to empirically test whether price differences exist between the 
quarterly option and futures contracts. The existence of a price difference could 
suggest that some seasonality exists in the potential overconfidence of market 
participants. The price difference is defined as the inequality in euro terms 
between the dynamically managed delta option strategy and the corresponding 
static futures strategy. In theory, the monetary outcome of both strategies should 
be equal, as the risk levels related to future electricity prices are equal. If some 
price difference exists, it could indicate that the option contracts in question might 
be over- or underpriced. 
The sample period is from 4/21/2005 to 12/9/2011. The underlying quarterly 
contracts cover the delivery period starting from the first quarter of 2006 and 
lasting to the first quarter of 2012, consisting of 25 quarters in total. The sample 
period contains quarters with different market states of electricity prices, both 
increasing and decreasing. Using three different levels of moneyness (5 % out-of-
the-money, at-the-money, and 5 % in-the-money) produces close to 9000 daily 
observations for dynamic delta option strategies that use either call or put options. 
I test the existence of price difference first with univariate analysis by conducting 
a paired difference test between the static futures strategy and dynamic delta 
option strategies. In addition to the previously mentioned tests, I also employ 
multivariate analysis. 
There is some seasonality in the ex-ante pricing of call and put options traded in 
the Nordic financial electricity market. This possibly reflects seasonally varying 
overconfidence bias among the market participants. For the dynamic delta option 
strategy that uses call options, the study finds that it performs better (worse) than 
static futures strategy during winter (summer) quarters. This suggests that call 
options are ex-ante over (under)-priced for the winter (summer) quarters. One 
possible explanation for the ex-ante overpricing is that due to highly volatile 
electricity prices during the winter quarters, the market participants might prefer 
buying call options in the hope of obtaining high returns; thus the market 
participants are ex-ante overpaying for those call options. This then further 
suggests that during the winter quarters, the market participants might be 
overconfident about their private information and want to capitalize it during 
highly volatile market environment. This then leads call options to be ex-ante 
overpriced during the winter quarters.  
                                                        
50 I take into account the trading costs, but not the bid-ask spreads. This may have an 
effect on the implementation of the suggested strategy.   
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For the dynamic delta option strategy that uses put options, the study finds that it 
performs worse than the static futures strategy during the winter quarters. This 
suggests that put-option contracts are also ex-ante overpriced during the winter 
quarters. Hence, there is evidence of some seasonality in ex-ante put-option 
pricing in the Nordic financial electricity market during the winter quarters. The 
same argument as made for call options could also hold here. Due to highly volatile 
electricity prices during the winter quarters, the market participants overconfident 
about their private information and end up overpaying ex-ante. 
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Appendix: Internet Search-Based Investor Sentiment and 
Value Premium 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 ADS EPU EMU VIX 
Mean -0.32 123.78 44.82 18.72 
Median -0.18 104.76 29.55 15.86 
Std.Dev 0.78 71.61 55.72 9.15 
Maximum 0.93 472.47 823.76 79.13 
Minimum -4.08 19.34 7.46 9.75 
Skewness -2.65 1.24 5.98 2.70 
Kurtosis 10.96 4.60 65.01 12.93 
Observations 704 704 704 704 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the 
study. ADS is the Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) index. EPU is the Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2013) index. EMU is also developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2013). VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange daily market volatility index. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 ADS EPU EMU VIX 
ADS 1.00    
     
EPU -0.25 1.00   
 (-6.98)    
     
EMU -0.28 0.44 1.00  
 (-7.84) (12.90)   
     
VIX -0.65 0.44 0.39 1.00 
 (-22.41) (13.10) (11.27)  
This table shows correlation coefficient estimates for the control variables used in 
the study. ADS is the Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) index. EPU is the Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2013) index. EMU is also developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2013). VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange daily market volatility index. 
The data set consists of 704 weekly observations, from January 2004 to June 2017. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
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CHANGES IN INVESTORS’ MARKET ATTENTION AND NEAR-
TERM STOCK MARKET RETURNS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We use Google Search volume to track changes investors’ positive and negative market 
attention. Our results support the hypothesis that this information reflects investors’ 
optimistic and pessimistic anticipation and can be used to predict near-term future re-
turns. We find that changes in negative search term volume of “market crash” and “bear 
market” and changes in positive search term volume “market rally” explain near-term 
stock returns. Changes in investors’ attention are partly related to past stock market re-
turns implying that investors are prone to pay attention to possible price reversals. 
These measures of market attention are potential gauges of investor sentiment. 
 
JEL classification: G12, G14, G17   
 
 
Keywords: Investor sentiment; Stock market; Returns; Google search volume; market 
attention 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investors commonly apply two types of security analysis as a base of their investment 
decisions. The first type is a fundamental analysis, which has the goal of identifying 
under- and overpriced securities based on their fundamental information. The second 
one is a technical analysis, which aims to find predictability in stock prices using price 
and volume information. Technical analysis therefore builds its rationale on an observa-
tion that systematic human behavior can be observed in stock and volume patterns. 
However, less is recognized that the patterns of investor behavior may be observed even 
before the patterns are transmitted to the stock market. That is, when investors start di-
recting their attention to the stock market. In this study, we consider public information 
retrieved by individuals as an essential element in stock price formation, which should 
be finally reflected in the stock prices. 
Our purpose is to consider the Google Search Volume Index of negative 
and positive market-related search terms as measures of investors’ market attention to 
gauge the stock market sentiment. We examine whether there is a relation between 
changes in investors’ market attention and near-term returns and trading volumes of the 
S&P 500 index. The objective of this study is to examine predictability in stock prices 
by analyzing investors’ information retrieval as an origin of stock price formation. We 
hypothesize that “bear market” and “market crash” (“bull market” and “market rally”) 
searches relate to investor attention at bear market (bull market) and characterize the 
general stock market sentiment. 
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Our study contributes to studies on investor sentiment such as Solt and 
Statman [1988], Otoo [1999], and Fisher and Statman [2000], by employing the Google 
Search Volume Index as a potential tool to gauge investor sentiment. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have used the Google Search Volume Index as a meas-
urement of investors’ overall market attention and stock market predictor, even though 
information from Google is used to analyze individual stocks. Data provided by Google 
News service were previously used by Ozik and Sadka [2010] and the Google Search 
Volume Index is used to measure investors’ attention to different stocks by Da et al. 
[2011].1 Our study differs from that of Da et al. [2011] who measure investor attention 
to different stocks and is therefore more related to stocks’ visibility like, for example, 
Gervais et al. [2001].2 
Although the issue whether Google Search Volume can track investors’ 
positive and negative market attention in order to gauge the stock market sentiment has 
not been examined previously, forecasting with Google search volume has received 
some recent attention in news media. For example, Mackintosh [2012] writes in the 
Financial Times that researchers at the Bank of Italy used information from Google 
search volumes to calculate Italy´s euro break-up premium. Furthermore, Ito and Oden-
heimer [2012] write in Bloomberg Businessweek that Israel´s central bank applies 
Google search volume as an economic indicator. This rising interest of practitioners 
covered in the media provides further motivation for our study. 
We apply Ordinary Least Squares regression to examine the effects that 
the Google Search Volume Index possibly has on the near-term S&P 500 returns. We 
use the Granger Causality tests to analyze causal relations between the Google Search 
Volume Index and the returns and volumes of the S&P 500 index. We find that changes 
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in the Google Search Volume Index for Google search terms “market crash,” “bear 
market” and “market rally” contain some information that helps in forecasting  near-
term S&P 500 returns. In contrast, we do not find that changes in the Google Search 
Volume Index for the Google search term “bull market” contains information that helps 
in forecasting near-term S&P 500 returns. We also find that past S&P 500 returns pre-
dict changes for the search terms “market crash” and “market rally”. This implies bi-
directional causality between the measures of investor’s market attention and stock 
market returns. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
literature review related to studies on investor sentiment and presents our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. The empirical results are discussed in 
Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1. Literature review on investor sentiment 
 
Two main issues in academic literature on investor sentiment are often addressed. First, 
can investor sentiment forecast future market returns and second, can the investor sen-
timent be explained by market returns? In academic literature investor sentiment is 
broadly studied through time and the results are mixed. However, most studies suggest 
that investor sentiment contains some information that helps forecasting future stock 
market returns and that the investor sentiment also plays a role in asset pricing. In the 
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whether past stock market returns are related to the investor sentiment, the literature is 
more consistent that past stock market returns are related to investor sentiment.  
In the literature, investor sentiment is measured in various ways. One sub-
class of investor sentiment is small investor sentiment, for example, measured from 
AAIS’s (American Association of Individual Investors) surveys3, consumer confidence 
surveys4 or other different proxies for small investor sentiment5. Results from Fisher 
and Statman [2000], Fisher and Statman [2003], Charoenrook [2005], Kumar and Lee 
[2006], Lemmon and Portniaguina [2006], Verma and Soydemir [2006], Schmeling 
[2007], Schmeling [2009], Verma and Soydemir [2009], Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer 
[2011] and Antoniou et al. [2011] suggest that small investor sentiment helps predict 
future stock market returns. By contrast, Otoo [1999], Jansen and Nahuis [2003], Brown 
and Cliff [2004] and Wang et al. [2006] find that the small investor sentiment helps on-
ly a little or not at all in predicting future stock market returns. Whether past or contem-
poraneous stock market returns have a relationship with small investor sentiment, the 
literature is more consistent. De Bondt [1993], Otoo [1999], Fisher and Statman [2000], 
Fisher and Statman [2003], Jansen and Nahuis [2003], Brown and Cliff [2004], Wang et 
al. [2006] and Verma and Verma [2008] document that small investor sentiment is re-
lated to past stock market returns.  
Another investor sentiment subclass used in academic literature is the in-
vestor sentiment that represents the sentiment of more sophisticated investors (known as 
institutional investor sentiment), like the sentiment of newsletter writers measured by 
Investors Intelligence surveys6, the sentiment of Wall Street strategists7, futures market 
positions by large investors8 or other proxies for institutional investor sentiment9. Re-
sults from Lee et al. [2002], Brown and Cliff [2005], Verma and Soydemir [2006] and 
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Schmeling [2007] suggest that the institutional investor sentiment helps to predict future 
stock market returns. By contrast, Solt and Statman [1988], Clarke and Statman [1998] 
and Brown and Cliff [2004] find that the institutional investor sentiment helps only a 
little or not at all in predicting future stock market returns. Wang [2001] and Wang 
[2003] report that institutional investor sentiment also helps to forecast future changes 
in futures markets and Kurov [2008] links institutional investor sentiment to trading 
activity of index futures traders. By contrast, Sanders et al. [2003] argue that institution-
al investor sentiment has only very marginal ability to forecast price changes in the fu-
tures market. In addition, Solt and Statman [1988], Clarke and Statman [1998], Fisher 
and Statman [2000], Sanders et al. [2003], Brown and Cliff [2004] and Verma and 
Verma [2008] document that institutional investor sentiment follows past and contem-
poraneous stock market and futures market returns. 
One alternative method to measure investor sentiment is to derive it from 
market data. These methods, for example, are VIX10, put-call ratio11, discount of closed 
end funds12 and mutual fund data13. Whaley [2000] documents a negative relationship 
between the VIX and stock market returns. The results from Simon and Wiggins III 
[2001] and Giot [2005] suggest that high and low levels of VIX have some ability to 
forecast future stock market and futures market returns. Han [2008] links investor sen-
timent to index volatility smile. Furthermore, Simon and Wiggins III [2001] find that 
the put-call ratio has some forecasting ability over subsequent futures market returns. 
By contrast, Wang et al. [2006] claim that the put-call ratio has no forecasting ability 
but is related to past stock market returns.  
Lee et al. [1991] find a relationship between the discount of closed end 
funds and contemporaneous stock market returns. In addition, Swaminathan [1996] and 
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Neal and Wheatley [1998] find that the discount of closed end funds has some explana-
tory power for future stock market returns for small-cap stocks. By contrast, Chen et al. 
[1993], Elton et al. [1998], and Brown and Cliff [2005] criticize and challenge the find-
ings of Lee et al. [1991]. 
Results from Neal and Wheatley [1998], Brown and Cliff [2005], Frazzini 
and Lamont [2008], Beaumont et al. [2008] and Feldman [2010] suggest that mutual 
fund data contain some information that helps forecast future stock market returns. In 
addition, Brown et al. [2003] and Ben-Rephael et al. [2012] find a relationship between 
mutual fund flows and contemporaneous stock market returns. In contrast, Edelen et al. 
[2010] document a relationship between the asset allocation of small investors and fu-
ture stock market returns.       
In recent years in academic literature, a new investor sentiment measure-
ment has emerged, the composite investor sentiment, which is measured using principal 
component analysis14. Baker and Wurgler [2006], Baker and Wurgler [2007], Baker et 
al. [2008], Beer and Zouaoui [2011], Stambaugh et al. [2012] and Baker et al. [2012] 
find that the composite investor sentiment helps forecast future stock market returns. Yu 
and Yuan [2011] find that the composite investor sentiment is related to a market´s 
mean-variance tradeoff. Baker and Wurgler [2012] document that the composite inves-
tor sentiment does not only help predict future stock market returns, but also helps pre-
dict bond returns. In addition, results from Ho and Hung [2008] and Beer et al. [2012] 
suggest that the composite investor sentiment plays a role in asset pricing. Furthermore, 
Chau et al. [2011] and Liao et al. [2011] link the composite investor sentiment to trad-
ing activity. Results from Kurov [2010] suggest that changes in composite investor sen-
timent are related to monetary policy decisions. 
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Other investor sentiment proxies reported in academic literature are, for 
example, the share of equity issues in total new equity and debt issues (Baker and 
Wurgler [2000], NYSE seat prices Keim and Madhavan [2000], market liquidity Baker 
and Stein [2004], grey market prices Cornelli et al. [2006] ). However, these studies are 
not discussed here any further.  
Investor sentiment measures can also be based on media information. Tet-
lock [2007] finds that high media pessimism in :DOO6WUHHW-RXUQDOcolumns forecasts 
negative future returns. However, Tetlock [2007] notes media pessimism is partly driv-
en by past negative market returns. 
As Google searches can be done by everyone and not just professionals, 
we conclude that our study and measure of investor attention considered as sentiment 
indicators would be most closely related to the studies by De Bondt [1993], Fisher and 
Statman [2000], Brown and Cliff [2004], Kumar and Lee [2006] Wang et al. [2006], 
and Verma and Soydemir [2009]. Our study is less related to investigating institutional 
investor sentiment (see, e.g., Schmeling, [2007] ). 
Our study, especially negative search terms we use, would also be closely 
related to the study by Tetlock [2007] on media pessimism but less related to sentiment 
measures related to concrete actions such as mutual fund flows (see, e.g., Beaumont et 
al. [2008]; Ben-Rephael et al. [2012] ). On the other hand, our approach has technical 
similarities to bull and bear division of bull and bears as in Investors Intelligence sur-
veys (see Fisher and Statman [2000] ) since we use bullish and bearish search terms. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
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We use four different Google web search terms to measure market attention and to track 
investor sentiment: “market crash”, “bear market”, “bull market”, and “market rally”. 
Many studies find the relationship between investor sentiment and future stock market 
returns is statistically significant (see, e.g., Fisher and Statman [2000]; Fisher and Stat-
man [2003]; Brown and Cliff [2005] ). We focus on changes in investors’ market atten-
tion and near-term stock market returns, assuming that the measured changes in investor 
attention are a timely proxy for changes in investor sentiment. Thus, the effect of meas-
ured changes in investors’ sentiment on stock market returns should be imminent. 
The Google Search Volume Index measures how many searches have 
been done for the specific search terms entered on Google web search, relative to the 
total number of searches done for the specific search term on Google over time. Da et 
al. [2011] find Google search frequencies about stocks to be correlated with existing 
proxies of investor attention. We use negative and positive market-related search terms 
as measures of investors’ positive and negative stock market attention to gauge inves-
tors’ pessimism and optimism. As such, our approach to measure investor sentiment is 
similar to that of Investor Intelligence’s surveys (see Brown and Cliff [2004] ) but, in-
stead of carrying out of a survey, we focus on investors’ market attention. Following 
this analogy, when investors pay more attention to a certain market condition or state, 
for example, fear for the stock market crash, the Google Search Volume Index increas-
es, reflecting pessimism and negative market sentiment and vice versa.  
Our approach is similar to that of Joseph et al. [2011] who present evi-
dence that higher online search intensity for a stock ticker forecasts higher future ab-
normal stock returns. However, the study does not similarly relate different search 
words to investor sentiment as we do. Following Tetlock [2007] who finds that media 
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pessimism is related to future downward pressure on stock market prices, our hypothe-
ses for the relationship of optimistic/pessimistic search and future stock returns are as 
follows: 
 
H1a: Changes in search volume of “market crash” have a negative relationship to near-
term stock returns. 
H1b: Changes in search volume of “market rally” have a positive relationship to near-
term stock returns. 
H1c: Changes in search volume of “bear market” have a negative relationship to near-
term stock returns. 
H1d: Changes in search volume of “bull market” have a positive relationship to near-
term stock returns. 
 
If our measures of investors’ market attention gauge investor sentiment, 
especially small investor sentiment, investors’ market attention should be predictable 
because of the following evidence. De Bondt [1993], Fisher and Statman [2000], and 
Brown and Cliff [2004] present evidence that past stock market returns explain small 
investor sentiment. Wang et al. [2006] find that past returns and volatilities of the S&P 
100 index Granger-cause small investor sentiment, but not vice versa. Tetlock [2007] 
notes that media pessimism is partly driven by past negative market returns. Conse-
quently, we hypothesize the following relationships between stock returns and investor 
future market attention: 
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H2a: Stock returns have a negative relationship to near-term changes in search volume 
of “market crash.” 
H2b: Stock returns have a positive relationship to near-term changes in search volume 
of “market rally.” 
H2c: Stock returns have a negative relationship to near-term changes in search volume 
of “bear market.” 
H2d: Stock returns have a positive relationship to near-term changes in search volume 
of “bull market.” 
 
Some other aspects of investor behavior may also be relevant when forming expecta-
tions for our results. The expectations can be considered from the perspective of the 
‘gambler’s fallacy’ versus the ‘hot hands’ effect. As explained by Rabin and Vayanos 
[2010], the former means that investors predict random sequences to exhibit excessive 
reversals; the latter means that investors predict random sequences to exhibit excessive 
persistence. If investors are prone to experience the gambler’s fallacy, they may perform 
negative (positive) searches after positive (negative) market returns. If they are prone to 
experience the hot hands fallacy, they may perform positive (negative) searches after 
positive (negative) returns and vice versa. Our hypotheses 2a-2d concur with the hot 
hands effect. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
Google Search Volume Index data used in this study are in relative mode. The Google 
Search Volume Index measures how many searches have been done for a specific 
search term on a Google web search on that specific week, relative to the total number 
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of searches done for the same specific search term on Google web search over time. In 
the relative mode, the data are scaled by Google to the average traffic for the specific 
search term during the time period selected. When the Google Search Volume Index 
exceeds one, number of times the specific search term has been entered on a Google 
web search that week is above the historical average. Conversely, when the Google 
Search Volume Index is less than one, the number of times the specific search term has 
been entered on a Google web search that week is below the historical average. This 
study uses the period 1 January 2004 to 10 February 2011.  
This study uses four different Google search terms to test possible rela-
tionships between of the Google Search Volume Index and logarithmic future near-term 
S&P 500 total return index returns. The four different Google search terms used in this 
study are: “bear market”, “bull market”, “market crash” and “market rally”. Of these 
search terms, “bear market” and “market crash” represent negative market attention, and 
the search terms “bull market” and “market rally” represent positive market attention. 
Data for Google Search Volume Index are downloaded from Google15. Data for S&P 
500 total return index returns are from Datastream. Data for AAII’s (American Associa-
tion of Individual Investors) individual investor sentiment (percentage of bullish inves-
tor minus percentage of bearish investors) is downloaded from AAII’s homepage16. 
This study uses weekly first differences to calculate the changes in the Google Search 
Volume Index and AAII’s individual investor sentiment. The Google Search Volume 
Index is updated every Sunday and AAII’s individual investor sentiment is updated eve-
ry Thursday. Returns for the S&P 500 total return index are calculated from Mondays’ 
opening values. The logarithmic change of the volume of S&P 500 total return index is 
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calculated from the week’s daily average volume. Table 1 reports the descriptive statis-
tics of the data.   
 
(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
To test possible relationship between changes in the Google Search Vol-
ume Index and future S&P 500 returns, we use following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model: 
 
 ሺοͷͲͲ୲ሻ ൌ Ⱦ଴ ൅Ⱦଵሺο୲ିଵሻ ൅Ⱦଶሺο୲ିଵሻ ൅୲  (1) 
 
where ǻSP500t  defines the weekly logarithmic change for Monday opening of the S&P 
500 index; ǻIndext-1 defines the weekly first difference for the Google Search Volume 
Index with a lag of one week; and ǻVolumet-1 defines the weekly logarithmic change 
for week’s average daily volume of S&P 500 total return index with lag of one week.  
In addition, to the regression model presented above, this study uses vec-
tor auto-regression analysis in order to analyze possible exogeneity of the Google 
Search Volume Index as a possible forecaster of future near-term S&P 500 returns. To 
analyze possible exogeneity of the Google Search Volume Index, this study uses fol-
lowing vector auto-regression (VAR) models with lags up to four weeks: 
 
 ሺοͷͲͲ୲ሻ ൌ  Ⱦ଴ ൅σ Ⱦୱସୱୀଵ ሺοͷͲͲ୲ିୱሻ ൅ σ Ⱦ୧ସ୧ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୧ሻ 
 ൅σ Ⱦ୴ସ୴ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୴ሻ ൅୲  (2) 
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 ሺο୲ሻ ൌ  Ⱦ଴ ൅σ Ⱦୱସୱୀଵ ሺοͷͲͲ୲ିୱሻ ൅ σ Ⱦ୧ସ୧ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୧ሻ 
 ൅σ Ⱦ୴ସ୴ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୴ሻ ൅୲  (3) 
 
where ǻSP500t-s defines the weekly logarithmic change for Monday openings of the 
S&P 500 index with different weekly lags; ǻIndext-i defines the weekly first difference 
for the Google Search Volume Index with different weekly lags; ǻVolumet-v defines the 
weekly logarithmic change for a week’s average daily volume of S&P 500 total return 
index with different weekly lags. 
This study also uses the Granger causality test to further analyze the pos-
sible exogeneity of the Google Search Volume Index as a possible forecaster of future 
S&P 500 returns. The Granger causality test analyzes if past values of the Google 
Search Volume Index contain some information that helps forecast future S&P 500 re-
turns. 
Finally, this study carries out a series of robustness tests to further evalu-
ate if the Google Search Volume Index helps forecast future S&P 500 returns. The ro-
bustness tests are carried out using three different estimation periods and adding chang-
es of all Google search terms used in this study as explanatory variables into a single 
multiple OLS model. In addition, changes for the volume of the S&P 500 index and 
AAII’s individual investor sentiment are added as control variables. The three different 
estimation periods used are 1 January 2004 to 10 February 2011, from 1 January 2004 
to 30 December 2007 and from 1 March 2008 10 February 2011. The three different 
estimation periods were chosen so that they represent different kinds of stock market 
environment. For the Google search term “market rally” there are not enough searches 
during the estimation period 1 January 2004 to 30 December 2007. For this reason, the 
52 Acta Wasaensia
15 
 
coefficient for Google search term “market rally” cannot be estimated. The estimated 
multiple OLS model is:  
 
ሺοͷͲͲ୲ሻ ൌ  Ⱦ଴ ൅ σ Ⱦ୧ସ୧ୀଵ ሺο୲ିଵǡ୧ሻ ൅ Ⱦହሾοሺ െ ୲ିଵሻሿ 
 ൅Ⱦ଺ሺο୲ିଵሻ ൅୲ (4) 
 
where ǻSP500t defines the logarithmic change for Monday openings of the S&P 500 
index; ǻIndext-1,i defines the weekly first difference for different Google Search Volume 
Indices with a lag of one week; ǻ[Bull – Beart-1] defines the weekly first difference for 
AAII’s individual investor sentiment with a lag of one week; ǻVolumet-1 defines the 
weekly logarithmic change for a week’s average daily volume of S&P 500 with a lag of 
one week. The analysis of variance inflation factors (VIF) shows that multicollinearity 
is not present in the regression equations.  
      
4. Empirical results 
 
Table 2 reports regression results from equation (1) for each search term analyzed. The 
results are for hypotheses 1a-1d. The results support hypotheses 1a-1c, indicating that 
changes in the Google Search Volume Index for the search terms “market crash”, “mar-
ket rally” and “bear market” have a statistically significant relationship with future near-
term returns of the S&P 500 index. Estimated coefficients for the Google search terms 
“market crash” and “bear market” are negative whereas the estimated coefficient for the 
search term “market rally” is positive. However, the search term “bull market” does not 
have a statistically significant relationship with future near-term returns of the S&P 500 
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index. Furthermore, the control variable, change of week’s average daily volume of the 
S&P 500 index, does not have a statistically significant relationship with the future 
near-term returns of the S&P 500 index in any of the four panels.  
The adjusted R2 values reported in Table 2 range from zero to 5.5%; the 
Google search terms “market rally” and “market crash” have the largest adjusted R2 of 
5.5 %. The Google search term “bear market” has an adjusted R2 of 3.4 % and the 
Google search term “bull market” has an adjusted R2 of zero. The results in Table 2 are 
consistent with results from earlier studies (see, e.g., Fisher and Statman [2000]; Lem-
mon and Portniaguina [2006]; Kumar and Lee [2006]; Schmeling [2009] ), which report 
a relationship between investor sentiment and future stock market returns.  
 
 
(INSERT TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
 
Table 3 gives the vector auto-regression model estimates from equations 
(2) and (3) for each Google search term. The analysis results presented in Table 3 are 
for testing all the study’s hypotheses. The results in Table 3 give more support to the 
findings in Table 2; there is a relationship between future near-term returns of the S&P 
500 index and past first differences of the Google Search Volume Index for the search 
terms “market crash”, “market rally” and “bear market”. These findings further support 
hypotheses 1a-1c and are consistent with the Tetlock’s [2007] evidence for media pes-
simism and stock returns. 
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The results in Table 3 also suggest that future first differences of Google 
Search Volume Index for search terms “market crash” and “market rally” are affected 
by past near-term returns of the S&P 500 index. These findings are consistent with re-
sults from earlier studies (see, e.g., De Bondt [1993]; Fisher and Statman [2000]; Brown 
and Cliff [2004]; Wang et al. [2006] ), which report a relationship between past stock 
market returns and investor sentiment.  
However, estimated coefficients for how past near-term returns of the 
S&P 500 index affect the Google Search Volume Index for search terms “market crash” 
and “market rally” are the reverse of those stated in hypotheses 2a and 2b, and also the 
results of Brown and Cliff [2004]. The results suggest that our measure of investor at-
tention conveys some other information that predicts stock market returns, but the in-
formation does not fully reflect investor sentiment. Possibly these results may be related 
to the gambler’s fallacy; investors find betting against the opposite direction of the re-
cent market returns compelling and look information about the opposite direction. For 
example, after a string of negative market returns, investors want to bet that the market 
will rally and use positive search terms such as “market crash”. Indeed, Rao and Diego 
[2009] present evidence that the gambler’s fallacy rather than the hot hand fallacy exists 
during shorter intervals. Thus, this fallacy may explain our results because we use only 
lags of weekly S&P 500 returns, which is a relatively short time period. 
For the Google search term “market crash”, different lags of ǻINDEX 
have a negative estimated relationship with ǻSP500, which supports hypothesis 1a. For 
different lags of the ǻINDEX, the t-statistics range from -5.413 to -2.601; the ǻINDEX 
with a lag of one week has the largest estimated negative coefficient and t-statistic. In 
addition, different lags of the ǻSP500 have a positive relationship with the ǻINDEX, 
 Acta Wasaensia 55 
18 
 
which is the reverse relationship to that stated in hypothesis 2a, thus does not support 
hypothesis 2a. For different lags of the ǻSP500, the t-statistics range from 0.494 to 
2.976; the ǻSP500 with a lag of one week has the largest estimated positive coefficient 
and t-statistic. 
For the Google search term “market rally”, different lags of the ǻINDEX 
have a positive relationship with ǻSP500, which supports hypothesis 1b. For different 
lags of ǻINDEX, the t-statistics range from 0.505 to 5.749; the ǻINDEX with a lag of 
one week has the largest positive coefficient and t-statistic. Different lags of the ǻSP500 
have generally a negative relationship with the ǻINDEX, which is reverse of that stated 
in hypothesis 2b and thus does not support hypothesis 2b. For different lags of the 
ǻSP500, the t-statistics range from -3.396 to 1.538; the ǻSP500 with a lag of two weeks 
has the largest negative coefficient and t-statistic. 
For the Google search term “bear market”, different lags of the ǻINDEX 
generally have a negative relationship with ǻSP500, which supports hypothesis 1c. For 
different lags of the ǻINDEX, the t-statastics range from -4.350 to 0.128; the ǻINDEX 
with a lag of one week has the largest negative coefficient and t-statistic. Different lags 
of ǻSP500 have a positive relationship with the ǻINDEX, which is the reverse of that 
stated in hypothesis 2c. However, the t-statistics for these coefficients are relatively 
small. 
For the Google search term “bull market”, different lags of the ǻINDEX 
have a negative relationship with ǻSP500. However, the t-statistics for these coeffi-
cients are relatively small. Different lags of ǻSP500 generally have a positive relation-
ship with the ǻINDEX in line with the results for the search term “market rally”. Never-
theless, the t-statistics for these coefficients are also relatively small.  
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(INSERT TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
Table 4 reports the Granger causality results. The table is divided into four 
different panels, corresponding to the four different Google search terms used to con-
struct the Google Search Volume Index. The results suggest that past first differences of 
the Google Search Volume Index for the Google search terms “market crash”, “market 
rally” and “bear market” contain some information that helps forecast future near-term 
returns of the S&P 500 total return index. These findings are statistically significant and 
hence support hypotheses 1a-1c. These findings are also consistent with the findings of 
earlier studies (see, e.g., Fisher and Statman [2000]; Lemmon and Portniaguina [2006]; 
Kumar and Lee [2006]; Schmeling [2009] ), which report a relationship between inves-
tor sentiment and future stock market returns. Conversely, no statistically significant 
results support hypothesis 1d. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that past near-term returns of the S&P 500 
index contain some information that helps forecast future first differences in the Google 
Search Volume Index for the Google search terms “market crash” and “market rally”. 
These findings are statistically significant and hence support hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
These findings are also consistent with findings of earlier studies (see, e.g., De Bondt 
[1993]; Fisher and Statman [2000]; Brown and Cliff [2004]; Wang et al. [2006] ), which 
report a relationship between past stock market returns and investor sentiment. Con-
versely, for the Google search terms “bear market” and “bull market”, the results in 
Table 4 are not statistically significant and hence do not support hypotheses 2c and 2d. 
In addition, the results in Table 4 suggest that past near-term changes of the S&P 500 
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index volume do not contain information that helps forecast future first differences of 
the Google Search Volume Index for all the Google search terms used in this study. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 4 HERE) 
 
Table 5 reports the robustness test results. The results in panels A, B and 
C, Table 5, suggest that first differences of the Google Search Volume Index for the 
Google search terms “market crash” and “market rally” are the only two that have statis-
tically significant coefficients for forecasting future near-term returns of S&P 500 in-
dex; “market crash” has a negative coefficient and “market rally” has a positive coeffi-
cient. These findings further support hypotheses 1a and 1b, even with different estima-
tion periods. These findings are consistent with findings from earlier studies (see, e.g., 
Fisher and Statman [2000]; Lemmon and Portniaguina [2006]; Kumar and Lee [2006]; 
Schmeling [2009] ). The results in Table 5 for the Google search terms “bear market” 
and “bull market” do not support hypotheses 1c and 1d.   
However, comparing the results among the three panels, it can be seen that 
the adjusted R-square has the highest value in panel C. This finding could indicate that 
the ability of the Google Search Volume Index to forecast future near-term returns of 
the S&P 500 index has improved in recent years. In addition, results from Table 5 sug-
gest that the first differences of the more traditional investor sentiment measure, AAIS’s 
individual investor sentiment (measured as percentage of bullish investor minus per-
centage of bearish investors), do not have a statistically significant coefficient in any of 
the estimation periods.  
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that changes in investors’ 
market attention constructed using the Google Search Volume Index for the Google 
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search terms ”market crash” and ”market rally” contain some information that helps 
forecast future near-term stock market returns. Specifically, higher negative search term 
volumes are associated with lower future returns. As such, it may be considered that our 
results agree with the evidence of Tetlock [2007] for a negative relationship between 
media pessimism and future stock returns and a positive relation between individual 
stock search volumes and subsequent stock returns. The findings about the forecasting 
ability of the Google Search Volume Index for the Google search term “bear market” 
are mixed and not homogeneous. The search term “bull market” is not a good predictor 
of future stock market returns. 
In line with De Bondt [1993], Otoo [1999], Fisher and Statman [2000], 
Jansen and Nahuis [2003], and Brown and Cliff [2004], whose results suggest that past 
returns have an effect on investor sentiment, we find that past returns explain our inves-
tors’ market attention (changes in the Google Search Volume Index for the Google 
search terms “market crash,” and “market rally”) suggesting that ‘attention’ has similar 
characteristics to other measures of sentiment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Measuring investor sentiment has been an interest of academic research (e.g., Solt and 
Statman [1988]; De Bondt [1993]; Lee et al. [1991] ). In this study, we use Google 
Search volume to measure investors’ market attention as sentiment information that can 
help to predict near-term stock market returns. Overall, we find that changes in the 
Google Search volume of some search words can predict future near-term stock market 
returns. Specifically, the search terms are “market crash”, “market rally” and “bear 
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market”. As Google searches are related to attention and we did not find predictability 
using the term “bull market,” the results may be more related to negative attention bias 
(see, e.g., Smith et al. [2006] ); the attention paid to negative information may just more 
effectively transmit into action. However, since a positive search term “market rally” 
had a positive effect, the evidence for negative attention is not conclusive. Our evidence 
on pessimistic search terms and future stock return is consistent with the evidence in 
Tetlock [2007] about media pessimism and future stock returns. 
The relationship between the examined search terms and past near-term 
stock returns was different from that of the future stock returns. We find a positive rela-
tionship between the negative search term “market crash” and past stock returns. The 
relationship between the positive search term “market rally” and past stock returns is 
negative. An explanation for these results is that, because of the gambler’s fallacy, in-
vestors turn negative (positive) after good (poor) returns and search information accord-
ingly. 
Investors’ market attention is also affected by previous market returns, 
which suggests that our measure of investor attention is comparable to documented sen-
timent indicators (see Brown and Cliff [2004] ). Information that tracks investor atten-
tion on the internet should be an important avenue for future academic research and in 
the industry to analyze stock markets. 
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Note
 
1 Ozik and Sadka [2010] examine the effect of media coverage of hedge funds inferred 
from Google News on their performance. 
2 Zhang and Skiena [2010] use quantitative media data from blogs and newspapers to 
build profitable sentiment-based stock trading strategy. They find that portfolio that, on 
daily basis, goes long on positive sentiment stocks and goes short on negative sentiment 
stocks yields smooth positive daily returns. In addition, Klein et al. [2011] use automat-
ic extraction of investor sentiment from blog texts to form a daily long-short portfolio 
that outperforms a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Both the portfolios of Zhang and 
Skiena [2010] and Klein et al. [2011] succeeded exceptionally well in 2008. 
3 De Bondt [1993]; Fisher and Statman [ 2000]; Brown and Cliff [2004]; Wang et al. 
[2006]; Verma and Soydemir [2006]; Kurov [2008]; Verma and Verma [2008]; Verma 
and Soydemir [2009]. 
4 Otoo [1999]; Fisher and Statman [2003]; Jansen and Nahuis [2003]; Charoenrook 
[2005]; Lemmon and Portniaguina [2006]; Schmeling [2009]; Zouaoui et al. [2011]; 
Antoniou et al. [2011]. 
5 Kumar and Lee [2006]; Schmeling [2007]. 
6 Solt and Statman [1988]; Clarke and Statman [1998]; Fisher and Statman [2000]; 
Brown and Cliff [2004]; Kurov [2008]; Verma and Verma [2008]. 
7 Fisher and Statman [2000]. 
8 Wang [2001]; Wang [2003]. 
9 Sanders et al. [2003]. 
10 Whaley [2000]; Simon and Wiggins III [2001]; Giot [2005]. 
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11 Simon and Wiggins III [2001]; Wang et al. [2006]. 
12 Lee et al. [1991]; Chen et al. [1993]; Swaminathan [1996]; Neal and Wheatley 
[1998]; Elton et al. [1998]; Brown and Cliff [2005]. 
13 Neal and Wheatley [1998]; Brown et al. [2003]; Brown and Cliff [2005]; Frazzini and 
Lamont [2008]; Beaumont et al. [2008]; Feldman [2010]; Ben-Rephael et al. [2012].   
14 Baker and Wurgler [2006]; Baker and Wurgler [2007]; Baker et al. [2008]; Ho and 
Hung [2009]; Kurov [2010]; Beer and Zouaoui [2011]; Yu and Yuan [2011]; Chau et al. 
[2011]; Liao et al. [2011]; Baker and Wurgler [2012]; Baker et al. [2012]; Beer et al. 
[2012]; Stambaugh et al. [2012]. 
15 http://www.google.com/trends 
16 http://www.aaii.com/sentimentsurvey 
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Table 3. Vector autoregression estimates 
 
Panel A: Market Crash       
Variable ǻ63 t-Stat. ǻ,1'(; t-Stat. ǻ92/80( t-Stat. 
ǻ63-1) -0.064 -1.269 2.642 2.976 -1.158 -3.833 
ǻ63-2) 0.058 1.126 1.879 2.057 -0.538 -1.729 
ǻ63-3) -0.039 -0.759 0.453 0.494 -0.509 -1.633 
ǻ63-4) 0.042 0.820 1.979 2.203 -0.389 -1.273 
ǻ,1'(;-1) -0.015 -5.413 -0.230 -4.635 0.163 9.606 
ǻ,1'(;-2) -0.008 -2.601 -0.103 -1.811 0.069 3.545 
ǻ,1'(;-3) -0.011 -3.480 -0.001 -0.015 0.043 2.256 
ǻ,1'(;-4) -0.010 -3.112 -0.213 -3.873 0.000 0.023 
ǻ92/80(-1) 0.000 0.036 0.078 0.547 -0.437 -8.962 
ǻ92/80(-2) 0.006 0.710 0.244 1.645 -0.335 -6.643 
ǻ92/80(-3) 0.016 1.883 0.247 1.671 -0.332 -6.582 
ǻ92/80(-4) 0.010 1.406 -0.003 -0.023 -0.269 -6.014 
C 0.000 -0.127 -0.005 -0.216 0.004 0.533 
       
Adjusted R2 0.095  0.110  0.340  
F-statistic 4.509  5.119  18.150 
AIC -4.478  1.265  -0.890 
SIC -4.348  1.395  -0.760  
       
Panel B: Market Rally       
Variable ǻ63 t-Stat. ǻ,1'(; t-Stat. ǻ92/80( t-Stat. 
ǻ63-1) 0.060 1.104 -8.138 -3.112 -1.236 -3.445 
ǻ63-2) 0.063 1.124 -9.133 -3.396 0.051 0.140 
ǻ63-3) -0.012 -0.205 -5.795 -2.134 -0.009 -0.025 
ǻ63-4) 0.048 0.868 4.107 1.538 -0.157 -0.428 
ǻ,1'(;-1) 0.006 5.749 -0.207 -3.893 0.002 0.222 
ǻ,1'(;-2) 0.001 0.505 -0.193 -3.487 0.005 0.694 
ǻ,1'(;-3) 0.003 2.587 -0.125 -2.270 -0.003 -0.443 
ǻ,1'(;-4) 0.002 1.862 0.101 1.887 -0.002 -0.338 
ǻ92/80(-1) -0.004 -0.462 0.739 2.018 -0.404 -8.046 
ǻ92/80(-2) -0.009 -1.177 -0.155 -0.403 -0.292 -5.548 
ǻ92/80(-3) 0.004 0.485 0.214 0.561 -0.285 -5.438 
ǻ92/80(-4) 0.006 0.768 0.084 0.232 -0.247 -4.973 
C 0.000 -0.080 0.011 0.183 0.003 0.366 
       
Adjusted R2 0.072  0.111  0.178  
F-statistic 3.617  5.156  8.186  
AIC -4.453  3.304  -0.670  
SIC -4.323  3.433  -0.540  
     (continues) 
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Table 3 (continues).      
      
Panel C: Bear Market       
Variable ǻSP500 t-Stat. ǻINDEX t-Stat. ǻ92/80( t-Stat. 
ǻ63-1) -0.077 -1.465  0.424 0.387 -0.704 -2.200 
ǻ63-2)  0.050 0.935  0.033 0.030 0.053 0.165 
ǻ63-3) -0.087 -1.639 0.837 0.754  0.151 0.465 
ǻ63-4) -0.013 -0.244 1.371 1.256 -0.213 -0.668 
ǻ,1'(;-1) -0.011 -4.350 -0.116 -2.223  0.099 6.535 
ǻ,1'(;-2)  0.000 0.128 -0.199 -3.589  0.042 2.582 
ǻ,1'(;-3) -0.003 -1.281 -0.139 -2.511 0.060 3.689 
ǻ,1'(;-4) -0.003 -1.030 -0.150 -2.700 0.034 2.090 
ǻ92/80(-1) -0.006 -0.691  0.010 0.058 -0.448 -9.055 
ǻ92/80(-2) -0.005 -0.568  0.242 1.373 -0.333 -6.461 
ǻ92/80(-3)  0.005 0.576  -0.021 -0.117 -0.326 -6.331 
ǻ92/80(-4) 0.005 0.681  0.092 0.574 -0.238 -5.104 
C 0.000 0.037 0.009 0.320 0.003 0.316 
       
Adjusted R2 0.035  0.052  0.274  
F-statistic 2.222  2.807  13.521  
AIC -4.413  1.669  -0.794  
SIC -4.284  1.799  -0.664  
       
Panel D: Bull Market        
Variable ǻSP500 t-Stat. ǻINDEX t-Stat. ǻ92/80( t-Stat. 
ǻ63-1) -0.046 -0.889 0.723 1.255 -0.915 -2.875 
ǻ63-2)  0.046 0.862 -0.208 -0.355 -0.103 -0.318 
ǻ63-3) -0.081 -1.529 0.097 0.166 -0.008 -0.026 
ǻ63-4) -0.014 -0.273 0.676 1.160 -0.190 -0.592 
ǻ,1'(;-1) -0.007 -1.459 -0.331 -6.497 0.153 5.425 
ǻ,1'(;-2) -0.001 -0.205 -0.107 -1.934 0.112 3.646 
ǻ,1'(;-3) -0.004 -0.866 -0.149 -2.665 0.064 2.064 
ǻ,1'(;-4) -0.001 -0.147 -0.192 -3.635 -0.015 -0.499 
ǻ92/80(-1) -0.005 -0.592 0.002 0.026 -0.450 -9.032 
ǻ92/80(-2) -0.004 -0.434 0.104 1.093 -0.318 -6.057 
ǻ92/80(-3) 0.002 0.288 0.127 1.354 -0.288 -5.548 
ǻ92/80(-4) 0.008 0.999 0.031 0.364 -0.258 -5.469 
C  0.000 0.020 0.005 0.335 0.002 0.297 
       
Adjusted R2 -0.007  0.116  0.247  
F-statistic 0.765  5.373  11.910  
AIC -4.370  0.428  -0.628  
SIC -4.241  0.558  -0.758  
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Table 3 reports the vector auto-regression model estimates with lags up to four weeks. The models used 
are: 
 
ሺοͷͲͲ୲ሻ ൌ Ⱦ଴ ൅σ Ⱦୱସୱୀଵ ሺοͷͲͲ୲ିୱሻ ൅σ Ⱦ୧ସ୧ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୧ሻ  
൅σ Ⱦ୴ସ୴ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୴ሻ ൅୲  
 
 
ሺο୲ሻ ൌ  Ⱦ଴ ൅ σ Ⱦୱସୱୀଵ ሺοͷͲͲ୲ିୱሻ ൅ σ Ⱦ୧ସ୧ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୧ሻ  
൅σ Ⱦ୴ସ୴ୀଵ ሺο୲ି୴ሻ ൅୲  
 
where ǻ63t-s defines the weekly logarithmic change for the S&P 500 total return index with different 
weekly lags; ǻ,QGH[t-i defines the weekly first difference for the different Google Search Volume Indices 
³PDUNHWFUDVK´³PDUNHWUDOO\´³EHDUPDUNHW´DQG³EXOOPDUNHW´ with GLIIHUHQWZHHNO\ODJVǻ9ROXPHt-v 
defines the weekly logarithmic change for a ZHHN¶V DYHUDJHGDLO\YROXPHRI the S&P 500 total return 
index with different weekly lags. Each panel represents a different Google search term used to construct 
the Google Search Volume Index.  
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Table 5. Multiple Regression estimates of Ordinary Least Squares model 
 Panel A: 
1/1í10/2/2011 
Panel B: 
1/1í 12/30/2007 
Panel C: 
1/3í 10/2/2011 
Variable Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. 
C 0.000 0.010 0.001 1.374 -0.001 -0.463 
ǻMarket Crash(-1) -0.007** -2.013 -0.008* -1.752 -0.009* -1.678 
ǻMarket Rally(-1) 0.004*** 4.782 N/A N/A 0.004*** 3.691 
ȴBear Market(-1) -0.006 -1.592 -0.004 -1.128 -0.008 -1.398 
ǻ%XOO Market(-1) 0.001 0.242 -0.001 -0.209 0.008 0.557 
ǻ[Bull – Bear](-1) -0.001 -0.176 -0.005 -0.798 0.002 0.121 
ǻVolume(-1) -0.007 -0.853 0.004 0.683 -0.017 -1.402 
       
Adjusted R2 0.098  0.034  0.105  
F-statistic 7.257  2.201  4.255  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.044  0.000  
AIC -4.500  -5.514  -3.956  
SIC -4.420  -5.402  -3.822  
Durbin-Watson 1.967  2.123  1.965  
Number of observations 403  207  195  
 
Table 5 reports Ordinary Least Squares model results. The model used is: 
 
 ሺοͷͲͲ୲ሻ ൌ  Ⱦ଴ ൅ σ Ⱦ୧ସ୧ୀଵ ሺο୲ିଵǡ୧ሻ ൅ Ⱦହሾοሺ െ ୲ିଵሻሿ 
൅Ⱦ଺ሺο୲ିଵሻ ൅୲ 
 
ZKHUHǻ63t defines the logarithmic change for Monday opening of the S&P 500 total return index; 
ǻ,QGH[t-1,i  defines the first difference for different Google Search Volume Indices (“market crash”, “mar-
NHWUDOO\´“bear market” and “bull market”) with a lag of one week; ǻ[Bull – Beart-1] defines first differ-
ence for AAII’s individual investor sentiment (percentage of bullish investor minus percentage of bearish 
investors) with a lag of one weekǻ9ROXPHt-1 GHILQHV WKH ORJDULWKPLF FKDQJH IRUZHHN¶V DYHUDJHGDLO\
volume of S&P 500 total return index with a lag of one week. This table also presents the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and Durbin-Watson test. All standard errors 
are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
The three different panels represent different estimation periods for the OLS model. For panel B, there 
were not enough searches made for the *RRJOHVHDUFKWHUP³market rDOO\´ during that estimation period.  
* refers to statistical significance at the 0.1 level; ** refers to statistical significance at the 0.05 level; 
*** refers to statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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6PDOO,QYHVWRUV¶,QWHUQHW6HQWLPHQWDQG5HWXUQ3UHGLFWDELOLW\ 
 
Author:   Antti Klemola, University of Vaasa 
Abstract:   Purpose 
ņ7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLVSDSHULVWRSURSRVHDQRYHODQGQHZGLUHFWPHDVXUH
ment of small investor sentiment in the equity market. The sentiment is 
based RQWKHLQGLYLGXDOLQYHVWRUV¶LQWHUQHWVHDUFKDFWLYLW\ 
Design/methodology/approach  
ņ7KHDXWKRUPHDVXUHV unexpected changes in the small investor sentiment 
with AR (1) process, where the residuals capture the unexpected changes in 
small investor sentiment. The authors employ vector autoregressive, 
Granger causality and linear regression models to estimate the association 
between the unexpected changes in small investor sentiment and future eq-
uity market returns.   
Findings 
ņAn unexpected increase in the search popularity of the term bear market 
LVQHJDWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHIROORZLQJZHHN¶VUHWXUQV$QXnexpected 
increase in the spread (the difference in popularities between a bull market 
DQGDEHDUPDUNHW LVSRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHIROORZLQJZHHN¶VUH-
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turns. We find that these effects are stronger for small-sized companies and 
especially after highly negative returns of large-sized companies. 
 
Originality/value 
ņ%\DXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJHWKHSDSHULVWKHILUVWWKDWPHDVXUHVWKHVPDOOLQ
vestor sentiment that is based on the internet search activity for keywords 
XVHG LQ WKH $$,,¶V VXUYH\ TXHVWLRQV 7KH SDSHU SURSRVHV DQ DOWHUQDWLYH
small investor sentiment measure that captures the changes in small investor 
sentiment in more timely fashion than the AAII survey. 
 
Keywords:  Small Investor Sentiment, Internet Searches, Equity Market Returns, Re-
turn Predictability, G40 
Type:  Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, investor sentiment is measured with two alternative approaches. The first is the sur-
vey-based investor sentiment approach, measured by surveying small investors or more sophisti-
cated investors. These surveys include the likes of Consumer Confidence, American Association 
of Individual Investor (AAII) and Investors Intelligence. The second form is the market-data-based 
investor sentiment approach. These include the likes of VIX, the put-call ratio, a discount of 
closed-end funds, and mutual funds flows. Several previous studies find that investor sentiment is 
related to contemporaneous and future stock market returns1. 
In this paper, we propose a novel and more direct measurement of small investor sentiment in the 
equity market. We construct a weekly small investor sentiment measure based on the individual 
investors’ internet search activity for the search terms as bear market and bull market. We argue 
that our Small Investors’ Internet Sentiment (SIIS) measures the current market view of individual 
investors’ in a more timely fashion than the AAII survey. As Baker and Wurgler (2007) state: 
“Now the question is no longer, as it was a few decades ago whether investor sentiment affects 
stocks prices, but rather how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects.” 
We find that unexpected change in our SIIS, when inferred from the search term bear market, is 
negatively associated with following week’s returns. One-standard-deviation unexpected increase 
in the search volumes of bear market is associated with a 17 basis-points-lower return for small-
sized companies and a 13 basis-points-lower return for large ones, and a 15 basis- points-lower 
size premium for the following week. When the SIIS is the difference between the popularities of 
 
1 (see, e.g., Lee et al., 1991; Brown and Cliff, 2005; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Lemmon and Portniaquina, 2006; Baker 
and Wurgler 2006; Baker, Wang and Wurgler, 2008; Baker, Wurgler and Yuan, 2012; Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 
2012) 
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the terms bull market and bear market (henceforth known as the spread), the unexpected change 
in the SIIS is positively associated with the following week’s returns. One-standard-deviation un-
expected increase in the spread is associated with a 13 basis-points-higher equity market return for 
small-sized companies, and a 12 basis-points-higher equity market return for large ones, and an 
eight basis-points-higher size premium for the forthcoming week.2 
We find that when large-sized companies are experiencing highly negative returns, the effect of 
unexpected change in the SIIS on the forthcoming returns of small-sized companies becomes 
stronger. That suggests that small investors form their short-term investor sentiment based more 
on the high negative returns of large-sized companies. In other words, the unexpected popularity 
of the search term bear market increases contemporaneously with the high negative returns of 
large-sized companies. This unexpected pessimistic growth in small investors’ equity market 
views then reflects more on the forthcoming returns of small-sized companies, as suggested by the 
classic noise-trader model. 
We also find that unexpected changes in the SIIS offer more information that helps predict the 
future market movements than do unexpected changes in the AAII survey. Investors need lags of 
two to four weeks of unexpected changes in the SIIS to help forecast the following week’s market 
movements. Whereas investors need lags of four to six weeks of unexpected changes in the AAII 
survey to help forecast the following week’s movements. These results suggest that our SIIS 
measures the changes in sentiment of small investors and their effect on returns in more timely 
fashion than the AAII survey can. 
 
2 We also document a statistically significant association between the unexpected changes in our SIIS and future 
cross-sectional return spread for companies sorted by profitability.  
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Why should one then measure or at least be interested in internet search-based investor sentiment 
instead of the more traditional forms? For example, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015) point out some 
important reasons why search-based sentiment might have an advantage over market-based and 
survey-based sentiments. First, the market-based sentiment might be the equilibrium outcome of 
many different economic forces and hence not purely reflect the current investor sentiment. Sec-
ond, some survey-based sentiments are conducted on too low a frequency, such as on a monthly 
basis. Third, respondents might not answer survey questions truthfully, especially if the incentive 
for telling the truth is low. Finally, the search-based sentiment method also reveals real attitudes 
rather than just inquiring about them, as is the case with survey-based sentiments. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a novel and new alternative measure of small investor 
sentiment. By utilizing the data from Google search volumes, the aim is to capture the changing 
sentiment of small investors’ and its effect on returns in more timely fashion than the more tradi-
tional AAII survey can. Earlier studies related to the ability of AAII survey to predict future market 
movements are divergent. Fisher and Statman (2000), Verma and Soydemir (2006) find the support 
that the AAII survey contains some information that helps to predict future market movements. 
Whereas, Brown and Cliff (2004) do not find support that the AAII survey contains information 
that helps to predict future returns. Hence the association between the small investor sentiment and 
future equity market returns is still questionable, and maybe an alternative measure of small in-
vestor sentiment could be needed.  
We incorporate the idea of Da et al. (2015) to capture the changing sentiment of small investors’ 
based on the popularity of Google search terms bear market and bull market. The choice of search 
words ensures they are as closely as possible related to the terminology used in the survey ques-
tions of the AAII. In the AAII survey, the investors are asked if their attitudes are bullish, neutral, 
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or bearish about the market movements for the following six months. Where Da et al. (2015) use 
more macro-level condition terminology such as recession, unemployment, and bankruptcy, we 
use terminology more related to equity market condition. 3 
In recent years, a new line of academic research has emerged from utilizing data from Google 
searches volumes, known as the Google Search Volume Index (SVI). For example, Da, Engelberg, 
and Gao (2011) find a positive relationship between the SVI for stock tickers of Russell 3000 
companies and their subsequent returns for the following two weeks. Da et al. (2011) also report 
that an increased SVI for the stock tickers of IPO companies predicts higher first-day IPO returns. 
Furthermore, Vozlyublennaia (2014) finds that the SVI is not only related to the performance of 
individual stocks but also to the performance of stock indices and commodities. 
The previous studies that use the SVI consider themselves more market attention studies than 
investor sentiment studies. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015) construct a market-level sentiment 
(known as FEARS) by aggregating the SVIs of issues such as recession, unemployment, and bank-
ruptcy. They find that an increase in this market-level sentiment predicts return reversals, increas-
ing volatility, and mutual fund flows from equity funds to bond funds. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following way. We propose a new and novel 
alternative measure of small investor sentiment in the equity market that captures the changes, and 
its effect on future equity market returns, in the small investor sentiment in more timely fashion 
than the AAII survey. In addition, we contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the effect 
that the investor sentiment inferred from Google search volumes has on future size premium. 
 
3 We find no statistically significant correlation between our sentiment measurements and average weekly Da et al. 
(2015) FEARS30 index. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The theoretical background of our study is based on the two theories of how the behavior of small 
investors can affect returns. The first theory is based on the sentiment of small investors and re-
turns. The second theory is based on market attention, measured by Google searches, of small 
investors and returns. 
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) present a theory suggesting that the investor 
sentiment of so-called noise traders can affect asset prices if more rational investors are unable to 
balance the asset prices owing to the limits of arbitrage. Barber and Odean (2008) find that indi-
vidual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, hence causing the price of such stocks 
to deviate from their more fundamental value. That causes the attention-grabbing stocks to face a 
liquidity shock as described by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993). Yuan (2015) finds that 
the individual investors might not just be net buyers, but potentially also net sellers. Yuan (2015) 
argues that during market-wide attention events, investors increase the attention they pay to their 
portfolios and rebalance it, which then leads to increased trading. In fact, Yuan (2015) finds that 
certain front-page news events can increase the selling orders from individual investors. Kumar 
and Lee (2006) also find that small investors tend to trade in concert. 
We argue that: First, past aggregate equity market returns grab small investors’ attention. For ex-
ample, terms such as bear market and bull market used in the financial media grab the attention of 
small investors. Second, the small investors then use Google to look for information on such ter-
minology or the news related to it, causing an unexpected change in search volumes. Third, the 
small investors then form their short-term equity market sentiment based on the information 
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searched for, on which they then act, which leads to decisions on whether to sell or buy to rebalance 
their current portfolio. Finally, this then causes an irrational liquidity shock to the equity market, 
leading to negative or positive equity market movements. This effect should be stronger for small-
sized companies since they tend to carry more noise-trading risk. The effect should also be stronger 
after extreme returns of large-sized companies, since those returns, and their corresponding termi-
nology, are more likely to be reported in the financial media that catches the attention of small 
investors. 
 
2.1. Hypotheses  
Based on the investor sentiment theory proposed by De Long et al. (1990) and the findings of 
Fisher and Statman (2000), Verma and Soydemir (2006), we form the following hypotheses: 
H1: An unexpected change in the SIIS, measured as the popularity of the term bear market, has a 
negative relationship with the following week’s equity market returns. 
H2: An unexpected change in the SIIS, measured as the popularity of the term bull market, has a 
positive relationship with the following week’s equity market returns. 
H3: An unexpected change in the SIIS, measured as the popularity difference (the spread) between 
the terms bull market and bear market, has a positive relationship with the following week’s equity 
market returns. 
H4: The effect of an unexpected change in the SIIS is stronger for small-sized companies. 
H5: The effect of an unexpected change in the SIIS is stronger after periods of highly negative or 
positive returns. 
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2.2. Small investor sentiment and aggregate equity market returns 
Generally two types of investor sentiment surveys are referred to in research on small investor 
sentiment: The small investor sentiment survey conducted by the AAII and consumer confidence 
surveys. Fisher and Statman (2003) report that the AAII survey and consumer confidence surveys 
in the U.S.A move contemporaneously. 
 Fisher and Statman (2000) find that a high (low) level of small investor sentiment (the AAII sur-
vey) during the present month is associated with negative (positive) returns for the S&P 500 index 
for the following month. However, they find no statistically significant association between the 
present level of small investor sentiment and the returns of small-cap stocks for the following 
month. In addition, they do not find any statistically significant results that the change of small 
investor sentiment would forecast the following month’s returns. 
Consistent with the results of Fisher and Statman (2000), Schemling (2007) also finds in a more 
global context (Germany, Europe, the U.S.A., and Japan) that the level of individual investor sen-
timent (Sentix) is negatively associated with future stock market returns. Whereas, Verma and 
Soydemir (2006) come to a conclusion when they report that that a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in small investor sentiment (the AAII survey) in the U.S.A. has a positive effect not only 
on the future U.S. returns but also on the future U.K returns. Contradicting the previously 
mentioned findings, Brown and Cliff (2004) find no or very weak evidence that either the level of 
or any change in small investor sentiment in the U.S.A. is associated with future returns. 
An alternative proxy to measure small investor sentiment is consumer confidence. For example, 
Charoenrook (2005) finds that positive changes in consumer confidence predict negative excess 
stock market returns on one-month and one-year time horizons in the U.S.A. In addition, Lemmon 
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and Portniaquina (2006) find a negative linkage between lagged consumer confidence and a small-
stock premium with lags of 3, 6, and 12 months. They also find that lagged excessive sentiment 
(residuals when macroeconomic variables are regressed on consumer confidence) is negatively 
associated with a future small-stock premium. 
In a more recent study, Schmeling (2009) also finds a negative association with consumer confi-
dence and global stock market returns for the forecast horizons of 1, 6, 12, and 24 months. The 
same study also notes that consumer confidence correlates negatively with the size premium for 
the forecast horizons of one and six months. Zouaoui, Nouyrigat, and Beer (2011) in contrast find 
that consumer confidence in Europe and the United States positively affects the probability of 
stock market crises within a one-year period. Otoo (1999) and Jansen and Nahuis (2003) present 
contradictory results since they do not find any statistically significant association between the 
present consumer confidence and future returns in the U.S.A or Europe. 
 
2.3 Investor sentiment and cross-section of equity returns 
In their seminal work, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) underline that only in a textbook case the arbi-
trage does not require capital and is riskless. Whereas, in real-life the arbitrage does require some 
capital and is also risky, thus limiting the possibility for an arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that arbitrageurs especially tend to avoid investing in markets where the sentiment of noise 
trader can drive the asset prices away from their more fundamental value for a long time period. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the arbitrageurs are especially worried about their short-
term performance in the eyes of outside investors and hence prefer arbitrage strategies with a 
shorter time period.  That then makes the assets that are more affected by the movements in the 
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sentiment of noise traders less appealing for the rational arbitrageurs. Reciprocally leading into 
larger cross-sectional mispricing in assets, especially where the noise traders more dominate the 
trading.    
Whereas, Baker and Wurgler (2006) assume that investor sentiment can have a cross-sectional 
effect on equity returns due to two different reasons. The sentiment-based demand varies across 
the equities, or the limit to arbitrage varies across the equities. Although the authors note that these 
two reasons are closely correlated. Equities that are highly sensitive to speculative demand are 
whose valuation is highly subjective, are also usually the hardest ones to arbitrage. Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) find that the investor sentiment has a heterogenous effect on cross-sectional returns 
of equities: small, young, high volatility, unprofitable, non-dividend-paying, extreme growth, and 
distressed stocks are the most affected by the investor sentiment.    
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) also document a cross-sectional linkage between the investor 
sentiment and returns of small stocks and stocks with low institutional ownership.   
 
2.4. Google search volumes and equity market returns 
Da et al. (2011) propose an alternative method to measure investor attention by using the Google 
Search Volume Index (SVI) for stock tickers of Russell 3000 stocks. They note two main argu-
ments for using the SVI as a proxy of investor attention. First, the investors use Google to search 
for and gather information. Second, and more critically, Google searches constitute materialized 
investor attention; if you Google it, you are paying attention to it. 
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Da et al. (2011) find that an abnormal increase in the SVI for stock tickers predicts positive stock 
returns for Russell 3000 companies within the following two weeks. The abnormal increase in SVI 
is associated with 0.3 % characteristic-adjusted outperformance during the following two weeks. 
Moreover, as a robustness check, Da et al. (2011) also find that a higher SVI for the stock tickers 
is associated with higher first-day returns for IPO companies. The IPO companies with the highest 
abnormal SVI a week before the listing day outperform those with the lowest abnormal SVI by as 
much as by 6 % during the IPO listing day. 
Joseph, Wintoki, and Zhang (2011) form quintile portfolios of S&P 500 companies based on their 
stock ticker SVI. They find that the quintile portfolio with the highest SVI has a statistically sig-
nificant weekly risk-adjusted (by market, size, value, and momentum) alpha of 0.04 %. The same 
study reports that the zero-cost portfolio (the highest SVI minus the lowest SVI portfolio) also has 
a statistically significant positive risk-adjusted weekly alpha of 0.03 %. 
Bank, Larch, and Peter (2011) extend the topic to the German stock market. They construct a 
double-sorted zero-cost portfolio that goes long on high SVI companies with high market value 
and short on low SVI companies with low market value for one month. They find that the alpha of 
such a portfolio is positive (0.77 % per month) and significant, even after controlling for market, 
size, value, and momentum factors. Moreover, Bank, Larch, and Peter (2011) find that a double-
sorted zero-cost portfolio that goes long on high SVI companies with a low market-to-book ratio 
and short on low SVI companies with a high market-to-book ratio yields a monthly alpha of 1.9 
%, even after controlling for the market, size, value, and momentum factors.  
Takeda and Wakao (2014) extend the topic to the Japanese stock market. They also find that the 
quartile portfolio that holds stocks with the highest SVI yields a positive risk-adjusted alpha (by 
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market, size, and value). However, the risk-adjusted alpha between the highest and the lowest SVI 
portfolios is not statistically significant as reported by Joseph, Wintoki, and Zhang (2011) and 
Bank, Larch and Peter (2011) for the U.S.A. and German stock markets. 
Instead of the SVI for individual stocks, Vozlyublennaia (2014) focuses more on broader markets 
such as market indices, commodities, and bonds. The study reports that, generally, a high SVI for 
market indices (S&P 500, Dow and NASDAQ) forecasts negative market returns for the following 
one to two weeks; although return reversal will materialize within a month. In addition, Klemola 
et al. (2016), and Chen (2017) find an association between SVI and global stock market returns. 
Tantaopas, Padungsaksawasdi, and Treepongkaruna (2016) test the linkage between the SVI and 
future stock market index movements in a more global respect. They find that the SVI affects the 
future market index movements in most stock markets analyzed within the following three weeks. 
Although, they conclude that the causality is more one-way, from returns to the SVI.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
The data used in this study are obtained from several sources. The data for annual Google search 
volumes are downloaded from Google Trends. The search terms used in this study are bear market 
and bull market. Furthermore, the popularity of searches is limited to cover only the United States 
and finance-related searches. The search volumes are scaled to range from 0 to 100, where zero 
represents a low relative popularity, and 100 represents a high relative popularity for the given 
search terms during the week in question. 4 
 
4 In total, the data set consists of 704 weekly observations, from 1/4/2004 to 6/25/2017. 
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Data for different size portfolio returns are downloaded from the Kenneth R. French Data Library. 
The size portfolios are divided into the bottom 30 % and the top 30 % of companies by market 
equity.  
For the set of control variables, we follow the Da et al. (2015) study. For volatility and the “fear 
gauge” control variable we use the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index (VIX). For 
the macroeconomic condition control variable, we use the ADS index developed by Aruoba, 
Diebold, and Scotti (2009). The ADS contains information on several seasonally-adjusted 
macroeconomic activities, including weekly initial jobless claims, monthly payroll employment, 
industrial production, and real gross domestic product. As a control variable for economic 
uncertainty, we use the US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) as developed by Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2016). It is based on newspaper coverage frequency of policy-related economic 
news. As an additional control variable, we also use the US Equity Market Uncertainty Index 
(EMU). Instead of measuring the policy-related economic news, the US Equity Market Uncer-
tainty Index measures news related to equity market. As an additional investor sentiment variable, 
this study uses the sentiment data of the American Individual Investors survey. 
3.1. The construction of the SIIS 
We use the relative search popularity of the Google search terms bear market and bull market to 
construct a measure of Small Investor Internet Sentiment or SIIS. In this study, we use three alter-
native methods to calculate the SIIS. In the first two methods the relative popularity rankings of 
the search terms bear market and bull market are used as standalone variables for the SIIS. It should 
measure how pessimistic (denoted by searches for bear market) or optimistic (denoted by searches 
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for bull market) investors currently are. This approach should closely follow the method used in 
more traditional investor sentiment surveys, where investors are asked whether they are bullish, 
bearish, or neutral about future stock market movements. For example, Fisher and Statman (2000) 
use a percentage of bullish investors to reflect investor sentiment. 
In the third method, we use the difference, or the spread, between the relative popularities of the 
search terms bull market and bear market, which should indicate if investors are currently more 
bullish or bearish. For example, Brown and Cliff (2004) and Verma and Soydemir (2006), Schmel-
ing (2007), Verma and Verma (2008) use the difference in number between bullish and bearish 
investors as their investor sentiment. 
We model the SIIS into two separate components; expected SIIS and unexpected SIIS. To capture 
the unexpected SIIS, we follow the method applied by Peltomäki, Graham, and Hasselgren (2017), 
who use the residuals from the AR (1) process to capture unexpected Google search volumes for 
a given search term at the certain time. 
We model the AR (1) process as: 
(1)  ௝ǡ୲ ൌ  ௝ ൅ ȡ௝ǡ୲ିଵ ൅௝ǡ୲ , 
where SIISj,t is the Google Search Volume Index at time t for a given search term j. cj is the constant 
for search term j, SIISj,t-1 is the lagged Google Search Volume Index for search term j. uj,t is the 
residual for the search term j. 
We define the expected level SIIS as: 
(2)  ൣ௝ǡ୲൧ ൌ  ௜ ൅ ȡ௝ǡ୲ିଵ, 
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and we define unexpected SIIS as: 
(3)  ൣ௝ǡ୲൧ ൌ  ௝ǡ୲ 
The descriptive data for the study are presented in Table 1. We argue that the UE[SIIS] captures a 
shock or an unexpected increase/decrease in the small investor sentiment. Hence it should have an 
effect on subsequent equity market returns caused by the portfolio rebalancing of small investors, 
reflecting possible liquidity shock as described by Campbell et al. (1993).   
 
[Table 1 Descriptive Statistics] 
 
To test the possible interdependence between equity market returns and the unexpected SIIS, we 
employ vector autoregressive models5. The estimated models are the following: 
 
(4) R,t= c+ σ ȕsR,t-s+ σ ȖgሾSIISሿ,t-g+ e,t4g=14s=1  
(5) ሾሿ௝ǡ୲ൌ௝൅ σ ȾǡǦ൅σ ɀ୥ሾሿ௝ǡ୲ି୥൅௝ǡ୲ͶൌͶൌͳ , 
 
where Ri,t is the return of size portfolio i at time t. UE[SIISj,t] is the unexpected Small Investors’ 
Internet Sentiment at time t inferred from the search term j. The notation ci represents the constant; 
 
5 We conducted several vector autoregressive models with different lag structures. Based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion, we consider the lag-structure with four lags to be the most robust one. These results are available upon a 
request. 
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Ri,t-s are the lagged returns of a given size portfolio i. UE[SIISj,t-g] are the lagged UE[SIIS]s inferred 
from the given search term j. In addition to the vector autoregressive model, we also conduct pair-
wise Granger causality tests to empirically analyze if the lagged UE[SIIS] or returns contain some 
information that helps to predict the future returns or the UE[SIIS]. In addition, we conduct pair-
wise Granger causality tests between the equity market returns and unexpected components of 
AAII survey to test if our UE[SIIS] measure is able to forecast future equity market returns in more 
timely fashion than the existing alternatives. 
If the lagged returns affect investor sentiment, as previous studies suggest6, we account for that 
effect by including an interaction term between the lagged returns and the UE[SIIS]. Bearish (bull-
ish) sentiment should have a stronger effect after highly negative (positive) equity market returns. 
For example, if the current week’s returns are highly negative (positive) it should associate with 
the unexpected increase in popularity of the search term bear market (bull market). This increased 
bearish (bullish) small investor sentiment then leads to negative (positive) returns for the following 
week. In light of the findings of Vozlyublennaia (2014), we run the following regression model 
with a very similar set of control variables as that used by Da et al. (2015)7. 
 
(6)  ௜ǡ୲ ൌ ௜ ൅σ Ⱦୱ௜ǡ୲ିୱ ൅σ ɀ୥ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୥ሿ ൅σ Ȝ୪ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୪ሿ כ ሺ௜ǡ୲ି୪ሻ ൅ସ୪ୀଵସ୥ୀଵସୱୀଵ
σ Ȟ୦୦ǡ୲ିଵ ൅௜ǡ୲ସ୦ୀଵ  , 
 
6 (see, e.g., De Bondt , 1993; Brown and Cliff, 2004; Verma and Verma, 2008; Vozlyublennaia, 2014) 
7 For robustness, we also conducted a predictive regression with log-transformed Google search data. These results 
(and their interpretation) are closely similar as results with non-log-transformed Google search data later reported in 
this paper. These results are available upon request.  
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where Ri,t is the return of size portfolio i at the time t and Ri,t-s are its lagged returns. UE[SIISj,t-g] 
denotes the lagged UE[SIIS]s inferred from the search term j. The coefficient ȜPHDVXUHVWKHLQ
teraction between the lagged portfolio returns and the lagged UE[SIIS]. The set of control variables 
are the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) business conditions index, a news-based measure of the eq-
uity market uncertainty index (EMU), a news-based measure of economic uncertainty index (EPU) 
and the CBOE volatility index (VIX). The estimated coeIILFLHQWȜPHDVXUHVKRZWKHcontempora-
neous returns affect the magnitude of UE[SIIS]. D(Ri,t-l) is a dummy variable for the 10 % decile 
of lowest or highest weekly returns. 
4. Statistical causality between the unexpected changes in SIIS and equity market returns
Table 2 presents the estimates from a vector autoregressive model (see equations 4 and 5) for the 
UE[SIIS]s that are formed on the popularity of the bear market and bull market search terms and 
their spread in popularity (bull market minus bear market). For the UE[SIIS] inferred from the 
bear market popularity, we find that the one-week lagged unexpected SIIS is negatively associated 
with the following ZHHN¶V returns for portfolios of both sizes. The estimated coefficients vary from 
-0.03 to -0.02, the effect being stronger for the small-sized companies. This is further supported
by the negative estimated coefficient for the low-minus-high (LMH) portfolio8. However, the ini-
tial negative shock of unexpected SIIS on the equity market returns is counterbalanced after four 
weeks. Vozlyublennaia (2014) also report a similar delayed counterbalancing effect between 
Google search volume index and the future aggregate equity market returns. This suggest that the 
effect of unexpected changes in our sentiment measurement is relatively short-term. Also Da et al. 
8 Formed by subtracting the returns of the top 30 % of companies by market equity from the returns of the bottom 30 
% of companies by market equity. 
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(2015) document that the investor sentiment inferred from Google search popularities has only a 
short-term effect on future equity market returns.   
When analyzing the effects that the past equity market returns have on the UE[SIIS] of bear mar-
ket, we find no statistically significant evidence that the previous week’s equity market returns are 
associated with the UE[SIIS]. Whereas, three-week lagged equity market return of small- and 
large-sized companies has a positive effect on the UE[SIIS]. This finding suggests that lagged 
positive (negative) returns increase (decrease) the unexpected component in the popularity of 
Google search term bear market. I.e. one could argue that our sentiment measure is an adaptive 
process.   
 
[Table 2 VAR] 
 
Table 2 also presents estimates from the vector autoregressive model for the UE[SIIS] formed on 
the basis of the popularity of the search term bull market. We do not find that the unexpected SIIS 
has any predictive power over future equity market returns for any of the size-portfolios. We do 
however find some weak evidence that past equity market returns, with lags of two to three weeks, 
negatively affect the unexpected popularity of the search term bull market. Also in this case, the 
results suggest that our sentiment measurement is an adaptive process. Lagged negative (positive)  
increase (decrease) the unexpected component in bull market popularity.  
Table two also presents estimates from a vector autoregressive model for the UE[SIIS] that uses 
the difference between the popularity of the search terms bull market and bear market, also known 
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as the spread. We find a positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient for the unex-
pected SIIS with a one-week lag when regressed on returns of the different-sized portfolios. The 
estimated coefficients vary from 0.02 to 0.01. In this case, the effect also seems to be stronger for 
the small-sized companies, as indicated by the statistically significant estimated positive coeffi-
cient for the LMH portfolio. These results indicate that an unexpected increase (decrease) in the 
spread forecasts positive (negative) equity market returns for the forthcoming week. In addition, 
as with the case of the bear market UE[SIIS], the spread UE[SIIIS] has a return reversal after four 
weeks. 
When analyzing the effect of the past returns on the unexpected spread, we find that returns with 
one (two/three) weeks lag are positively (negatively) associated with the UE[SIIS] inferred from 
the spread. This implies that positive (negative) equity market returns in the preceding week lead 
into unexpected increase in optimism (pessimism) among the investors. Whereas, this effect is 
counter-balanced after two to three weeks.  
To test the potential causality between the unexpected SIIS and the equity market returns, we em-
ploy a Granger causality test. Table 3 presents the results from pairwise Granger causality tests 
between the portfolio returns and the UE[SIIS] inferred from bear market, bull market, and the 
spread. 
 
[Table 3 Pairwise Granger Causality tests] 
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The results reported in Table 3 suggest that both UE[SIIS] inferred from either bear market or 
from the spread have some predictive power over future equity market returns. The results are 
consistent whether we use the UE[SIIS] information from either the previous two or four weeks. 
The UE[SIIS] inferred from bear market also has predictive power for the LMH portfolio. The 
UE[SIIS] inferred from the popularity of bull market term does not contain any information that 
helps to predict future equity market movements.  
These findings are consistent with the findings reported in some of the previous studies. For ex-
ample, Da et al. (2015) select only those keywords in their sentiment that have negative loadings 
to equity market returns, and find a statistically significant association with the sentiment and fu-
ture equity market returns. Tetlock (2007) finds that high level of media pessimism in Wall Street 
Journal is associated with negative future aggregate equity market returns. Whereas, Tetlock et al. 
(2008) find that stock prices of individual companies tend to react in negative wording in firm-
specific news stories. Hence it is plausible to argue the bear market or negatively oriented news 
and information are more likely to capture the small investors’ attention, which then reciprocally 
increases the popularity of Google search term bear market.  
As a robustness check, the investor sentiments based on the percentage of bearish AAII survey 
respondents and the AAII’s survey spread contain information that helps to predict the future eq-
uity market returns, but only with the lags of four weeks.9 Neither of the AAII investor sentiment 
measurements contains information that helps to predict the size premium. Hence, the results sug-
gest that the unexpected component of SIIS, which is based on the search popularity of the term 
 
9 The statistical significance is higher with lags up to six weeks. These results are available upon request. 
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bear market or the spread, do perform better compared to the more traditional AAII investor sen-
timent, especially, in the context of how many weekly lags have to be used for the forecasts. Also 
in the case of AAII sentiment measure, its’ forecasting ability is more related to the pessimism of 
investors.  
 
5. The effect of UE[SIIS] on portfolio returns is conditional on past returns. 
We now focus on how the UE[SIIS] affects future equity market returns when conditional on past 
equity market returns. For example, it can be argued, that contemporaneous negative equity market 
returns increase the search popularity of the search term bear market, which then leads to an in-
crease in the UE[SIIS] inferred from bear market. That then potentially leads to negative equity 
market returns for the forthcoming week, and thus, the effect of UE[SIIS] inferred from the popu-
larity of bear market term on future equity market returns should be stronger after strongly negative 
equity market returns. To account for this effect, we include interaction coefficients between the 
lagged UE[SIIS] and the lagged returns. In addition, we use a model with a dummy variable for 
those weeks when the equity market returns appear in the lowest or the highest decile of returns. 
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates when the UE[SIIS] is inferred from the search term bear 
market. In general, the results from Model l are consistent with the previously reported findings 
and suggest that the UE[SIIS] with a one-week lag is negatively and statistically significantly as-
sociated with the following week’s equity market returns. The estimated coefficients for UE[SIIS] 
vary from -0.0260 to -0.015, being larger for small-sized companies; as is suggested by the LMH 
portfolio that has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. That indicates that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the UE[SIIS] forecast leads to a 17 basis-points-lower equity market 
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return for the forthcoming week for small companies and to a 13 basis-points-lower equity market 
return for large companies, and to a 15-basis-point lower size premium. As also suggested by the 
previous finding, the return reversal occurs after four weeks. 
 As previously argued, the popularity of the bear market search term should increase contempora-
neously with negative equity market returns. For this reason, we focus on Model 2 to analyze the 
interaction term between the UE[SIIS] and negative equity market returns (the lowest decile of 
weekly returns). First, the estimated coefficient for UE[SIIS] itself remains negative and statisti-
cally significant for small-sized companies, but not for large-sized companies. Second, the inter-
action term is negative and statistically significant only for large-sized companies. That indicates 
that the previously identified negative association between the UE[SIIS] and the following week’s 
equity market returns of large-sized companies is mainly driven by the interaction term of the 
lagged UE[SIIS] and the preceding week’s low returns. The estimated interaction term for the 
large-sized companies is -0.051. That indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
UE[SIIS], contemporaneously with negative equity market returns, predicts 16-basis-point-lower 
equity market returns for the forthcoming week. 
The estimated coefficient for UE[SIIS] on the returns of small-sized companies is -0.022 and sta-
tistically significant, whereas the estimated interaction term is not statistically significant. The 
small-sized companies are also more affected by the UE[SIIS] as a standalone variable, as 
suggested by the negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient for LMH portfolio. 
These results indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the UE[SIIS] is associated with 14 
basis-points-lower returns for small-sized companies for the forthcoming week, and a 15 basis-
points-lower size premium for the following week. 
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Together these findings suggest that the returns of small companies are more prone to the unex-
pected changes in the popularity of the bear market search term as a standalone variable than those 
of large firms, which are only affected by the unexpected changes in popularity of the search term 
bear market during periods of low equity market returns. 
 
[Table 4 UE[Bear market] OLS] 
 
Table 5 reports the result when the UE[SIIS] is formed on the popularity of the search term bull 
market. The results from Model 1 are consistent with the previously reported findings and suggest 
that the UE[SIIS] is not statistically significantly related to the following week’s equity market 
returns on any of the size portfolios. When the UE[SIIS] is conditioned on the highest decile of 
returns (Model 2), we find no statistically significant relationship between the UE[SIIS] and forth-
coming equity market returns. This finding further supports the previously reported findings, and 
also previously mentioned studies, that negatively oriented news and information are more likely 
to capture the small investors’ attention and affect their sentiment. Causing a possible liquidity 
shock that affects future equity market returns.  
 
[Table 5 UE[Bull Market] OLS] 
 
Table 6 reports the result when the UE[SIIS] is formed on the spread, the difference between 
popularity of the search terms bull market and bear market. For Model 1, we find positive and 
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statistically significant estimated coefficients for the UE[SIIS], with a one-week lag, for both size 
portfolios and for the LMH portfolio. A one-standard-deviation increase in the UE[SIIS] is 
associated with 13 basis-points-higher returns for small-sized companies and 11 ba-
sis-points-higher returns for large-sized companies for the forthcoming week10. The effect of 
UE[SIIS] on equity returns is larger for the small-sized companies, as suggested by the positive 
and statistically significant estimated UE[SIIS] coefficient for the LMH portfolio. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the UE[SIIS] forecasts an eight basis-points-higher size premium for the fol-
lowing week. As in the case of the bear market UE[SIIS], we find a return reversal after four 
weeks. 
When the UE[SIIS] is conditioned on the decile of the lowest returns (Model 2), we find a statis-
tically significant positive interaction term between the UE[SIIS] and the returns for both portfo-
lios. This finding indicates that the effect of UE[SIIS] on future returns is stronger by some mag-
nitude after a week of negative returns, and the magnitude is greater for the large-sized companies. 
The interaction term indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in UE[SIIS], contemporane-
ous with negative equity market returns, is associated with a 17 basis-points-higher return for 
large-sized companies and a nine basis-points-higher return for small-sized companies for the 
forthcoming week. 
The estimated coefficients for the UE[SIIS] itself are positive and statistically significant for the 
small-sized companies, but not for the large-sized companies. That implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the UE[SIIS] is associated with eight basis-points-higher returns for small-
 
10 From the bear market perspective, one-standard-deviation decrease is associated with 13 to 11 basis-points-lower 
returns for the forthcoming week. 
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sized companies for the forthcoming week, and a ten basis-points-higher size premium for the 
following week. 
This finding is similar that previously found for the UE[SIIS] that is inferred from the popularity 
of the search term bear market. The association between the UE[SIIS] and future equity market 
returns is stronger and more robust for the small-sized companies, whereas the effect of UE[SIIS] 
on large-sized companies is generally limited to those weeks that follow the weeks of negative 
returns. 
 
[Table 6 UE[Spread] OLS] 
 
As the previous findings suggest, the forthcoming returns of small-sized companies are more af-
fected by the UE[SIIS] when the SIIS is inferred either from the term bear market or the spread. 
Moreover, the UE[SIIS] affects only the forthcoming returns of large-sized companies when con-
ditional on past highly negative returns. One could argue that small investors form their short-term 
sentiment SIIS based more on the past returns of large-sized companies, which are also more likely 
to be reported in the financial media. This SIIS is then reflected on to the forthcoming returns of 
small-sized companies, as suggested by the traditional noise-trader model. We test this relation 
when we condition the UE[SIIS] on the past highly negative returns of large-sized companies (see 
Table 7). 
Table 7 reports the result when the UE[SIIS] is conditional on the lowest decile of returns of the 
large-sized companies. The interaction term between the UE[SIIS] and the return of the small-
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sized companies is negative and statistically significant when the UE[SIIS] is inferred either from 
the bear market or the spread. These results imply that the UE[SIIS] has an even stronger effect on 
the forthcoming returns of small-sized companies when the large-sized companies have experi-
enced relatively high negative returns. 
Hence, it can be argued that the channel through which the UE[SIIS] affect future returns of small-
sized companies is determined by the contemporaneous correlation of the returns of large-sized 
companies and the UE[SIIS]. In other words, the relatively high negative returns, the bear market 
scenario, of large-size companies is reported in the financial media and catches the attention of 
small investors. Then the small investors use Google to search for more detailed related 
information, and then base their short-term sentiment on the information they gather before sub-
sequently rebalancing their portfolios. 
 
[Table 7] 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper develops a new and alternative method to measure small investor sentiment in the eq-
uity market. By utilizing the data of from Google search volumes, the aim is to capture the chang-
ing sentiment of small investors’, and its effect on equity market returns, in more timely fashion 
than the more traditional AAII survey can. Study by Da et al. (2015) highlight several reasons why 
search-based investor sentiment might be a better alternative to measure the investor sentiment 
than more classical market-based or survey-based investor sentiment measures. We now extend 
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the idea of Da et al. (2015) to encompass small investor sentiment in the equity market. Where Da 
et al. (2015) use search terms more closely related to macroeconomic conditions, such as “reces-
sion”, “unemployment” and “inflation rate”, whereas we focus more on the equity market 
condition. We chose a set of search words closely related to the terminology used in the AAII 
survey. The search terms in question are bear market and bull market. Based on the popularity of 
those search terms, we construct a novel and new small investor sentiment measure, Small Inves-
tor’s Internet Sentiment (SIIS). 
We find that an unexpected change in levels of pessimism among small investors, measured as the 
popularity of the Google search term bear market, is negatively associated with the following 
week’s equity market returns. A one-standard-deviation unexpected increase in the search volumes 
of the term bear market is associated with a 17 basis-points-lower return for small-sized firms and 
a 13 basis-points-lower return for large firms, and a 15 basis-points-lower size premium for the 
forthcoming week. 
When the SIIS is measured as the difference between the popularities of the bull market and bear 
market terms (the spread), the unexpected change is positively associated with the following 
week’s equity market returns. A one-standard-deviation unexpected increase in the spread is asso-
ciated with a 13 basis-points-higher equity market return for small-sized companies and with a 12 
basis-points-higher equity market return for their large counterparts, and an eight basis-points-
higher size premium for the forthcoming week. 
We argue that the effect of UE[SIIS] on the following week’s equity market returns is stronger by 
some magnitude when the financial media or other sources report news that captures small inves-
tors’ attention. Terminology such as bull market or bear market is more likely to be used during 
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periods of high or low equity market returns, which is then reflected in the volume of Google 
searches made by the small investors. This then reflects more strongly on the future returns of 
small-sized companies that carry more so-called noise-trader risk. 
We find that when the large-sized companies are experiencing low returns, the effect of unexpected 
changes in the SIIS, inferred from searches for bear market or the spread, on the forthcoming 
returns of small-sized companies is stronger. That suggests that the small investors form their 
short-term investor sentiment based more on the low returns of large-sized companies. In other 
words, the unexpected popularity of the search term bear market increases contemporaneously 
with the low returns of large-sized companies. This unexpected pessimistic increase in the small 
investors’ equity market views is then reflected in the forthcoming returns of small-sized compa-
nies, as suggested by the classical noise-trader model. 
The findings suggest that our SIIS measures the changes of small investor sentiment in a more 
timely fashion than the more traditional AAII survey, in that the unexpected changes in the SIIS 
are more associated with the forthcoming equity market returns in the short time horizon. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 N Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
SIIS      
SIIS_Bear 704 40.04 23.06 0.00 100.00 
E[SIIS_Bear] 704 40.00 12.44 18.46 72.37 
UE[SIIS_Bear] 704 0.04 19.42 -58.34 73.57 
SIIS_Bull 704 49.21 20.95 0.00 100.00 
E[SIIS_Bull] 704 49.23 8.19 29.98 69.08 
UE[SIIS_Bull] 704 -0.02 19.29 -59.30 56.91 
SIIS_Spread 704 9.16 28.00 -92.00 89.00 
E[SIIS_Spread] 704 9.22 11.90 -33.82 43.14 
UE[SIIS_Spread] 704 -0.06 25.37 -97.30 81.38 
      
AAII      
AAII_Bear 704 33.21 9.39 10.10 70.27 
E[AAII_Bear] 704 33.18 6.65 16.81 59.43 
UE[AAII_Bear] 704 0.03 6.64 -19.07 24.86 
AAII_Bull 704 38.19 9.09 16.50 69.50 
E[AAII_Bull] 704 38.22 6.30 23.18 59.91 
UE[AAII_Bull] 704 -0.03 6.58 -17.86 26.90 
AAII_Spread 704 4.98 16.72 -51.35 56.20 
E[AAII_Spread] 704 5.04 11.34 -33.15 39.73 
UE[AAII_Spread] 704 -0.06 12.33 -41.78 45.60 
      
Portfolio Returns      
Low 30 704 0.163 3.07 -18.04 13.80 
Med 40 704 0.193 2.89 -19.97 14.50 
High 30 704 0.161 2.33 -21.94 10.87 
LMH 704 0.002 1.41 -4.48 7.26 
      
Control Variables      
VIX 704 18.73 9.14 9.75 79.13 
ADS 704 -0.32 0.78 -4.08 0.93 
EPU 704 123.78 71.61 19.34 472.47 
EMU 704 44.82 55.72 7.46 823.76 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study. SIIS_Bear, SIIS_Bull are Google 
search volumes for the bear market and bull market search terms. SIIS_Spread is the difference between search vol-
umes for the bull market and bear market search terms. AAII is the survey of American Association of Individual 
Investors. AAII_Bear (AAII_Bull) is the percentage of respondents who are bearish (bullish) on their market view for 
the following six months. AAII_Spread is the difference between AAII_Bull and AAII_Bear. E[.] is the expected 
search volume for a given search term using the AR (1) process. UE[.] is the unexpected search volume for a given 
search term using the AR (1) process, i.e., the residual. Low 30, Med 40, and High 30 are portfolio returns for the 
bottom 30 %, middle 40 % and top 30 % of companies by market equity. LMH is return difference between bottom 
30 % and top 30 % companies. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index. ADS is the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Con-
ditions Index. EPU is the news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty index. EMU is the news-based Equity Market 
Uncertainty index. The data are in weekly form from 4/1/204 to 6/25/2017.   
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Table 2. Vector Autoregressive estimates between the unexpected changes in bear market popu-
larity and equity market returns. 
                         Bear Market 
 
 Low 30  High 30  LMH 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
Intercept -0.03 (-0.04) 
0.15 
(1.32) 
 -0.08 
(-0.10) 
0.18 
(2.00) 
 0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
UE[SIISt-1] 
-0.15 
(-4.05) 
-0.03 
(-4.24) 
 -0.16 
(-4.14) 
-0.02 
(-3.33) 
 -0.15 
(-3.96) 
-0.01 
(-3.75) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
0.08 
(2.08) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
 0.08 
(2.13) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
 0.08 
(2.12) 
-0.00 
(-1.51) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
0.22 
(5.99) 
0.01 
(1.19) 
 0.23 
(6.13) 
0.01 
(1.73) 
 0.21 
(5.74) 
-0.00 
(0.09) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
0.14 
(3.83) 
0.02 
(3.45) 
 0.114 
(3.82) 
0.01 
(2.84) 
 0.14 
(3.63) 
0.01 
(2.97) 
Rt-1 
-0.09 
(-0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.28) 
 -0.24 
(-0.79) 
-0.08 
(-2.03) 
 0.25 
(0.50) 
-0.03 
(-0.66) 
Rt-2 
0.08 
(0.36) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
 0.31 
(1.02) 
0.04 
(1.16) 
 -0.38 
(-0.76) 
0.03 
(0.92) 
Rt-3 
0.44 
(1.89) 
-0.07 
(-1.89) 
 0.66 
(2.15) 
-0.08 
(-2.23) 
 0.32 
(0.64) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
Rt-4 
-0.09 
(-0.40) 
0.03 
(0.85) 
 -0.10 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
 -0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.02 
(-0.49) 
Adj. R2 0.070 0.034  0.073 0.033  0.067 0.019 
F-Stat 7.60 4.08  7.89 3.99  7.25 2.71 
         
                         Bull Market 
 
 Low 30  High 30  LMH 
 UE [SIISt] 
 
Rt 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
Intercept -0.13 
(-0.19) 
0.16 
(1.33) 
 -0.16 
(-0.22) 
0.18 
(2.02) 
 -0.12 
(-0.17) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
UE[SIISt-1] -0.09 
(-2.29) 
-0.00 
(-0.27) 
 -0.09 
(-2.28) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
 -0.09 
(-2.42) 
-0.00 
(-1.23) 
UE[SIISt-2] 0.11 
(3.03) 
-0.00 
(-0.43) 
 0.11 
(2.92) 
-0.00 
(-0.31) 
 0.12 
(3.15) 
-0.00 
(-0.63) 
UE[SIISt-3] 0.12 
(3.21) 
0.00 
(0.31) 
 0.12 
(3.31) 
0.00 
(0.61) 
 0.12 
(3.26) 
-0.00 
(-0.30) 
UE[SIISt-4] 0.13 
(3.60) 
-0.00 
(-0.46) 
 0.13 
(3.61) 
-0.00 
(-0.61) 
 0.13 
(3.53) 
0.00 
(0.15) 
Rt-1 0.34 
(1.49) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
 0.33 
(1.09) 
-0.06 
(-1.65) 
 0.59 
(1.17) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
Rt-2 -0.42 
(-1.83) 
0.04 
(0.93) 
 -0.59 
(-1.95) 
0.04 
(1.05) 
 -0.32 
(-0.63) 
0.04 
(0.92) 
Rt-3 -0.14 
(-0.60) 
-0.09 
(-2.31) 
 0.10 
(0.34) 
-0.10 
(-2.62) 
 -0.98 
(-1.95) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
Rt-4 0.31 
(1.36) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
 0.38 
(1.25) 
-0.03 
(-0.66) 
 0.41 
(0.81) 
-0.02 
(-0.62) 
Adj. R2 0.049 -0.001  0.049 0.008  0.048 -0.007 
F-Stat 5.54 0.92  5.45 1.72  5.39 0.40 
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Table 2. Continues 
                   Spread 
 
 Low 30  High 30  LMH 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
 UE 
[SIISt] 
 
Rt 
Intercept -0.10 (-0.12) 
0.15 
(1.33) 
 -0.09 
(-0.10) 
0.18 
(2.02) 
 -0.13 
(-0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
UE[SIISt-1] 
-0.17 
(-4.60) 
0.02 
(3.16) 
 -0.17 
(-4.55) 
0.01 
(2.80) 
 -0.17 
(-4.53) 
0.00 
(2.09) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
0.13 
(3.60) 
-0.00 
(-0.50) 
 0.13 
(3.59) 
-0.00 
(-1.00) 
 0.13 
(3.58) 
0.00 
(0.67) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
0.29 
(8.02) 
-0.01 
(-1.14) 
 0.29 
(8.06) 
-0.01 
(-1.29) 
 0.28 
(7.85) 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
0.18 
(4.77) 
-0.02 
(-3.23) 
 0.17 
(4.66) 
-0.01 
(-2.94) 
 0.18 
(4.74) 
-0.00 
(-2.21) 
Rt-1 
0.55 
(1.90) 
-0.00 
(-0.00) 
 0.71 
(1.85) 
-0.07 
(-1.76) 
 0.52 
(0.82) 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 
Rt-2 
-0.45 
(-1.56) 
0.03 
(0.71) 
 -0.83 
(-2.16) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
 0.12 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.83) 
Rt-3 
-0.58 
(-1.99) 
-0.07 
(-1.86) 
 -0.55 
(-1.43) 
-0.08 
(-2.22) 
 -1.32 
(-2.09) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
Rt-4 
0.31 
(1.08) 
0.03 
(1.33) 
 0.39 
(1.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.51) 
 0.32 
(0.50) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
Adj. R2 0.125 0.023  0.125 0.029  0.118 0.001 
F-Stat 13.47 3.04  13.51 3.60  12.73 1.07 
This table reports estimates from the following vector autoregressive models: 
 ሾ௝ǡ୲ሿ ൌ  ௝ ൅ σ Ⱦୱ௜ǡ୲ିଵ ൅σ ɀ୥ሾሿ௝ǡ୲ି୥ ൅ ௝ǡ୲ସ୲ୀ୥ସୱୀଵ  
 ௜ǡ୲ ൌ  ௜ ൅σ Ⱦୱ௜ǡ୲ିୱ ൅σ ɀ୥ሾሿ௝ǡ୲ି୥ ൅ ௜ǡ୲ସ୥ୀଵସୱୀଵ  
where SIISi,t is the Google Search Volume Index at time t for the search term bear market, bull market and the differ-
ence (Spread) between the Google Search Volume Indices at time t for search terms bull market and bear market.  Ri,t 
is the return for given size portfolio at time t. UE[IS] is the unexpected SIIS using the AR (1) process, i.e., the residual. 
Low 30 is the portfolio consisting of the bottom 30 % companies by market equity. High 30 is the portfolio consisting 
of top 30 % companies by market equity. LMH is return difference between bottom 30 % and top 30 % companies. 
The data are in weekly form from 4/1/204 to 6/25/2017. T-stats are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Pairwise Granger causality tests between unexpected SIIS, unexpected AAII and equity 
market returns. 
 Panel A: 
Dependent Variable 
 Low 30 High 30 LMH 
2 Weeks    
UE[SIIS_Bear] 5.76*** 4.26*** 5.04*** 
UE[SIIS_Bull] 0.19 0.21 0.85 
UE[SIIS_Spread] 3.24** 3.42** 1.07 
UE[AAII_Bear] 0.22 0.09 0.28 
UE[AAII_Bull] 0.14 0.20 0.45 
UE[AAAII_Spread] 0.19 0.17 0.33 
    
4 Weeks    
UE[SIIS_Bear] 6.43*** 4.72*** 5.10*** 
UE[SIIS_Bull] 0.17 0.26 0.49 
UE[SIIS_Spread] 4.38*** 3.96*** 1.84 
UE[AAII_Bear] 2.18* 1.35 1.23 
UE[AAII_Bull] 1.53 1.27 1.05 
UE[AAII_Spread] 2.11* 1.50 1.24 
This table report results from Granger Causality tests with lags of two and four weeks. Low 30 is the portfolio con-
sisting of the bottom 30 % of companies by market equity. High 30 is the portfolio consisting of the top 30 % of 
companies by market equity. LMH is return difference between bottom 30 % and top 30 % companies. UE[SIIS] is 
the unexpected SIIS inferred from search terms bear market, bull market, and their spread (bull market minus bear 
market). UE[AAII] is the unexpected AAII, measured as a percentage of bearish or bullish respondents and their 
difference (the spread). The unexpected components are the residuals from the AR (1) process. *, **, *** refers to 
statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level.  
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Table 4. Unexpected change in bear market popularity and future equity market returns. 
 Low 30  High 30  LMH 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.148 
(1.23) 
0.170 
(1.43) 
 0.176* 
(1.86) 
0.197** 
(2.08) 
 -0.006 
(-0.11) 
-0.005 
(-0.09) 
UE[SIISt-1] -0.026*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.54) 
 -0.015*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.007 
(-1.56) 
 -0.011*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.59) 
UE[SIISt-2] 0.001 
(0.17) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
 0.004 
(0.82) 
0.006 
(1.23) 
 -0.004 
(-1.40) 
-0.003 
(-0.88) 
UE[SIISt-3] 0.008 
(1.24) 
0.012* 
(1.66) 
 0.008* 
(1.75) 
0.007 
(1.43) 
 0.000 
(-0.08) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
UE[SIISt-4] 0.022*** 
(3.59) 
0.019*** 
(3.42) 
 0.014*** 
(3.41) 
0.009*** 
(2.56) 
 0.009*** 
(2.85) 
0.009*** 
(3.07) 
Rt-1 0.045 
(0.73) 
0.051 
(0.77) 
 -0.065 
(-0.83) 
-0.065 
(-0.87) 
 -0.023 
(-0.50) 
-0.028 
(-0.59) 
Rt-2 0.023 
(0.44) 
0.015 
(0.29) 
 0.034 
(0.58) 
0.018 
(0.30) 
 0.036 
(0.88) 
0.033 
(0.84) 
Rt-3 -0.072* 
(-1.93) 
-0.081** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.084* 
(-1.70) 
-0.085* 
(-1.85) 
 0.011 
(0.21) 
0.016 
(0.30) 
Rt-4 0.035 
(0.59) 
0.038 
(0.64) 
 -0.005 
(-0.10) 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
 -0.017 
(-0.38) 
-0.016 
(-0.35) 
UE[SIISt-1] 
*D(Rt-1) 
 -0.028 
(-1.25) 
  -0.051** 
(-2.56) 
  0.006 
(0.57) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
*D(Rt-2) 
 -0.003 
(-0.15) 
  0.000 
(0.01) 
  -0.012 
(-1.22) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
*D(Rt-3) 
 -0.031 
(-1.54) 
  -0.002 
(-0.18) 
  -0.009 
(-1.20) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
*D(Rt-4) 
 0.021 
(0.72) 
  0.021 
(1.06) 
  -0.009 
(-0.92) 
ADSt-1 -2.432 
(-1.18) 
-2.524 
(-1.23) 
 -2.235 
(-1.12) 
-2.173 
(-1.11) 
 -0.305 
(-0.62) 
-0.262 
(-0.55) 
EMUt-1 0.063 
(0.58) 
0.075 
(0.69) 
 0.008 
(0.10) 
0.018 
(0.23) 
 0.060 
(1.18) 
0.058 
(1.12) 
EPUt-1 -0.126 
(-0.51) 
-0.142 
(-0.57) 
 -0.126 
(-0.74) 
-0.110 
(-0.65) 
 0.022 
(0.19) 
0.026 
(0.22) 
VIXt-1 1.976* 
(1.81) 
2.367** 
(2.03) 
 0.483 
(0.47) 
0.922 
(0.95) 
 0.024 
(0.05) 
-0.026 
(-0.06) 
Adj R2 0.040 0.044  0.037 0.056  0.016 0.017 
F-Statistics 3.40 3.03  3.25 3.61  1.95 1.75 
Obs 700 700  700 700  700 700 
This table reports results from following model:    
௜ǡ୲ ൌ 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where Ri,t is the weekly return for size portfolio i at time t and Ri,t-s are its lagged returns. UE[SIISj,t-g] are the lagged 
unexpected components of SIIS, inferred from search popularity of search term bear market. Control variables are: 
ADS is a weekly change in Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business condition index, EMU is the weekly change in the news-
based measure of equity market uncertainty index, EPU is the weekly change in the news-based measure of economic 
uncertainty index and VIX is the weekly change CBOE volatility index. D is a dummy variable for those weekly stock 
returns that belong to the lowest 10 % decile. Low 30, High 30 are portfolio returns for the bottom 30 % and top 30 
% of companies by market equity. LMH is return difference between the bottom 30 % and top 30 % of companies. 
All standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by the White diagonal method. * 
refers to statistical significance at the 0.1 level; ** refers to statistical significance at the 0.05 level; *** refers to 
statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5. Unexpected change in bull market popularity and future equity market returns. 
 Low 30  High 30  LMH 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.152 
(1.25) 
0.150 
(1.16) 
 0.181* 
(1.87) 
0.176* 
(1.80) 
 -0.006 
(-0.11) 
-0.006 
(-0.10) 
UE[SIISt-1] -0.002 
(-0.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.31) 
 0.002 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
 -0.003 
(-1.15) 
-0.003 
(-1.16) 
UE[SIISt-2] -0.003 
(-0.55) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
 -0.001 
(-0.32) 
-0.004 
(-0.90) 
 -0.002 
(-0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
UE[SIISt-3] 0.002 
(0.45) 
0.003 
(0.43) 
 0.003 
(0.77) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
 -0.001 
(-0.41) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
UE[SIISt-4] -0.002 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
 -0.003 
(-0.55) 
-0.004 
(-0.74) 
 0.000 
(0.16) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
Rt-1 0.049 
(0.78) 
0.048 
(0.75) 
 -0.057 
(-0.71) 
-0.054 
(-0.66) 
 -0.018 
(-0.41) 
-0.016 
(-0.35) 
Rt-2 0.022 
(0.45) 
0.019 
(0.30) 
 0.030 
(0.53) 
0.027 
(0.48) 
 0.036 
(0.90) 
0.038 
(0.96) 
Rt-3 -0.088** 
(-2.32) 
-0.090** 
(-2.18) 
 -0.099** 
(-2.05) 
-0.102** 
(-2.05) 
 0.008 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
Rt-4 0.018 
(0.31) 
0.017 
(0.30) 
 -0.022 
(-0.41) 
-0.022 
(-0.42) 
 -0.022 
(-0.48) 
-0.019 
(-0.41) 
UE[SIISt-1] 
*D(Rt-1) 
 0.006 
(0.31) 
  -0.007 
(-0.49) 
  0.004 
(0.37) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
*D(Rt-2) 
 0.016 
(0.54) 
  0.030 
(1.35) 
  -0.010 
(-0.81) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
*D(Rt-3) 
 -0.005 
(-0.16) 
  -0.001 
(-0.07) 
  0.013 
(1.31) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
*D(Rt-4) 
 -0.010 
(-0.36) 
  0.012 
(0.50) 
  -0.009 
(-0.74) 
ADSt-1 -2.523 
(-1.22) 
-2.493 
(-1.19) 
 -2.273 
(-1.13) 
-2.270 
(-1.12) 
 -0.380 
(-0.76) 
-0.396 
(-0.78) 
EMUt-1 0.023 
(0.21) 
0.021 
(0.20) 
 -0.021 
(-0.25) 
-0.038 
(-0.47) 
 0.050 
(0.99) 
0.062 
(1.20) 
EPUt-1 -0.062 
(-0.26) 
-0.056 
(-0.23) 
 -0.085 
(-0.50) 
-0.055 
(-0.31) 
 0.041 
(0.36) 
0.026 
(0.24) 
VIXt-1 1.693 
(1.51) 
1.703 
(1.50) 
 0.374 
(0.36) 
0.405 
(0.39) 
 -0.104 
(-0.24) 
-0.119 
(-0.28) 
Adj R2 0.003 -0.002  0.012 0.011  -0.010 -0.011 
F-Statistics 1.17 0.93  1.71 1.51  0.40 0.52 
Obs 700 700  700 700  700 700 
This table reports results from following model:   
௜ǡ୲ ൌ ௜ ൅ ෍Ⱦୱ௜ǡ୲ିୱ ൅ ෍ɀ୥ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୥ሿ ൅ ෍ Ȝ୪ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୪ሿ כ ሺ௜ǡ୲ି୪ሻ ൅ ෍ Ȟ୦୦ǡ୲ିଵ ൅௜ǡ୲
ସ
୦ୀଵ
ସ
୪ୀଵ
ସ
୥ୀଵ
ସ
ୱୀଵ
 
where Ri,t is the weekly return for size portfolio i at time t and Ri,t-s are its lagged returns. UE[SIISj,t-g] are the lagged 
unexpected components of SIIS, inferred from search popularity of search term bull market. Control variables are: 
ADS is a weekly change in Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business condition index, EMU is the weekly change in the news-
based measure of equity market uncertainty index, EPU is the weekly change in the news-based measure of economic 
uncertainty index and VIX is the weekly change CBOE volatility index. D is a dummy variable for those weekly stock 
returns that belong to the highest 10 % decile. Low 30 and High 30 are portfolio returns for the bottom 30 % and top 
30 % of companies by market equity. LMH is return difference between the bottom 30 % and top 30 % of companies. 
All standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by the White diagonal method. * 
refers to statistical significance at the 0.1 level; ** refers to statistical significance at the 0.05 level; *** refers to 
statistical significance at the 0.01 level.   
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Table 6. Unexpected change in the spread and future equity market returns. 
 Low 30  High 30  LMH 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.151 
(1.25) 
0.146 
(1.20) 
 0.179** 
(1.89) 
0.171* 
(1.80) 
 -0.005 
(-0.10) 
-0.005 
(-0.10) 
UE[SIISt-1] 0.015*** 
(3.44) 
0.009** 
(2.22) 
 0.010*** 
(3.10) 
0.004 
(1.28) 
 0.005* 
(1.87) 
0.005** 
(2.13) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
 
-0.003 
(-0.59) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
 -0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.003 
(-0.94) 
 0.001 
(0.63) 
0.002 
(0.69) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
 
-0.005 
(-1.10) 
-0.008 
(-1.50) 
 -0.005 
(-1.20) 
-0.004 
(-0.92) 
 -0.001 
(-0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.63) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
 
-0.015*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.011** 
(-2.30) 
 -0.011** 
(-2.45) 
-0.006 
(-1.61) 
 -0.005** 
(-2.08) 
-0.006** 
(-2.47) 
Rt-1 
 
0.041 
(0.66) 
0.077 
(1.11) 
 -0.062 
(-0.78) 
-0.019 
(-0.23) 
 -0.024 
(-0.54) 
-0.028 
(-0.60) 
Rt-2 
 
0.015 
(0.29) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
 0.023 
(0.42) 
0.020 
(0.38) 
 0.033 
(0.83) 
0.031 
(0.76) 
Rt-3 
 
-0.070** 
(-1.99) 
-0.061* 
(-1.76) 
 -0.084* 
(-1.80) 
-0.063* 
(-1.71) 
 0.011 
(0.21) 
0.012 
(0.22) 
Rt-4 
 
0.029 
(0.50) 
0.029 
(0.55) 
 -0.016 
(-0.31) 
-0.022 
(-0.46) 
 -0.010 
(-0.22) 
-0.008 
(-0.18) 
UE[SIISt-1] 
*D(Rt-1) 
 0.031* 
(1.71) 
  0.044*** 
(2.71) 
  -0.005 
(-0.60) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
*D(Rt-2) 
 -0.013 
(-0.61) 
  -0.009 
(-0.52) 
  -0.002 
(-0.27) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
*D(Rt-3) 
 0.025 
(1.46) 
  -0.002 
(-0.15) 
  0.002 
(0.22) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
*D(Rt-4) 
 -0.023 
(-1.02) 
  -0.023 
(-1.53) 
  0.006 
(0.73) 
ADSt-1 -2.640 
(-1.31) 
-2.729 
(-1.35) 
 -2.307 
(-1.17) 
-2.339 
(-1.19) 
 -0.445 
(-0.92) 
-0.418 
(-0.89) 
EMUt-1 0.037 
(0.34) 
0.067 
(0.61) 
 -0.009 
(-0.11) 
0.017 
(0.21) 
 0.052 
(1.04) 
0.051 
(1.02) 
EPUt-1 -0.057 
(-0.24) 
-0.100 
(-0.40) 
 -0.088 
(-0.52) 
-0.098 
(-0.57) 
 0.048 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.46) 
VIXt-1 1.545 
(1.38) 
2.172* 
(1.86) 
 0.327 
(0.31) 
0.915 
(0.95) 
 -0.173 
(-0.40) 
-0.197 
(-0.45) 
Adj R2 0.027 0.040  0.033 0.059  -0.002 -0.006 
F-Statistics 2.62 2.84  2.99 3.76  0.88 0.74 
Obs 700 700  700 700  700 700 
This table reports results from following model:  
௜ǡ୲ ൌ ௜ ൅ ෍Ⱦୱ௜ǡ୲ିୱ ൅ ෍ɀ୥ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୥ሿ ൅ ෍ Ȝ୪ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୪ሿ כ ሺ௜ǡ୲ି୪ሻ ൅ ෍ Ȟ୦୦ǡ୲ିଵ ൅௜ǡ୲
ସ
୦ୀଵ
ସ
୪ୀଵ
ସ
୥ୀଵ
ସ
ୱୀଵ
 
where Ri,t is the weekly return for size portfolio i at time t and Ri,t-s are its lagged returns. UE[SIISj,t-g] are the lagged 
unexpected components of SIIS, inferred from search popularity difference between the search terms bull market and 
bear market. Control variables are: ADS is a weekly change in Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business condition index, EMU 
is the weekly change in the news-based measure of equity market uncertainty index, EPU is the weekly change in the 
news-based measure of economic uncertainty index and VIX is the weekly change CBOE volatility index. D is a 
dummy variable for those weekly stock returns that belong to the lowest 10 % decile. Low 30 and High 30 are portfolio 
returns for the bottom 30 % and top 30 % of companies by market equity. LMH is the return difference between the 
bottom 30 % and top 30 % of companies. All standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation using the White diagonal method. * refers to statistical significance at the 0.1 level; ** refers to statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level; *** refers to statistical significance at the 0.01 level.   
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Table 7. Interaction of returns of large-sized companies and unexpected changes in SIIS on fu-
ture returns of small-sized companies. 
 SIIS[Bear market]  SIIS[Spread] 
 Low 30 LMH  Low 30 LMH 
Constant 0.159 
(1.30) 
-0.007 
(-0.13) 
 0.145 
(1.21) 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
UE[SIISt-1] -0.018*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.14) 
 0.008* 
(1.79) 
0.004* 
(1.81) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
 
0.002 
(0.37) 
-0.003 
(-1.15) 
 -0.001 
(-0.26) 
0.002 
(0.88) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
 
0.006 
(0.96) 
0.000 
(-0.15) 
 -0.005 
(-0.92) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
 
0.016*** 
(2.78) 
0.007*** 
(2.14) 
 -0.009* 
(-1.85) 
-0.004* 
(-1.71) 
Rt-1 
 
0.046 
(0.71) 
-0.024 
(-0.51) 
 0.069 
(1.00) 
-0.024 
(-0.53) 
Rt-2 
 
0.016 
(0.31) 
0.036 
(0.88) 
 0.012 
(0.23) 
0.033 
(0.78) 
Rt-3 
 
-0.072* 
(-1.93) 
0.012 
(0.22) 
 -0.054 
(-1.59) 
0.010 
(0.19) 
Rt-4 
 
0.038 
(0.64) 
-0.017 
(-0.36) 
 0.021 
(0.41) 
-0.010 
(-0.22) 
UE[SIISt-1] 
*D(HRt-1) 
-0.052** 
(-2.10) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
 0.046*** 
(2.70) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
UE[SIISt-2] 
*D(HRt-2) 
0.004 
(0.17) 
-0.003 
(-0.33) 
 -0.016 
(-0.76) 
-0.005 
(-0.54) 
UE[SIISt-3] 
*D(HRt-3) 
-0.003 
(-0.14) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
 0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
UE[SIISt-4] 
*D(HRt-4) 
0.033 
(1.18) 
0.007 
(0.69) 
 -0.033* 
(-1.65) 
-0.009 
(-0.96) 
ADSt-1 -2.367 
(-1.16) 
-0.302 
(-0.62) 
 -2.792 
(-1.37) 
-0.541 
(-1.09) 
EMUt-1 0.074 
(0.70) 
0.059 
(1.15) 
 0.071 
(0.66) 
0.055 
(1.11) 
EPUt-1 -0.116 
(-0.47) 
0.019 
(0.16) 
 -0.080 
(-0.32) 
0.038 
(0.33) 
VIXt-1 2.452** 
(2.19) 
0.056 
(0.13) 
 2.019* 
(1.77) 
-0.159 
(-0.36) 
Adj R2 0.052 0.012  0.047 -0.004 
F-Statistics 3.38 1.52  3.17 0.82 
Obs 700 700  700 700 
This table reports results from following models:  
௜ǡ୲ ൌ ௜ ൅෍Ⱦୱ௜ǡ୲ିୱ ൅෍ɀ୥ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୥ሿ ൅෍ Ȝ୪ሾ௝ǡ୲ି୪ሿ כ ሺ୦୰ǡ୲ି୪ሻ ൅ ෍ Ȟ୦୦ǡ୲ିଵ ൅ ௜ǡ୲
ସ
୦ୀଵ
ସ
୪ୀଵ
ସ
୥ୀଵ
ସ
ୱୀଵ
 
where Ri,t is the weekly return for size portfolio i at time t and Ri,t-s are its lagged returns. UE[SIISj,t-g] are the lagged 
unexpected components of SIIS. Control variables are: ADS is a weekly change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business 
condition index, EMU is the weekly change in the news-based measure of the equity market uncertainty index, EPU 
is the weekly change in the news-based measure of an economic uncertainty index and VIX is the weekly change of 
the CBOE volatility index. HR is the return for size portfolio with the top 30 % of companies by market equity. D1 is 
a dummy variable for those weekly stock returns that belong to the lowest 10 % decile. Low 30 is portfolio return for 
the bottom 30 % of companies by market equity. LMH is the return difference between the bottom 30 % and top 30 
% of companies. All standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the White 
diagonal method. * refers to statistical significance at the 0.1 level; ** refers to statistical significance at the 0.05 level; 
*** refers to statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Abstract 
We study how unexpected change in Internet search-based investor sentiment affects subsequent 
value premium in the U.S. stock market. For the investor sentiment, we use a sentiment that is 
based on individual investors’ Internet search activity. We argue that stocks that are considered to 
be more sensitive to fluctuations in investor sentiment, like financially distressed (proxied by high 
book-to-market ratio) stocks, should also be more affected by unexpected changes in the sentiment. 
We find that an unexpected increase in optimism (pessimism) in the sentiment predicts positive 
(negative) subsequent value premium in the U.S stock market.  
 
Keywords: Search-Based Investor Sentiment, Internet Searches, Cross-Sectional Stock Returns, 
Value Premium 
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1. Introduction 
In their seminal work, Baker and Wurgler (2006) show that the investor sentiment does not only 
affect the aggregate U.S. stock market returns, but they also document a relation between investor 
sentiment and cross-sectional U.S. stock returns. The authors argue that the effect of sentiment is 
stronger for stocks that are more difficult to arbitrage and value; for example small, growth, and 
distressed stocks. Both low (growth) and high (distress) book-to-market ratio stocks are reported 
to be the most sensitive to the fluctuations in investor sentiment, leading into a U-shaped sensitivity 
pattern, and the effect of investor sentiment being generally stronger for high book-to-market 
stocks2. The authors also note that the effect of investor sentiment on future stock returns is 
stronger during negative sentiment periods. On a more international level, Baker, Wurgler and 
Yuan (2012) and Corredor, Ferrer and Santamaria (2015) also document a closely similar associ-
ation between investor sentiments and future returns of stocks sorted by their book-to-market ra-
tios.  
In academic literature, the investor sentiment is usually considered to be either surveys-based (like 
American Association of Individual Investors and Consumer Confidence) or market-based (like 
VIX and put-call ratio) or the combination of these two. However, Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) 
highlight several important arguments why an investor sentiment inferred from Internet search 
volumes might have an advantage over the previously mentioned and more traditional investor 
sentiment measurements. First, the market-based sentiment might be the equilibrium outcome of 
many different economic forces and hence not purely reflect the current investor sentiment. Sec-
ond, some survey-based sentiments are conducted on too low frequency. Third, the respondents 
 
2 However, they do not find a statistically significant association between lagged investor sentiment and value pre-
mium. 
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might not answer truthfully in the surveys. Whereas, the Internet search-based investor sentiment 
also reveals real attitudes rather than just conducting a Gallup poll about it.  
In recent decade, a new line of research has emerged in the academic literature. These studies 
especially analyze the impact of Google search volumes on asset prices, where the Google search 
volumes can be seen as one form of investors’ information retrieval and market attention. Da, 
Engelberg and Gao (2011) find that increase (decrease) in Google search volumes for the stock 
tickers of Russell 3000 companies predict positive (negative) subsequent returns for the stock in 
question. Da et al. (2011) also find that an increase in Google search volume for the stock tickers 
of IPO companies predicts a higher first-day IPO returns. Vozlyublennaia (2014) and Klemola, 
Nikkinen, and Peltomäki (2016) find that information inferred from Google search volumes can 
also help to predict future aggregate stock market returns.         
Da et al. (2015) extend the previously mentioned Google studies more into investor sentiment 
literature by constructing a macro-based Internet search-based investor sentiment from Google 
search volumes. The authors construct the sentiment by aggregating the Google search volumes 
for such terminology as recession, unemployment, and bankruptcy3. Also, Klemola (2018) uses 
Google search volumes to construct an Internet search-based investor sentiment, but with termi-
nology that is more specifically related to equity market conditions4and terminology used in AAII-
survey. Both studies find that their investor sentiments are associated with future near-term aggre-
gate stock market returns. Da et al. (2015) and Klemola (2018) also document a relation between 
their sentiments and subsequent returns of small-stocks. Klemola (2018) also finds a statistically 
significant association between the Internet search-based investor sentiment and size premium.  
 
3 This Internet search-based investor sentiment is known as FEARS. 
4 This Internet search-based investor sentiment is known as Small Investors’ Internet Sentiment (SIIS). 
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The purpose of this paper is to further study the effect of Internet search-based investor sentiment 
on stock returns, by utilizing the same Internet search-based investor sentiment as in Klemola 
(2018), and study its effect on the subsequent value premium in the U.S. stock market. The findings 
can support the arguments of Da et al. (2015), that the usage of Internet search-based investor 
sentiment as an alternative investor sentiment measurement is a valid method. As Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) find, a good investor sentiment should not only effect stock returns on an aggregate 
level, but it also should have a cross-sectional stock return effect. Thus, this paper aims to 
strengthen the cross-sectional validation of Internet search-based investor sentiment as an 
alternative and more modern investor sentiment measurement.  
The paper contributes to the literature in two separate ways. First, the paper contributes to the 
studies of  Da et al. (2015) and Klemola (2018), by extending the literature of Internet search-
based investor sentiment’s effect on asset prices to cover also value premium. Second, the paper 
contributes to studies of Baker and Wurgler (2006), Baker et al. (2012) and Corredor et al. (2015) 
by studying the effect of investor sentiment on value premium, by utilizing an alternative and more 
modern investor sentiment measurement.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, high book-to-market (a proxy for financial distress) stocks are the 
most affected by unexpected changes in the Internet search-based sentiment. We find that an 
unexpected increase in optimism (pessimism) in the sentiment predicts positive (negative) value 
premium for the next week in the U.S. stock market. 
 
2. Data 
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The weekly data used in this study are obtained from multiple sources. The data for Google search 
volumes are downloaded from Google Trends. The search terms used in this study are bear market 
and bull market. Furthermore, the popularity of searches is limited to cover only the United States 
and its finance-related searches. The search volumes are scaled to range from 0 to 100 annually, 
where zero represents low relative popularity, and 100 represents high relative popularity for the 
given search terms during the week in question.  
The data for the returns of 10 different portfolios sorted by their book-to-market ratios are obtained 
from Kenneth R. French Data Library5. The choice of control variables is closely similar to Da et 
al. (2015). For the macroeconomic condition control variable, we use the ADS index developed 
by Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009)6. The ADS contains information on several seasonally-
adjusted macroeconomic activities, including weekly initial jobless claims, monthly payroll em-
ployment, industrial production, and real domestic product. As a control variable for economic 
uncertainty, we use the US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) as developed by Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2016)7. It is based on newspaper coverage frequency of policy-related eco-
nomic news. As a control variable for equity market uncertainty, we use the US Equity Market 
Uncertainty Index (EMU)8. Instead of measuring the policy-related economic news (EPU), the 
EMU measures news related to equity market conditions. We also include the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange volatility index (VIX)9 as a control variable.    
 
5 Downloaded from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
6 Downloaded from https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index 
7 Downloaded from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
8 Downloaded from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
9 Downloaded from Datastream 
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In total, the data set consists of 704 weekly observations, starting from the beginning of January 
2004 and ending at the end of June 2017.      
 
3. Hypotheses development 
The methodology of our Internet search-based investor sentiment is based on the investor senti-
ment develop by Klemola (2018), who use the weekly popularity of Google search terms bull 
market and bear market or in their difference in popularity (known as a spread).  
As Peltomäki et al. (2017) and Klemola (2018), we divide our sentiment into two components, 
expected and unexpected sentiment using AR(1)-process:    
(1)  ୨ǡ୲ ൌ  ୨ ൅ɏ୨ǡ୲ିଵ ൅ ɂ୨ǡ୲ 
(2)  ൣ୨ǡ୲൧ ൌ  ୨ ൅ɏ୨ǡ୲ିଵ 
(3)  ൣ୨ǡ୲൧ ൌ  ɂ୨ǡ୲ 
where E[] is the expected sentiment, and UE[] is the unexpected sentiment.  
We hypothesize that an unexpected change in the sentiment, UE[Sentiment], represents a shift in 
noise traders’ beliefs that creates a liquidity shock in the stock market (see, e.g., Campbell et al. 
1993). The effect should be stronger for those stocks that are more prone to the behavior of noise 
traders and are also more difficult to value and arbitrage; like potentially financially distressed 
(high book-to-market ratio) stocks.   
We test the effect of unexpected changes in the sentiment to subsequent cross-sectional stocks 
returns with the following regression model: 
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(4)  ܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ  ܿ௜ ൅ܷܧሾܵ݁݊ݐ݅݉݁݊ݐሿ௝ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ܴ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ σ ߣ௛ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௛ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ସ௛ୀଵ  
where Ri,t is the return of portfolio i consisting of stocks that are sorted by their book-to-market 
ratios. UE[Sentiment]j,t-1 is one week lagged unexpected change in the Internet search-based in-
vestor sentiment inferred from search term j.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 presents results when the sentiment is inferred from the popularity of the bear market. We 
document linearly increasing negative relation between the unexpected changes in the sentiment 
and subsequent cross-sectional stock returns. One standard deviation unexpected increase in the 
popularity of bear market predicts nine basis points lower return for low book-to-market, and 12 
basis points lower return for high book-to-market stocks for the next week. We also document a 
statistically significant negative cross-sectional return spread (value premium) between the high 
book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks.  One standard deviation unexpected increase in 
the popularity of bear market predicts six basis points lower value premium for the next week.   
Table 2 presents results when the sentiment is inferred from the popularity of the bull market. We 
do not document any statistically significant association between the individual portfolios sorted 
by their book-to-market ratio and unexpected changes in the sentiment. We do however, find that 
unexpected increase in the popularity of bull market predicts higher value premium for the next 
week. One standard deviation unexpected increase in the popularity of bull market predicts nine 
basis points higher value premium for the next week. 
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Table 3 presents results when sentiment is inferred from the difference in popularity of bull market 
and bear market (the spread). We document a linearly increasing positive association between the 
unexpected changes in the sentiment and subsequent cross-sectional stock returns. One standard 
deviation unexpected increase in the spread predicts six basis points higher return for low book-
to-market stocks and 11 basis points higher return for high book-to-market stocks for the next 
week. We also document a statistically significant value premium between the high-book-to-mar-
ket and low-book-to-market stocks. An unexpected increase in the spread predicts 11 basis points 
higher value premium for the next week.     
 
4. Conclusions 
We find a statistically significant relation between unexpected changes in the Internet search-based 
investor sentiment and subsequent value premium in the U.S. stock market. An unexpected in-
crease in optimism (pessimism) in the sentiment predicts positive (negative) value premium for 
the next week. As Baker and Wurgler (2006) also observe, high book-to-market stocks (a proxy 
for potential financial distress) generally tend to be more strongly affected by the sentiment.  
We also observe that when Google search term with a negative meaning, bear market, is used as 
a sentiment proxy; unexpected changes in the sentiment have a broader cross-sectional effect as 
we document a linearly increasing negative sensitivity between in the sentiment and future returns 
of stocks sorted by their book-to-market ratio. This result is consistent with the findings of Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) and Baker et al. (2012), who report that the sentiment has a stronger effect on 
future stock returns when the sentiment is on a negative side. 
The previous result is also consistent with the findings of Tetlock (2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechan-
sky, and Macskassy (2008) and García (2013). Tetlock (2007) finds that a high level of media 
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pessimism in the Wall Street Journal predicts negative future market returns. García (2013) finds 
that the effect of news-based investor sentiment on future stock market returns is stronger during 
recessions than during expansions. Tetlock et al. (2008) find that individual stock prices tend to 
react in negative wording in firm-specific news stories.  
The main contribution of the paper is that unexpected changes in the Internet search-based investor 
sentiment effects on the subsequent value premium in the U.S. stock market. Thus the sentiment 
has some cross-sectional effect on future stock returns. This finding further validates the use of the 
Internet search-based investor sentiment as an alternative and more modern investor sentiment 
measurement, as it has not the only effect on future aggregate stock markets returns (see, e.g. Da 
et al. 2015 and Klemola 2018), but it also has cross-sectional effect on future stock returns (see, 
e.g. Baker and Wurgler 2006). The main findings also contribute to studies of Baker and Wurgler 
(2006), Baker et al. (2012) and Corredor et al. (2015) by further documenting the effect of investor 
sentiment on value premium, by utilizing the Internet search-based investor sentiment instead.  
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ABSTRACT
We test the performance of popular option strategies in the Nordic power derivative
market using twelve years of data. We ﬁnd that protective put strategies outperform
long forward and covered call strategies on a risk-adjusted basis, because the payoff
function of the protective put seems a good ﬁt to themarket dynamics in both good and
bad times. Detailed analysis reveals differences across moneyness levels and holding
periods that can be further exploited. Different Delta levels of the analyzed strategies
allow for ﬂexible hedging solutions.
Keywords: Nord Pool; power derivatives; selective hedging; protective put; covered call; forward
contract.
1 INTRODUCTION
Electricity companies are among the most active users of ﬁnancial derivatives. This
is mostly because highly volatile electricity prices require rigorous hedging, but also
because increased competition within the industry forces companies to ﬁnd new
sources of proﬁt, such as arbitrage and speculation. Consequently, the traditionally
strict preference of hedging over trading is relaxed in the new business models, which
try to optimally combine the two. Stulz (1996) refers to such ﬂexible derivatives use
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as “selective hedging”, arguing that it is value creating compared with full hedging,
which does not allow one to take advantage of valuable investment opportunities in the
market. Flexible use of derivatives is also in line with Ederington (1979), who argues
that hedging should be implemented and assessed according to any other investment:
that is, by the trade-off between risk and return.A typical example of selective hedging
is an electricity company that uses forward and options contracts to take subjective
market views within given risk management boundaries.
The increasingly important role of selective derivatives use in the electricity indus-
try, reported, for example, by Sanda et al (2013), requires a new perspective of power
derivatives as ﬁnancial instruments. Speciﬁcally, the framework used to assess the per-
formance of different power derivatives should complywith the electricity companies’
growing interest in more investment-based hedging policies. However, the literature
regarding the performance of power derivatives as investment products is scarce.Most
empirical studies on power derivatives focus on their risk-reduction capabilities, in
accordance with the traditional risk-minimization principle, while remaining silent
about their return potential (for empirical studies on the hedging effectiveness of
power derivatives, see, for example, Shawky et al (2003), Frestad (2012) and Fleten
et al (2010)).
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment of the risk and return
characteristics of power derivatives from an investment perspective. Speciﬁcally, we
consider conservative but popular combinations of forwards and options that have
been documented to deliver risk-adjusted excess returns in other ﬁnancial markets.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that focuses on the investment potential of
power derivatives.The results can be easily applied to hedging, aswe assumea forward
contract as an underlying instrument. Choosing a forward position as a starting point
allows conclusions to be drawn within the framework of selective hedging.
We focus on the Nordic power derivative market and consider the contracts traded
in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities exchange, formerly known as Nord Pool ASA.
Nasdaq OMX Commodities is the largest power derivative exchange in Scandinavia,
with a 60% market share and an annual volume of 1028 TWh (€49 billion), three
times the spot market. The Nordic spot market price is highly seasonal, which guides
us to focus on forwards and options with quarterly expiration.
The results of the empirical analysis show large and somewhat systematic differ-
ences in the strategies based on various option types, holding periods and moneyness
levels, which suggests that it is possible to achieve excess returns in the Nordic power
derivative market with certain option strategies. Better reward-to-risk ratios are, how-
ever, only obtained with a careful selection of option characteristics and holding
periods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the relevant work on
hedging and derivative use. Section 3 describes the data and methodologies used in
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the empirical analysis, and the results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents
our conclusions.
2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Recent studies of risk management policies report a growing interest in selective
hedging strategies (Stulz 2003, pp. 630–637). Selective hedging is a general term
that refers to a company’s decision to allow private information, perceived market
mispricings and market timing to affect its use of derivatives. It can be viewed as a
continuumof trading strategies frompure speculation to full hedging, althoughusually
the selective hedging strategies are rather conservative. In practice, most companies
appear to scale down their hedge ratio rather than holding fully covered positions.
In terms of selective hedging instruments, Brown andToft (2002) suggest that com-
panies should use the combination of a forward contract and a plain vanilla option to
achieve an optimal risk exposure. They argue that standard derivative products com-
ply with most risk management policies, are ﬂexible in terms of exposure adjustment
and can be used to capture the convexity in returns.
While the optimal mixture of forward contracts and options depends on the risk
appetite and risk proﬁle of the company, there is evidence that some combinations
have better properties than others from an investment perspective. For example, in
equitymarketsWhaley (2002), Feldman andRoy (2005),Hill et al (2006) andKapadia
and Szado (2007) report high risk-adjusted returns from covered call strategies; these
involvewriting a call option against an investment in the underlying asset.A protective
put strategy is a variant of the covered call strategy and involves buying both the
underlying asset and a put option on the asset.
The covered call and protective put strategies are most often undertaken to enhance
the return potential of a dedicated portfolio. That is, both strategies assume a long
position in the underlying asset but have different return characteristics with respect
to its future price development. First, both strategies provide at least some insurance
against price declines in the underlying asset and so can be considered as hedging
strategies. Second, the strategies have different sensitivities to positive market turns
and so are “selective” in terms of upside return potential. For example, the covered
call strategy pays off when the price of the underlying asset does not decrease too
much or when the call option is overvalued. Equivalently, the protective put delivers
high returns when the underlying asset increases sufﬁciently in price or when the put
is undervalued. The relative performance of the strategies thus depends on the price
development of the underlying asset and the relative valuation of the options.
The covered call and protective put are natural candidates for selective hedging
strategies in electricity markets, because many trading companies in the industry have
a future delivery commitment and want to hedge against spot price increases with a
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Energy Markets
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FIGURE 1 The cumulative return index for quarterly forward contracts on Nordic electricity,
1999–2012.
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long forward contract position. While the forward position is considered mandatory
from a risk management perspective, it can be adjusted with an option position in
order to capture occasional jumps in the forward price (Bessembinder and Lemmon
2002; Longstaff and Wang 2004).
In the Nordic markets, Sanda et al (2013) report a normative use of forward con-
tracts by Norwegian electricity companies. However, the results suggest that accom-
panying option positions are less common, likely because option strategies are consid-
ered to be expensive by the market participants (NordReg 2010). High option prices
are argued to be caused by high volatility and, in particular, the occasional price spikes
in the forward market. Krapels (2000) arrives at a similar conclusion with respect to
the US power derivative market.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We compare the risk and return characteristics of covered call and protective put
strategies in theNordic electricitymarkets. Our data consists of daily settlement prices
for ﬁnancial forward and option contracts traded in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities
Europe exchange. Following risk management practices in the Nordic electricity
industry (Sanda et al 2013), we assume a long position in a quarterly forward contract.
The forward position can be either held naked (the benchmark case) or combined
with a position in a European-style call or put option with a matching maturity. The
option contracts are settled on the forward price, which is based on the expected
quarterly average price in the Nord Pool spot electricity market. We choose quarterly
Journal of Energy Markets www.risk.net/journal
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FIGURE 2 The three-month option-implied volatility of electricity forward prices, 1999–
2012.
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contracts for their liquidity and correspondence to the seasonal effects in the Nordic
spot price. The data spans fromNovember 1999 to February 2012,with approximately
252 trading days per year.
The sample period can be divided into two subsamples with different market con-
ditions. As can be seen from Figure 1 on the facing page, the returns for holding
a front-quarter forward contract generally increase from 1999 to 2006 and decline
from 2007 to 2012. The same general pattern holds for option-implied volatility in
Figure 2, although upward deviations from the trend are frequent and large. All in
all, the sample period includes various market conditions, which should increase the
robustness of our analysis against sample-speciﬁc effects.
Regarding the examined option strategies, a covered call involves a long forward
position and a short call option position (Figure 3 on the next page). The proﬁt pattern
of the portfolio is kinked downward, producing negative returns when the forward
price drops below the strike price of the option. The covered call strategy is relevant
for an investor who believes that the forward price will not rise much during the
investment period and is therefore willing to sell the upside potential of the forward
contract for the price of the call option. In this case, the return from writing the call
option (the value premium effect) will enhance the investor’s total holding-period
return, compared with an uncovered forward position. The investor can choose how
much upside potential they are willing to sell by selecting a suitable strike price for
the call option. With higher strike prices, the investor holds more upside potential for
themselves but receives a lower premium from the sale of the option.
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Energy Markets
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FIGURE 3 The proﬁt diagram for the covered call strategy.
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FIGURE 4 The proﬁt diagram for the protective put strategy.
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In the protective put strategy, the investor simultaneously purchases a forward
contract and a put option. As can be seen from Figure 4, the proﬁt–loss proﬁle of
the protective put strategy is kinked upward. For forward price levels lower than
the strike price, the protective put strategy yields mildly negative returns. However,
if the forward price exceeds the level of the strike plus the cost of the option, the
strategy starts to deliver positive returns. Thus, the protective put strategy can be seen
as a hedging maneuver against the downside risks of a naked forward position or a
speculative trade that proﬁts from potential underpricing of put options. Similarly to
implementing the covered call strategy, the investor will choose the strike price of the
Journal of Energy Markets www.risk.net/journal
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option according to their risk aversion or perceived return potential. The put options
with higher strike prices will cost more, but also provide more downside protection.
The strike prices for the options considered in the empirical analysis correspond
approximately to 90%, 95%, 100%, 105%and 110%of the forward price on the day of
the investment. For certain periods, however, optionswith suitable strike prices are not
traded, and therefore the number of observations could vary across option moneyness
levels. Different strike prices are considered in order to assess the performance of the
strategies including in-, at- or out-of-the-money options. For example, the prices of
deeply out-of-the-money options are low and typically much less sensitive to changes
in the forward price, which would have an effect on the volatility of the strategy.
Moreover, the rate of time decay in the option prices varies with moneyness levels
and affects the returns for different holding periods differently.
In the empirical analysis, the strategies are implemented so that the forward and
option positions are entered simultaneously 30, 60, 90 or 180 days before maturity,
and then liquidated on the last trading day. The investment returns are calculated on
a daily basis from the settlement prices. The capital required to buy an option, or the
premium from selling one, is accumulated at an overnight deposit rate. We assume
zero capital requirements on the forward positions.
4 PERFORMANCE OFTHE OPTION STRATEGIES
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the statistical properties of the returns from different
option strategies and compare them with the forward contract returns. We then exam-
ine the strategies’return–risk relationship with Sharpe ratios and Jensen’sAlphas. The
rest of the section is dedicated to ﬁnding the sources of the performance differentials.
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 on the next page presents descriptive statistics of the daily returns from
the long forward position and different covered call strategies. It is divided into four
panels corresponding to different holding periods. Table 2 on page 10 presents similar
statistics for different protective put strategies.
The ﬁrst row of Table 1 on the next page suggests that the long forward position
performs better than the covered call strategies on the basis of average returns, with a
few exceptions across moneyness levels. For the long forward position, all holding-
period returns except for the one-month period are on average positive. The protective
put strategies generally outperform the long forward position and the covered call
strategies across holding periods and moneyness levels. The average returns on the
forwardposition range from8%to6% in annualized terms, dependingon the holding
period, while the protective put strategies deliver up to 18% returns. The covered calls
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Energy Markets
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics of covered call option strategies, 1999–2012. [Table
continues on next page.]
(a) Six months
Covered call
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 4.58 2.55 3.83 2.76 2.11 14.29
Median 0 0.14 1.05 3.12 5.93 7.87
SD 37.91 16.66 19.84 21.21 21.59 21.05
Skewness 0.08 0.45 0.4 0.39 0.35 0.17
Kurtosis 8.81 20.59 15.67 13.45 12.6 9.98
Minimum 15.65 9.42 10.63 10.88 10.91 10.69
Maximum 23.03 9.68 10.92 11.12 11.58 9.12
Average Delta 1 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.57
No. of observations 5282 3299 5282 5282 4915 2552
No. of contracts 43 27 43 43 40 21
(b) Three months
Covered call
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 6.32 5.89 5.98 5.46 4.97 0.35
Median 0 0.14 1.62 1.92 4.28 7.25
SD 41.22 18.48 19.99 23.19 25.39 27.31
Skewness 0.13 0.94 0.83 0.55 0.43 0.42
Kurtosis 8.27 21.74 15.65 11.42 9.31 8.05
Minimum 15.65 10.82 10.91 10.97 10.97 10.97
Maximum 23.03 9.21 7.85 8.34 9.16 9.88
Average Delta 1 0.32 0.41 0.5 0.59 0.66
No. of observations 2619 2368 2496 2619 2619 2430
No. of contracts 42 38 40 42 42 39
have a relatively wide range (14% to 14%) of average returns and usually perform
approximately eight percentage points worse than a simple forward position.
The difference between average covered call and protective put returns is approx-
imately 12% in annual terms, but the return differential narrows for longer holding
periods. Overall, the returns across different strategies seem to trend downward, espe-
cially at shorter holding periods. For the protective put strategies, the intermediate
holding periods seem to be the best performing. However, one month is clearly and
Journal of Energy Markets www.risk.net/journal
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TABLE 1 Continued.
(c) Two months
Covered call
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 4.83 1.22 4.18 4.71 5.37 3.64
Median 0 0.33 2.44 3.36 3.91 6.05
SD 41.53 16.19 19.43 22.51 25.34 28.43
Skewness 0.19 1.72 1.26 0.97 0.77 0.6
Kurtosis 9.37 29.51 17.49 12.46 9.48 7.61
Minimum 15.65 10.63 10.82 10.91 10.97 11.18
Maximum 23.03 8.34 7.85 7.55 7.17 7.2
Average Delta 1 0.3 0.42 0.53 0.62 0.7
No. of observations 1805 1640 1805 1805 1805 1686
No. of contracts 43 39 43 43 43 40
(d) One month
Covered call
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 8.09 1.68 7.83 14.43 12.52 5.9
Median 0 0.58 1.58 3.59 6.96 17.38
SD 43.92 17.41 20.43 25.32 26.75 30.64
Skewness 0.33 1.46 1.31 0.92 0.78 0.6
Kurtosis 11.76 30.64 22.34 13.9 7.93 6.23
Minimum 15.65 10.04 11.17 12.66 10.82 10.91
Maximum 23.03 7.28 8.37 9.34 6.87 7.05
Average Delta 1 0.26 0.38 0.53 0.65 0.76
No. of observations 923 727 880 923 882 858
No. of contracts 43 34 41 43 41 40
The observations are annualized by multiplying by 252 (p252 for the standard deviation (SD)).
almost uniformly the worst performing choice for a holding period. This ﬁnding con-
tradicts what has been found in equity markets. Hill et al (2006) and Kapadia and
Szado (2007) report that a covered call strategy with a one-month holding period
outperforms lengthier strategies.
The results across differentmoneyness levels aremixed and lack a clear trend. Some
consistencies, however, can be found. First, the returns for the one-month holding
period are dominated by the changing Delta of the option positions. The Delta, or
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Energy Markets
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of protective put option strategies, 1999–2012. [Table
continues on next page.]
(a) Six months
Protective put
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 4.58 14.86 10.8 9.45 10.24 6.18
Median 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 4.6
SD 37.91 27.12 25.26 25.9 27.46 29.27
Skewness 0.08 0.68 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.59
Kurtosis 8.81 32.46 26.3 23.43 19.88 19.83
Minimum 15.65 14.73 15.11 15.42 15.5 14.31
Maximum 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03
Average Delta 1 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.6 0.65
No. of observations 5282 2425 4915 5282 5282 3178
No. of contracts 43 20 40 43 43 26
(b) Three months
Protective put
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 6.32 6.54 14.59 14.72 16.95 18.21
Median 0 0.08 0.17 1.19 1.09 0.59
SD 41.22 22.2 25.82 28.07 30.41 32.7
Skewness 0.13 0.1 1.12 0.89 0.74 0.6
Kurtosis 8.27 18.04 31.71 23.92 18.97 15.26
Minimum 15.65 14.73 15.24 15.5 15.59 15.65
Maximum 23.03 9.94 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03
Average Delta 1 0.37 0.43 0.52 0.61 0.7
No. of observations 2619 1991 2619 2619 2496 2432
No. of contracts 42 32 42 42 40 39
the sensitivity of the option component to changes in the forward price, converges
rapidly toward 1 for the written in-the-money calls and the purchased puts at short
maturities (the average Deltas of the strategies are presented in the eighth row). For
this reason, the forward and option positions at these moneyness levels and maturities
cancel each other out, and the returns converge toward zero. Second, the covered call
strategies closest to the at-the-money level seem to perform the worst across holding
periods. For the protective puts, the at-the-money choice performs relatively well
Journal of Energy Markets www.risk.net/journal
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TABLE 2 Continued.
(c) Two months
Protective put
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 4.83 12.97 14.96 12.72 12.09 11.8
Median 0 0.31 1.61 5.87 8.31 8.7
SD 41.53 23.43 26.51 28.7 31.33 34.76
Skewness 0.19 2.47 1.55 1.22 0.95 0.73
Kurtosis 9.37 58.97 37.83 28.17 21.04 15.76
Minimum 15.65 14.31 14.31 14.31 14.73 15.24
Maximum 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03 23.03
Average Delta 1 0.31 0.4 0.49 0.6 0.7
No. of observations 1805 1606 1762 1805 1805 1683
No. of contracts 43 38 42 43 43 40
(d) One month
Protective put
Long ‚ …„ ƒ
forward ITM 10% ITM 5% ATM OTM 5% OTM 10%
Mean 8.09 0.75 4.86 9.28 8.29 5.03
Median 0 0.79 4.99 9.49 11.05 18.8
SD 43.92 11.69 18.01 29.8 33.26 37.62
Skewness 0.33 0.94 0.33 1.89 1.43 1.12
Kurtosis 11.76 22.1 19.44 37.76 25.91 18.83
Minimum 15.65 5.57 9.89 14.3 14.31 14.31
Maximum 23.03 6.06 8.08 22.98 23 23.03
Average Delta 1 0.25 0.37 0.49 0.65 0.78
No. of observations 923 814 860 923 901 792
No. of contracts 43 38 40 43 42 37
The observations are annualized by multiplying by 252 (p252 for the standard deviation (SD)).
and is rather insensitive to different lengths of the holding period. Other choices for
the level of put option moneyness seem to change in ranking with different holding
periods.
Inspection of themedian returns in the second rows of Table 1 on page 8 andTable 2
on the facing page reveals several systematic patterns with respect to option type,
moneyness and, in the case of protective puts, the holding periods. First, the covered
call strategies have positive median returns, while the protective put strategies deliver
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Energy Markets
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negative median returns. This is in stark contrast with the ﬁndings from the average
return analysis, and implies negative (positive) skewness of covered call (protective
put) returns. Second, the median returns for the covered calls decrease monotonically
with optionmoneyness, ranging from0%to17%for the one-month holdingperiod and
to 8% for the longer ones. Third, the median returns of the protective put strategies
become almost uniformly worse for shorter holding periods and lower moneyness
levels. For example, the median returns on the one-month put option strategies range
from 19% to 0%, while being practically zero for the six-month holding period. The
median returns on the forward position are zero across holding periods.
The gaps between average and median returns stem from the difference in the
relative frequency of positive and negative returns, or skewness. The fourth rows of
Table 1 on page 8 and Table 2 on page 10 show that all covered call strategies have
negatively skewed returns, most probably because the written call option limits the
upside potential of the strategy. In contrast, all protective put strategies and the long
forward position have generally positively skewed returns. The skewnesses of the
covered call strategies increase monotonically with option moneyness and the length
of the holding period. The same pattern mostly holds for the protective put strategies
and the long forward contract, which implies that the skewnesses of the strategies
converge to zero as the holding period lengthens.
The annualized standard deviations, reported in the third rows of Table 1 on page 8
and Table 2 on page 10, clearly show an important beneﬁt of the option-augmented
strategies over a simple forward position. In particular, both the covered call and
protective puts strategies deliver signiﬁcantly less volatile returns than the forward
contract. Overall, the covered call strategies also have lower standard deviations than
the protective put counterparts. Once again, the changingDelta sensitivities play a part
at the level of the one-month volatilities, making deeply in-the-money put strategies
half as risky as the out-of-the-money alternatives. All volatilities, except for the in-
the-money strategies, increase with decreasing holding period. This effect is most
probably caused by the so-called Samuelson effect (Samuelson 1965), which refers
to increasing volatility of the forward price as the contract approaches expiration.
The Samuelson effect is particularly strong in a price discovery market, such as the
electricity forward market.
The volatilities of the strategies are also clustered in time, as illustrated by Figure 5
on the facing page andFigure 6 onpage 14.Theseﬁgures plot the returns of the covered
call (CC) and protective put (PP) strategies for the three-month holding period. The
ﬁgures for other holding periods are available from the authors on request. Figure 6
shows that volatilities were especially high in, for example, 2003, when the forward
price spiked frequently and caused large swings in the returns of the protective put
strategies.
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FIGURE 5 Covered call returns across different moneyness levels for the three-month
holding period, 1999–2012.
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(a) Forward. (b) CC90. (c) CC95. (d) CC100. (e) CC105. (f) CC110.
The overall level of annualized standard deviation is 42% for the long forward
position and ranged from 20% to 27% for the 5% in- and out-of-money covered call
strategies. For comparison, Kapadia and Szado (2007) report numbers twice as small
as those for similar strategies in the US equity market.
The lower standard deviations for the option strategies also imply that their returns
are more clustered around the mean, which is conﬁrmed by the kurtosis statistics
in the ﬁfth rows of Table 1 on page 8 and Table 2 on page 10. Kurtosis is directly
related to the probability of large negative and positive returns, and, according to
Tables 1 and 2, seems to vary with option moneyness, so that the kurtosis is highest
for the strategies involving in-the-money options. The protective put strategies have
on average higher kurtosis, which can also be observed from the number of extreme
returns in Figure 6 on the next page. Overall, these results imply that both strate-
gies exhibit occasional and relatively large jumps in returns, which, given the levels
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FIGURE 6 Protective put returns across different moneyness levels for the three-month
holding period, 1999–2012.
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of skewness, are more likely to be negative (positive) for the covered call (protec-
tive put) strategies. Whaley (2002) and Feldman and Roy (2005) also report high
excess kurtosis and negative skewness for covered call strategies in the US equity
markets.
The statistical descriptions of returns reported in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows of Table 1 on
page 8 and Table 2 on page 10 are also graphically illustrated in Figure 7 on the
facing page and Figure 8 on page 16, which plot the kernel-estimated densities for the
covered call and protective put strategies over the sample period. The ﬁgures show
clearly that the return distributions become more peaked with decreasing holding
periods. In addition, the kurtosis of the covered call strategies decreases (and for
the protective put increases) with the option strike price, suggesting that short-term
strategies implemented with in-the-money options exhibit relatively frequent jumps
in the returns.
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FIGURE 7 The distributions of covered call returns for different holding periods, 1999–
2012.
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Finally, the eighth rows of Table 1 on page 8 and Table 2 on page 10 report the
averageDeltas of the strategies. The numbers show that the option strategies involving
in-the-money options have the lowest sensitivity to changes in the forward price.
Intuitively, if the forward position is considered a full hedge, then the in-the-money
strategies correspond to 25–49% hedges, depending on the length of the holding
period. The at-the-money strategies have a stable 50% Delta across holding periods,
while the out-of-money strategies provide a 52–78% hedge. These results imply that,
by choosing a suitable moneyness level for each holding period, all economically
sensible hedging outcomes can be achieved.
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FIGURE 8 The distributions of protective put returns for different holding periods, 1999–
2012.
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4.2 Reward-to-risk measures
Next we compare different option strategies according to their reward-to-risk rela-
tionship. We ﬁrst focus on part (a) of Table 3 on the facing page, where the Sharpe
ratios for the strategies are presented. The Sharpe ratios are calculated by dividing the
annualized average return by the corresponding annualized standard deviation (both
values are available in Table 1 on page 8 and Table 2 on page 10). Intuitively, the
Sharpe ratio measures the compensation in return for a unit of risk. The level of the
risk-free rate is factored in at the return calculation phase.
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Part (a) of Table 3 on the preceding page reveals that the Sharpe ratios are, over-
all, high for the protective put strategies and negative for the covered call strategies.
The best-performing strategy, with a Sharpe ratio of over 50%, is the three-month
protective put strategy that combines the 5% in-the-money option with the forward
position. The uncovered forward position provides a 15% Sharpe ratio, except for
the one-month holding period, when it becomes negative. The covered call strate-
gies usually have deeply negative Sharpe ratios, but the ratios increase steadily with
lengthening holding periods. All Sharpe ratios decline dramatically when moving
from a two-month holding period to a one-month period.
With respect to option moneyness patterns in Sharpe ratios, the covered call strate-
gies show a ﬂat, declining or convex trend when moving from in-the-money strikes to
out-of-money levels. The protective puts, in contrast, show increasing, ﬂat or concave
patternswith respect to optionmoneyness.However, statistical signiﬁcance patterns of
the Sharpe ratios show that the holding period and the option type are more important
than the moneyness level in explaining the differences in performance.
For comparison, we also report Jensen’s Alphas for the option strategies. Jensen’s
Alpha is used to determine the risk-adjusted excess return of the strategy over a
benchmark rate, which here is naturally the return on the long forward position. The
Beta parameter is estimated empirically from the returns. TheAlpha values, shown in
part (b) ofTable 3 on the preceding page, conﬁrm the performance differences between
call- and put-based strategies. The put-based strategies perform well and deliver on
average a 13% Alpha on an annual basis, compared with an average 5% Alpha for
the covered call strategies. The performance gap between put and call strategies is
widest in the short holding periods (which is statistically veriﬁed), but the abnormal
returns converge universally toward zero with longer holding periods.
The results on performance measures imply large and somewhat systematic dif-
ferences in the risk-adjusted returns between option types and holding periods
(and moneyness levels to a certain extent), which suggests that it is possible to
enhance derivative market returns with the examined option strategies. However,
better reward-to-risk ratios are only obtained with a careful selection of option
characteristics.
4.3 Probabilities of option proﬁtability
The differences in the performance of the option strategies, as discussed above, may
stem from biased expectations regarding the options expiring in-the-money. The price
of a European option should reﬂect the probability-weighted present value of the proﬁt
at the expiry, and if the probabilities are systematically false, then the option is also
mispriced. Therefore, by comparing the market-based probabilities of options ending
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TABLE 4 The frequency (%) of options expiring in-the-money by holding period and
moneyness, 1999–2012.
(a) Realized
Months CC90 CC95 CC100 CC105 CC110 PP90 PP95 PP100 PP105 PP110
6 67 60 58 55 57 35 40 42 45 40
3 71 60 48 45 38 28 40 52 55 59
2 64 60 50 33 25 38 40 50 66 74
1 76 61 49 37 28 24 38 49 65 76
(b) Expected
Months CC90 CC95 CC100 CC105 CC110 PP90 PP95 PP100 PP105 PP110
6 65 58 52 48 43 35 40 46 51 54
3 68 59 50 41 34 30 39 48 57 63
2 70 58 47 38 30 30 40 51 60 69
1 74 62 47 35 24 22 35 51 63 75
CC90 refers to a covered call strategy with an option strike price of 90% of the initial forward price. PP refers to a
protective put strategy. A strike price below 100% is referred to as in-the-money for call options and out-of-money
for puts. The expected values are based on option Delta sensitivities.
up in-the-money with the actual ex post probabilities, one is able to draw conclusions
about the underlying causes of the excess returns.
Table 4 reports the actual and expected frequencies of option strategies expiring
in-the-money. The expected values are based on the Delta sensitivities of the option
strategies, which can be interpreted as market assumptions of the future moneyness.
The Deltas should correspond to the actual outcomes in an efﬁcient market. For
example, an option with a 70% Delta is expected to expire in-the-money seven times
out of ten.
The results inTable 4 show that the probability of an option strategy expiring in-the-
money increases (decreases) with the strike prices for put (call) options, which can be
considered as a basic requirement for fair option pricing.Amore careful comparison of
actual and expected outcomes reveals that the market-based expectations correspond
well with the ex post frequencies, which implies that the options in the market are
at least relatively efﬁciently priced. For example, the at-the-money option strategies
having a 50% Delta do actually expire in-the-money every second time in the sample.
We also carry out a regression analysis, in which we regress the Delta levels on
the ex post probabilities to statistically verify our interpretations. For brevity, we
do not report the regression results in detail but note that the ex ante probabilities
implied by the Delta levels are on average unbiased and efﬁcient estimates of the
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FIGURE 9 The difference between actual and expected probabilities of call options ex-
piring in-the-money, 1999–2012.
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FIGURE 10 The difference between expected and actual probabilities of put options
expiring in-the-money, 1999–2012.
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probability that the option strategies end up in proﬁt. However, as can be seen from
Figure 9 and Figure 10, there are some systematic deviations that correlate with
option moneyness and holding periods. In particular, the Delta levels of the call-based
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FIGURE 11 The cumulative returns of quarterly forward contract and at-the-money
covered call and protective put strategies, three-month holding period, 1999–2012.
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strategies underestimate the true probabilities of option moneyness, especially at high
strike prices and for long holding periods. The exact opposite holds for corresponding
put options. These results suggest that both strategies are expected to pay relatively
well when implemented with the highest strike price options for a six-month holding
period.
4.4 Split-sample analysis
Because the covered call and the protective put strategies have different directional
implications with respect to the price development of the underlying asset, it is impor-
tant to check whether the performance of the two strategies is driven by up- or down-
market periods. As an initial analysis, Figure 11 compares the cumulative returns
from holding a forward contract with covered call and protective put strategies based
on at-the-money options: the return index for the forward contract increases between
1999 and 2006 and then declines for most of the remaining sample period.
With regard to the option strategies, it can be clearly seen from the ﬁgure that
the covered call strategy delivers relatively low returns in both up- and down-market
conditions. Speciﬁcally, the covered call strategy delivers positive but relatively low
returns until 2007 and also experiences large losses during the latter half of the sample
period. This can be explained by the limited upside potential of the covered call
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TABLE 5 Annualized Sharpe ratios (%) for option strategies with different holding periods,
moneyness levels and subsamples: 1999–2006 and 2007–2012.
(a) 1999–2006
Covered call Protective put
‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
5% 5% 5% 5%
Months Forward ITM ATM OTM ITM ATM OTM
6 48 13 2 21 69 69 70
3 80 7 7 11 112 106 107
2 104 65 64 56 112 103 101
1 74 6 18 74 136 88 114
(b) 2007–2012
Covered call Protective put
‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
5% 5% 5% 5%
Months Forward ITM ATM OTM ITM ATM OTM
6 29 25 22 1 0 13 11
3 51 59 49 45 23 21 14
2 77 78 82 78 21 30 38
1 111 78 119 120 31 44 77
Estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Bootstrapped standard errors.
strategies, which curtailed the returns in 2003, and the inadequate protection against
market crashes, which depressed returns in 2007.
In Figure 11 on the preceding page, the protective put strategy stands in sharp
contrast to the covered call, performing relatively well in both rising and declining
market environments. Over the twelve-year sample period, the protective put strategy
delivers a cumulative return of 150%, which corresponds to an average 12% return on
an annual basis. Unlike the covered call strategy, the protective put strategy beneﬁted
fully from the rising forward prices between 1999 and 2006 and provided important
downside protection at the time of the market crash in 2007.
Regarding the realized return–risk ratios in the two subsamples, Table 5 presents
the conditional Sharpe ratios for the different strategies. The results from the table
give a strong indication that, in terms of reward for risk, the protective put strate-
gies outperform the covered call strategies and the forward contract investment in
both subsamples, irrespective of holding-period lengths or option moneyness lev-
els. The average Sharpe ratio for the protective put strategies is as high as 100% in
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the ﬁrst subsample, which means that every percentage point of risk that is taken is
compensated by a 1 percentage point increase in the annualized return. For the same
subsample, the average Sharpe ratio of the covered call strategies is only 26%, or one-
quarter of the protective put. Consistently, in declining markets the average Sharpe
ratio for the covered call strategies is approximately two and half times smaller than
that for the protective put. The results of the split-sample analysis imply that period-
speciﬁc effects are important but do not drive the relative performance gap of the
option strategies. More detailed subsample statistics are available from the authors
on request.
4.5 Return decompositions
In the previous sections, we have documented that the performance differences of
the option strategies do not stem from period-speciﬁc market conditions or mis-
estimated probabilities of the strategies expiring in-the-money. In order to understand
the source of the relative performance gap between the strategies, we turn to the return
decomposition approach byHill et al (2006). Speciﬁcally, we decompose the holding-
period returns of the option strategies into components attributable to option fair-value
and volatility premiums. The fair value premium is the return component obtained if
the optionwere to be valued at the realized volatility of the underlying asset rather than
at the implied volatility. By using the realized rather than the implied volatility, one is
able to isolate the investment effects of the higher moments of the underlying return
distribution. The volatility premium, on the other hand, captures the option pricing
effect of the spread of the implied volatility over realized volatility. It effectively
measures the excess returns that can be earned by writing options on relatively high
prices. The actual returns of the strategies can be calculated by summing the two
return components.
Figure 12 on the next page presents the return effects of the fair value premium
for different holding periods and moneyness levels. The two main observations from
the ﬁgure are the relatively stable positive returns of the protective put strategies
compared with the worsening negative performance of the covered call strategies
over shorter holding periods. Given that the effect of volatility is controlled for, these
results underline the unsuitability of the covered call strategy when the underlying
asset price experiences large jumps (see the reported kurtosis statistic of the underlying
asset in Table 1 on page 8). The adverse effects of the jumps are more pronounced in
the short term, which can be seen in the extremely bad performance of the call-option-
based strategies in the one-month holding period. The protective put strategies, on the
other hand, fully capitalize on the positive price jumps and provide protection against
the adverse effects of market crashes.
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FIGURE 12 Average returns on fair-valued option strategies for different holding periods
and moneyness levels, 1999–2012.
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FIGURE 13 The average volatility premium on option strategies for different holding
periods and moneyness levels, 1999–2012.
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Moving from the effect of fair-value premiums to volatility premiums, Figure 13
shows a clear term structure of returns on excess volatility. Speciﬁcally, the covered
call strategies, which are based on the writing options that are overpriced with respect
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to future volatility, show a strong, positive performance. The strong performance
of the call-based strategies is manifested in the shorter holding periods, where it is
enhanced by the increasing rate of decay in the time value of the written call option.
The reverse pattern holds for the protective put strategies, which are based on long
option positions. In general, the two return components seem to have an offsetting
effect on the actual returns, but the return effects of the fair-premium investments
have a much greater impact and thus drive the performance gap between the two
strategies.
The results from the return decompositions are consistent with the view that the
analyzed power options carry a price premium for the risk of price discontinuities.This
affects the performance of short and long option positions oppositely. However, the
dominance of the returns from the fair-value premiums over the returns from excess
volatility suggests that the volatility premium in option prices has been too small to
offset the adverse effects of jumps in the underlying asset price. This is especially
apparent in the poor performance of the covered strategies based onwritten short-term
call options, for which the adverse effects of price crashes are larger than the returns
from selling slightly overpriced options.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper carried out an investment-based assessment of the risk and return charac-
teristics of power derivatives.We considered different option strategies for the Nordic
electricity market with twelve years of observations and conclude that it is possible to
enhance investment returns with certain option strategies. Speciﬁcally, we found that
the best-performing option strategy in the sample is the protective put strategy. This
seems to perform well during rising and declining markets, and it is able to better
capture the positive effects of the frequent price jumps in the underlying forward
market. Compared with a covered call strategy, the protective put delivers on average
12 percentage points higher returns on an annual basis, and it has preferable skewness
properties.
The performance of the strategies varied across option moneyness levels and hold-
ing periods,with the one-month holding period delivering generally poor performance
and having the highest frequency of extreme returns. The option strategies based on
at-the-money or mildly in-the-money put options seem to be the best choices from
an investment perspective, because their returns are relatively high and stable across
holding periods. Further, the Delta values of the best-performing strategies range
from 25% to 75%, which implies that an economically sensible alternative to a tra-
ditional forward hedge can be achieved by moderately leveraging the protective put
positions.
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how electricity options traded in the Nasdaq OMX Commodi-
ties Europe ﬁnancial market are priced compared with their corresponding futures
contracts. For this purpose, the dynamic delta portfolio is constructed using quar-
terly options and an underlying futures contract. Given that the risk level of such a
portfolio is adjusted on a daily basis, in such a manner that it matches the correspond-
ing static futures strategy, we can directly calculate the price difference between the
dynamic delta option strategy and the static futures strategy. We ﬁnd some season-
ality in the price differences between the static and dynamic strategies. When using
calls, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative (positive) price difference during winter (sum-
mer) quarters. In contrast, for puts, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive price difference
during winter quarters, but not during summer quarters. We also ﬁnd that the winter
and summer quarters are associated with the reported price differences, which are not
as universally related to the trends in electricity prices (ie, increasing or decreasing
electricity prices).
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1 INTRODUCTION
In an electricity market where spot prices are generally highly volatile, employing
well-functioning ﬁnancial risk management practices can be an important competi-
tive advantage for electricity companies or other practitioners. However, to achieve
effective ﬁnancial risk management, the instruments traded in a ﬁnancial electricity
market should be relatively fairly priced, and the risk sharing between market partic-
ipants should be relatively equal. For example, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002)
state that the existence of forward premiums in an electricity market may imply that
the
power markets are not well integrated with the broader ﬁnancial markets, that is, that
outside speculators are not [a] signiﬁcant presence in these markets. It will be [of]
interest to see if mechanisms are developed to facilitate the sharing of power [price]
risk with outside speculators, and if risk premium decline[s] as a consequence.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether price differences exist
between euro-nominated quarterly options and futures contracts that are traded in
the Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market. In this study, the price dif-
ference is deﬁned as the inequality in euro terms between the dynamically managed
delta option strategy and the corresponding static futures strategy. In theory, the mon-
etary outcome from both strategies should be equal, as the risk levels related to the
future electricity prices are equal. However, nonzero and statistically signiﬁcant price
differences suggest that potential mispricing might exist that the investor, hedgers or
speculators could exploit. For example, the hedger might choose the strategy that
brings them the highest hedging price for the electricity.
The price difference is tested by constructing two separate portfolios and analyz-
ing their performance. The ﬁrst portfolio consists of only futures contracts, while the
second portfolio consists of a joint position on futures and option contracts (call or
put options). The risk level of the second portfolio is adjusted on a daily basis by trad-
ing the underlying asset of the option contracts: the futures contracts. The daily risk
adjustment is done so that the risk level, measured using delta, of portfolio 2 equals
that of portfolio 1 every day. This is known as the dynamic delta option strategy. In
theory, the electricity price achieved with either one of the two portfolios should be
the same, on average. Otherwise, the risk sharing of electricity price between market
participants in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market, especially
in the option contracts market, may not be fair enough.
In this paper, the static futures strategy is constructed by selling a futures con-
tract, while the dynamic delta option strategy is constructed by writing (buying) a
call (put) option contract and simultaneously selling a futures contract. In theory,
if call (put) option contracts are overpriced (underpriced), the dynamic delta option
strategy should outperform the static futures strategy. Instead, if call (put) options are
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underpriced (overpriced), the static futures strategy should outperform the dynamic
delta option strategy.
While the existing research (see, for example, Bessembinder and Lemmon 2002;
Longstaff and Wang 2004; Kristiansen 2007; Douglas and Popova 2008; Wimschulte
2010; Botterud et al 2010; Gjolberg and Brattested 2011; Lucia and Torro´ 2011;
Frestad 2012; Bunn and Chen 2013; Weron and Zator 2014; Smith-Meyer and Gjol-
berg 2016) on ﬁnancial electricity markets mainly focuses on futures/forward con-
tract markets, this paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the price dif-
ference between futures and option contracts. For example, Botterud et al (2010),
Gjolberg and Brattested (2011), Lucia and Torro´ (2011) and Weron and Zator (2014)
analyze the price differences between forward/futures contracts and spot prices in
the Nordic region. In addition, Kristiansen (2007), Wimschulte (2010) and Frestad
(2012) analyze the price difference between forward/futures contracts with different
maturities that are traded in the Nordic ﬁnancial electricity market. However, to the
best of the authors’ knowledge, the price difference between futures and option con-
tracts traded in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market has not been
analyzed before.
From a practical point of view, it is important to analyze in more detail the pric-
ing mechanism of option contracts that are traded in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities
Europe ﬁnancial market, since options could be practical hedging instruments for the
electricity companies that operate in the Nordic region. For example, several previ-
ous studies have shown, using a simulation setup, that option contracts are useful
hedging instruments (see, for example, Deng and Oren 2006; Oum et al 2006; Oum
and Oren 2009, 2010; Pineda and Conejo 2012). However, Sanda et al (2013) report
that Norwegian hydro-based electricity producers use option contracts as hedging
instruments relatively rarely. Do practitioners feel that the option contracts traded in
the Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market are perhaps too expensive
to use? If, however, the option contracts are mispriced relative to the futures con-
tracts, this offers practitioners an opportunity to boost their income level by exploit-
ing the mispriced option contracts, ie, if call option contracts are overpriced relative
to futures contracts, practitioners would ﬁnancially beneﬁt by writing call option
contracts and selling futures contracts jointly, instead of just selling futures con-
tracts. The ﬁndings of this study should aid and motivate practitioners to consider
using option contracts on electricity price as a component of their risk management
practice.
This topic is also of economic importance. For example, during February 2018,
total trading in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market amounted to
86.7 TWh (4700 GWh) of electricity, or €2.4 billion (€122 million), on a monthly
(daily) basis (Nasdaq Commodities Europe 2018a).
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Results from the empirical part of our investigation suggest that some price dif-
ferences exist between the dynamic delta option strategies vis-a`-vis the static futures
strategy. For the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options, we ﬁnd sea-
sonal variation in the reported price differences (the static futures strategy minus
the dynamic delta option strategy). We ﬁnd the winter quarters (the ﬁrst and fourth
quarters of the year) are negatively associated with the reported price differences,
whereas the summer quarters (the second and third quarters of the year) are posi-
tively associated with the reported price differences. Also, the price difference itself
is statistically signiﬁcant and negative (positive) for the winter (summer) quarters.
This indicates that the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options performs
better (worse) during the winter (summer) quarters than the static futures strategy.
For the dynamic delta option strategy that uses put options, we ﬁnd weaker sea-
sonal variation in the reported price differences. We ﬁnd the winter (summer) quar-
ters are positively (negatively) associated with the reported price differences, but the
price difference itself is only statistically signiﬁcant and positive for the winter quar-
ters. This indicates that the static futures strategy performs better than the dynamic
delta option strategy that uses put options during the winter quarters only, with the
average price difference being as high as 1.23 €/MWh in favor of the static futures
strategy. For the summer quarters, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant price difference.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the reported price differences are universally related to
the trends in electricity prices (ie, increasing or decreasing electricity prices). We
also ﬁnd some cross-sectional variation in the reported price differences when ana-
lyzing the different moneyness levels employed in the dynamic delta option strate-
gies that use call options. The reported price differences of such strategies seem to
be driven by those strategies that utilize at-the-money and in-the-money moneyness
call options.
These results suggest the call options traded on the Nasdaq OMX Europe Com-
modities ﬁnancial market might be overpriced (underpriced) during winter (sum-
mer) quarters, and the put options might also be overpriced during winter quarters,
especially for hedging purposes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy discusses earlier studies.
Section 3 describes the data and methodology used in the present study. Section 4
presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes, brieﬂy discussing our main
ﬁndings and their interconnection with previous studies.
2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE
2.1 Electricity forward/futures prices versus spot prices
The earliest, as well as the majority of previous, studies related to ﬁnancial electricity
markets generally focus on analyzing the price difference between forward/futures
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contract prices and spot prices. This price difference is also known as a forward pre-
mium, as described by Fama and French (1987). The forward premium can also be
viewed as a risk premium paid to the seller of a forward/futures contract for exposing
themselves to volatile spot prices.
Before the millennium, the behavior of electricity prices and the pricing of elec-
tricity derivatives were relatively uncovered topics. This was partly due to a lack of
publicly available data and the problems this caused in performing reliable statistical
tests. To improve the statistical power of small samples in highly volatile electric-
ity markets, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) developed a theoretical cost-based
equilibrium model to analyze the potential existence of forward premiums in US
electricity markets. They found that, on average, one-month-ahead monthly forward
contracts carry statistically signiﬁcant positive forward premiums during times of
high electricity demand (summer months). Moreover, the magnitude and statistical
signiﬁcance of the forward premiums diminish or become negative as demand for
electricity decreases. However, when we compare our ﬁndings from the theoretical
model, which is based on the cost expectation of future spot prices, with actual
realized spot prices, the results become mixed. The statistical signiﬁcance of pos-
itive forward premiums disappears, and the magnitude of negative forward premi-
ums increases as does their corresponding statistical signiﬁcance. Bessembinder and
Lemmon (2002) argue that this difference is due to an unusual price spike in the
summer of 2000 in the California Power Exchange (CalPX) market. Hence, Bessem-
binder and Lemmon (2002) motivate further research so that more conclusions may
be reached.
Longstaff and Wang (2004) address the data problem raised by Bessembinder and
Lemmon (2002) by using high-frequency day-ahead forward data from the PJM mar-
ket. They ﬁnd that the forward premium varies from negative to positive throughout
the day, although the average hourly forward premium is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In line with the results of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), Longstaff and Wang
(2004) ﬁnd that the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of positive forward pre-
miums are highest during so-called peak periods. Douglas and Popova (2008) report
similar results and ﬁnd that the magnitude and sign of the forward premium vary
within a day, although the daily mean and median stay close to zero. In addition,
Hadsell and Shawky (2007) ﬁnd that day-ahead forward premiums in the New York
wholesale electricity market are dependent not only on the time of day but also on
the day of the week and the calendar month. In a more recent study by Haugom and
Ullrich (2012), however, no consistent evidence that the forward premium still exists
on the PJM market for short-term forward contracts is found.
Botterud et al (2010) empirically analyze the potential existence of forward pre-
miums for weekly futures contracts in the Nord Pool electricity market. They ﬁnd
that, on average, futures prices are higher than their corresponding spot prices, but
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they vary seasonally. Botterud et al (2010) also report that, generally, the forward
premium increases monotonically with the holding period, as does the standard devi-
ation of the forward premium. However, Botterud et al (2010) do not ﬁnd any distinct
seasonal pattern in forward premiums, as they are generally positive all around the
year, although they do brieﬂy turn negative during the snow-melting period.
Consistent with the ﬁndings of Botterud et al (2010), Gjolberg and Brattested
(2011), Lucia and Torro´ (2011) and Haugom et al (2014) ﬁnd evidence of positive
forward premiums for short-term futures contracts traded in the Nord Pool electric-
ity market. Lucia and Torro´ (2011) also ﬁnd that the forward premiums for one-week
futures contracts increase with the holding period. Lucia and Torro´ (2011) and Hau-
gom et al (2014) also clearly demonstrate the seasonal pattern of forward premiums,
showing that the magnitude of forward premiums is at its largest during winter peri-
ods. Gjolberg and Brattested (2011) ﬁnd similar results for four- and six-week futures
contracts in the Nord Pool.
Also, Weron and Zator (2014) empirically analyze forward premiums for one-
week futures contracts for different holding periods. Their results suggest the forward
premium can vary from negative to positive depending on the holding period. How-
ever, consistent with earlier studies, the forward premium is positive and increases
for longer holding periods.
In a recent paper by Smith-Meyer and Gjolberg (2016), it is reported that after
the year 2008 the forward premiums from short-term futures contracts appear to
have diminished. Mork (2006) ﬁnds supporting evidence and argues that forward
premiums diminished in the Nordic electricity market after the millennium.
Diko et al (2006) empirically analyze the potential existence of forward premi-
ums in three major European electricity markets: German, Dutch and French. They
ﬁnd positive forward premiums for day-ahead forward contracts for all three mar-
kets. However, the positive forward premium is, in general, only statistically signiﬁ-
cant during peak hours. Ronn and Wimschulte (2009) ﬁnd consistent and supporting
results with regard to positive day-ahead forward premiums in the German and Aus-
trian electricity markets. In addition, Bunn and Chen (2013) ﬁnd day-ahead forward
premiums to be positive (negative) during peak (off-peak) hours in the British elec-
tricity market; however, they ﬁnd that month-ahead forward premiums have strong
seasonality, being positive in winter and negative in summer for both peak and off-
peak hours. Redl et al (2009) ﬁnd the positive forward premiums for monthly deliv-
ery periods in the European Energy Exchange (EEX) and Nord Pool markets for
month-ahead contracts.
Cartea and Villaplana (2008) ﬁnd that the forward premium is conditional on the
seasons in the PJM, English and Welsh, and Nord Pool markets. The forward pre-
mium is small, or even negative, during months of low demand volatility, and positive
during months of high demand volatility.
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Benth et al (2008) argue and ﬁnd that the existence of forward premiums in the
German electricity market is related to market participants’ desire to hedge their
positions. While producers are more willing to undertake long-term hedges, con-
sumers prefer short-term hedges. This makes the forward premium time dependent
and causes it to change sign. Huisman and Kilic (2012) show that forward premiums
are related to the type of electricity supply (or storage possibilities of fuel) in the mar-
ket. They ﬁnd that time-varying risk premiums only exist in markets with nearly per-
fect fuel storability (fossils), that is, they do not exist in markets with imperfect fuel
storability (hydro). In both markets, however, the futures prices contain information
about future changes in spot prices.
Redl and Bunn (2013) exploit multifactor analysis to evaluate the components
of forward premiums in the EEX market. They ﬁnd that several components affect
forward premiums in this market during the base load phase. These components
are, for instance, daily variations on spot electricity and Brent prices, the realized
ratio of generation and consumption, and the basis (the forward premium from the
previous delivery month) and shift in supply/demand balance during the delivery
month. During the peak load phase, gas forward premiums also affect electricity
forward premiums. In fact, Redl et al (2009) ﬁnd supporting results that year-ahead
generation costs and spot market prices affect futures prices in the EEX and Nord
Pool markets.
2.2 Short- versus long-term electricity forward prices
Kristiansen (2007) extends the literature related to forward premiums to the price
difference between derivative contracts with different maturities, arguing that “in an
efﬁcient forward market the price of a seasonal forward contract should equal the
time-weighted average of the underlying monthly forward contracts”. By construct-
ing synthetic seasonal forward contracts in the Nord Pool, and by using underlying
monthly forward contracts for summer and winter in both 2003 and 2004, Kristiansen
(2007) ﬁnds price differences, which are especially large in winter 2003. The same
author also constructs synthetic yearly forward contracts from seasonal forward con-
tracts for the respective year. In this case, Kristiansen (2007) again ﬁnds some price
differences, but with a lower magnitude.
Wimschulte (2010) continues and extends the study of Kristiansen (2007) and
analyzes price differences between short- and long-term derivative contracts in
the Nord Pool market from 2003 to 2008. Wimschulte (2010) constructs synthetic
monthly forward contracts from daily and weekly futures contracts. Although Wim-
schulte (2010) ﬁnds evidence of some price differences, the results are not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant after transaction costs have been taken into account. Wimschulte’s
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ﬁndings slightly contradict those of Kristiansen (2007). However, this demonstrates
that pricing in the Nord Pool market might have become more accurate over
time.
A study by Frestad (2012) is also closely related to price differences in the Nord
Pool between derivative contracts with different maturities. Frestad ﬁnds that using
delivery period mismatched hedging instruments with higher liquidity can overcome
the loss of hedging effectiveness.
2.3 Options on electricity futures
At the moment, the empirical analysis related to the valuation of options on elec-
tricity futures contracts is a relatively uncovered topic. Where some studies discuss
the electricity option contracts on spot electricity prices (see, for example, Deng and
Oren 2006; Oum et al 2006; Oum and Oren 2009, 2010; Pineda and Conejo 2012;
Boroumand et al 2015), only a few focus on option contracts on electricity futures/
forward contracts. For example, Weron (2008) ﬁnds that by utilizing the market price
of risk inferred from the more-liquid futures contracts, Asian-style options could efﬁ-
ciently be written on spot electricity prices. Also, those few studies that do focus on
option contracts on electricity futures/forward contracts are mainly from a theoretical
perspective.
Benth and Schmeck (2014a) go further and propose a model whereby they use
different probability measures to price futures contracts in the electricity market, and
different probability measures to price option contracts on those futures contracts.
They ﬁnd that if option contracts are priced with the probability measure derived
from futures contract markets, it leads to mispricing. However, they did not suggest
any speciﬁc probability measure for option contracts at present. In their study, Benth
and Schmeck (2014b) prove the Black-76 pricing model can also be utilized when
pricing electricity options on electricity futures contracts. In recent studies by Benth
and Detering (2015) and Schmeck (2016), the authors propose alternative pricing
methods for options contracts on futures/forwards in energy markets.
In a study by Zhang and Zhou (2004), the authors discuss and demonstrate the
theoretical payoffs from different option strategies on electricity forwards in China.
They conclude that forward options offer more potential payoff patterns for market
participants, play an important role in risk reducing and strengthen the stability of
the market. They suggest that option-type instruments will play an important role in
future electricity markets.
2.4 Summary of earlier ﬁndings
Most of the previous studies related to ﬁnancial electricity markets generally focus
on the existence of forward premiums. Several studies ﬁnd that forward premiums
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do exist in the ﬁnancial electricity market in a global setup. Moreover, some of the
studies report that the forward premium is conditional on the season, time of day or
holding period. Some studies also report that price differences exist between short-
and long-term forward contracts.
However, a new body of literature is emerging: the pricing of option contracts on
electricity futures contracts. These studies focus on how to price option contracts on
electricity futures from a more theoretical perspective.
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The ﬁnancial electricity market data used in this study was obtained from the Nord
Pool and Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial markets. The data set con-
sists of 8997 daily closing prices for the quarterly call and put option contracts as
well as closing prices for the corresponding futures contracts. The selection of call
and put option contracts is made so that they represent 5% in-the-money (ITM), at-
the-money (ATM) and 5% out-of-the-money (OTM) moneyness levels. The sample
period is from April 21, 2005 to December 9, 2011. The underlying quarterly con-
tracts cover the delivery period 2006 Q1–2012 Q1: twenty-ﬁve different quarters in
total. The quarterly futures and option contracts are chosen for their liquidity and
their ability to capture seasonal effects. In addition, the chosen period contains quar-
ters with increasing and decreasing electricity prices. A more detailed description
of option contract liquidity and volumes on the Nasdaq OMX commodities Europe
ﬁnancial market is provided by Nikkinen and Rothovius (2018).
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) futures price for the
sample period is 46.26 (46.20) €/MWh, with a maximum (minimum) price of 84.73
(22.89) €/MWh. For the sample period, the average (median) value of all call options
is 5.33 (4.16) €/MWh. For all of the put options, the corresponding value is 4.72
(3.34) €/MWh. For the sample period, the average (median) strike price for all call
options is 45.68 (47.00) €/MWh, and for all put options it is 45.64 (47.00) €/MWh.
The formation of dynamic delta option strategies in this paper closely follows the
methodology and model introduced by both Black and Scholes (1972) and Galai
(1977). The purpose of this model is to identify if the option contract in ques-
tion is overvalued or undervalued. If a signiﬁcant positive proﬁt can be made by
buying (shorting) the option contract, the result suggests that the option contract is
undervalued (overvalued). The model is expressed as follows:
.C  CvV /  .C  CvV /rt; (3.1)
where C is the change in option value, Cv is the delta value of the underlying
asset, and V is the change in value of the underlying asset. CvV gives the number
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics of daily option and futures contract prices.
Call Put
Futures ‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
price Price Strike Price Strike
Mean 46.26 5.33 45.68 4.72 45.64
Median 46.20 4.16 47.00 3.34 47.00
Standard deviation 10.89 4.80 10.07 4.78 10.02
Minimum 22.89 0.01 29.00 0.01 29.00
Maximum 84.73 31.63 73.00 30.21 73.00
Skewness 0.55 1.55 0.42 1.91 0.42
Kurtosis 3.23 5.87 2.59 7.49 2.61
Number of observations 8997 8997 8997 8997 8997
The descriptive statistics for the option and futures contracts used in this study. “Futures” are quarterly futures
contracts traded in the Nasdaq OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market. “Call” and “Put” are quarterly option
contracts (with different levels of moneyness: 5% ITM, ATM and 5% OTM) that are traded in the same market.
The underlying asset of quarterly option contracts is the previously mentioned quarterly futures contract. “Price”
represents the daily closing prices for a given contract. “Strike” is the strike price of quarterly option contracts. We
used daily data, measured in €/MWh, from April 21, 2005 to December 9, 2011.
of underlying assets needed to achieve a complete hedge, t is the time interval and
r is the interest rate. The option position is maintained throughout the life of the
option.
As can be seen from (3.1), the purpose of the equation is to maintain the delta
neutrality over time and on every single day. The underlying asset V is bought or
sold each day, depending on the change in Cv , so that the delta neutrality can be
maintained. This process is repeated each day until the maturity day of the option
contract. On the maturity day, the positions are liquidated so the dollar return can be
calculated (see, for example, Black and Scholes 1972; Galai 1977).
In this paper, the dynamic delta option strategy is carried out by writing (buy-
ing) a call (put) option and simultaneously shorting an underlying quarterly futures
contract. The positions are opened approximately six months before maturity, or the
closest possible trading day. The delta value of the option contract at the time of
opening the positions is used as a proxy for what percentage of the position is done
with the option contract, and the remainder is done with the quarterly futures contract
in such a way that their joint delta value equals the delta value of the futures contract.
Due to the time-varying delta values of the option position, the underlying quarterly
futures contracts are traded on a daily basis to keep the joint delta position ﬁxed at
the end of each trading day. The trading costs of 0.0045 €/MWh per traded quar-
terly futures contract are taken into account (Nasdaq Commodities Europe 2018b).
The positions are held until maturity, when the position values from the two different
strategies are compared (measured in €/MWh).
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The dynamic delta option strategies with both call and put are constructed using
a different level of moneyness from option contracts: 5% ITM, ATM and 5% OTM.
In our empirical analysis, various market states of electricity price are considered.
Hence, the results are reviewed separately for quarters with increasing or decreasing
electricity price. Also, due to the strong seasonality of electricity prices, the empirical
analysis takes winter and summer periods into account.
We follow the idea of Fama and French (1987) by ﬁrst testing the price differences
between the static futures strategy and the dynamic delta option strategies with the
following paired difference test:
EŒFutures Pricet  Option Strategy Pricet  D 0; (3.2)
where Futures Pricet is the hedging price achieved using the static futures strategy
for a given time period t . Option Strategy Pricet is the hedging price achieved using
the dynamic delta option strategy for a given time period t .
Second, a nonzero “pricing error” for different dynamic delta option strategies is
tested for seasonality (see Fama and French 1987) by applying the following model:
Futures Pricet  Option Strategy Pricet D ˇ0 C ˇ1 Dummyk;t C et ; (3.3)
where Dummyk;t deﬁnes a set of dummy variables k (“Down”, “Up”, “Winter” and
“Summer”) for a given time period t . “Down” is a dummy variable for the quarters
with decreasing electricity price. “Up” is a dummy variable for the quarters with
increasing electricity price. “Winter” is a dummy variable for winter quarters (the
ﬁrst and fourth quarters of the year). “Summer” is a dummy variable for summer
quarters (the second and third quarters of the year). Winter and summer dummies
are used to capture seasonal effects.1
A similar test is also carried out using panel data, set up across different levels of
moneyness, for dynamic delta option strategies with call and put options, separately.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Summary statistics for the strategies
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the dynamic delta option strategies and
the static futures strategy, which is viewed as a benchmark strategy.
On average, the electricity price achieved at maturity from the static futures strat-
egy is 45.63 €/MWh. For a dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options, the
1 Seasonality in electricity price can be observed, for example, when comparing the average price
from the static futures strategy during the winter quarters (49.70 €/MWh) with the average price
from the static futures strategy during the summer quarters (41.22 €/MWh). These results are not
reported in this study but are available upon request.
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TABLE 2 Summary statistics of dynamic delta option strategies and static futures
strategy.
(a) Call options (b) Put options
‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
Futures 5% OTM ATM 5% ITM 5% OTM ATM 5% ITM
Mean 45.63 45.80 45.60 45.67 44.92 44.92 45.05
Median 47.20 45.72 44.92 44.83 44.53 44.12 44.22
SD 10.02 9.81 9.89 9.91 10.45 10.69 10.83
Maximum 71.25 67.64 68.69 68.87 72.94 73.30 72.45
Minimum 30.73 29.65 29.66 29.93 30.74 30.91 30.96
The descriptive statistics for the dynamic delta option strategies and static futures strategy, measured in €/MWh. In
panel (a), the dynamic delta option strategy uses call options, while in panel (b) it uses put options. SD stands for
standard deviation. There are twenty-ﬁve quarters, and the estimation period is from Q1 2006 to Q1 2012, totaling
seventy-ﬁve trajectories for the dynamic strategies with both call and put options.
comparable electricity prices achieved range from 45.60 €/MWh to 45.80 €/MWh,
depending on the level of moneyness used. For a dynamic delta option strategy that
uses put options, the average electricity prices achieved are slightly lower and range
from 44.92 €/MWh to 45.05 €/MWh, depending on the level of moneyness used.
The electricity price achieved via the dynamic delta option strategy with call
options equates to the electricity price achieved via the static futures strategy. Mean-
while, the electricity price achieved via the dynamic delta option strategy with put
options is lower on average than that achieved via the static futures strategy or via
the dynamic delta option strategy with call options.
The standard deviation of achieved electricity price is lowest for the dynamic
delta option strategy that uses call options, while it is highest for the dynamic delta
option strategy that uses put options. The dynamic delta option strategy that uses put
options has the highest maximum and minimum achieved electricity prices, whereas
the strategy that uses call options has the lowest maximum and minimum achieved
electricity prices. The static futures strategy is between these two. Hence, from a
naive perspective, the dynamic delta option strategy with call options can be consid-
ered a lower-risk strategy, while that with put options can be considered a higher-risk
strategy.
4.2 Univariate analysis
To statistically test the price differential between the dynamic delta option strate-
gies and the static futures strategy (see (3.2)), paired difference tests are carried out.
Table 3 presents the results from these tests. The results indicate that there are no
statistically signiﬁcant price differences between the dynamic delta option strategy
that uses call options and the static futures strategy when all quarters are considered.
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TABLE 3 Paired difference test between dynamic delta option strategies and static
futures strategy.
Call Put
options options
All quarters .N D 75/
Mean 0.06 0.66
Median 0.44 0.41
Up .N D 39/
Mean 0.14 0.85
Median 0.52 0.54
Down .N D 36/
Mean 0.27 0.47
Median 0.11 0.28
Winter .N D 39/
Mean 0.68 1.23
Median 0.58 1.48
Summer .N D 36/
Mean 0.62 0.05
Median 0.71 0.04
The results from paired difference tests between the dynamic delta option strategies and static futures strategy of
the following model:
EŒFutures Pricet  Option Strategy Pricet  D 0:
The dynamic delta option strategy uses either call or put options. The estimation period is from Q1 2006 to Q1 2012.
Both panels are divided into ﬁve different subsections representing different electricity price market environments,
where N refers to the number of observations. “Up” are quarters with increasing electricity price. “Down” are
quarters with decreasing electricity price. The winter period consists of Q1 and Q4, while the summer period
consists of Q2 and Q3. The statistical signiﬁcance of the mean difference is tested using a t test, and a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test is used to test the median difference. The measurement is €/MWh. ,  and  represent
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
A similar conclusion can also be made when quarters with increasing or decreasing
electricity price are being taken into account separately. However, statistically sig-
niﬁcant price differences are found when we focus on seasonality effects. The price
difference is negative for winter quarters and positive for summer quarters. That indi-
cates the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options performs better (worse)
than the static futures strategy during the winter (summer) quarters.
For the dynamic delta option strategy with put options, the reported price differ-
ence is positive and statistically signiﬁcant when all quarters are considered. This
indicates that the static futures strategy outperforms the dynamic delta option strat-
egy with put options, on average. Also, when focusing on quarters with different
electricity price changes, a positive and statistically signiﬁcant price difference is
found for quarters with increasing electricity price. In contrast, the price difference
is not statistically signiﬁcant for the quarters with decreasing electricity price.
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TABLE 4 Multivariate analysis of the dynamic delta option strategies versus the static
futures strategy.
(a) Call options
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.06 0.00
(0.30)
0.14 0.41 0.00 0.79
(0.82) (1.48)
0.62 1.30 0.12 5.00
(2.80) (3.61)
0.72 0.25 1.27 0.11 5.03
(3.40) (1.21) (3.54)
(b) Put options
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.66 0.00
(4.13)
0.85 0.38 0.00 3.03
(5.39) (1.27)
0.05 1.18 0.12 25.82
(0.25) (3.61)
0.27 0.53 1.24 0.14 9.45
(1.24) (2.03) (4.00)
Here we report the estimates from the following model:
.Futures Pricet  Option Strategy Pricet / D ˇ0 C ˇ1 Dummyk;t C et ;
where Futures Pricet deﬁnes the hedging price achieved using the static futures strategy for a given time period
t . Option Strategy Pricet deﬁnes the hedging price achieved using the dynamic delta option strategy for a given
time period t . Dummyk;t deﬁnes a set of dummy variables k (“Down” and “Winter”) for a given time period t .
“Down” is a dummy variable for quarters with decreasing electricity price. “Winter” is a dummy variable for winter
futures contracts (the ﬁrst and fourth quarter futures contracts). The number of observations is seventy-ﬁve in all
regressions. “R2” is the adjusted R-squared. “F -statistic” reports the F -statistic from the Wald test, which tests
the null hypothesis that the estimated coefﬁcients are jointly equal to zero. All standard errors are corrected for
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using the White diagonal method. ,  and  represent statistical
signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
In addition, seasonality effects are found for the dynamic delta option strategy
with put options. As for the dynamic delta option strategy with call options, there is a
statistically signiﬁcant price difference for the dynamic delta option strategy with put
options during the winter quarters. However, in contrast to the dynamic delta option
strategy with call options, the price difference is now positive. This indicates that the
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static futures strategy outperforms the dynamic delta option strategy with put options
during the winter quarters. For the summer quarters, no statistically signiﬁcant price
difference is found.
4.3 Multivariate analysis
Table 4 reports regression estimates from the model (see (3.3)) for the dynamic delta
option strategy that uses call options. First, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative
(positive) association between the winter (summer) quarters and the reported price
differences.2 Also, the results from the Wald test conﬁrm that the null hypothesis
about a zero price difference can be rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level for the winter
and summer quarters separately.
All together, these results further support the earlier ﬁndings reported in Table 3,
that is, the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options outperforms (under-
performs) the static futures strategy during the winter (summer) quarters. More-
over, some seasonality effects can be found in the reported price differences for the
dynamic delta option strategies that use call options.
For the dynamic delta option strategy that uses put options, we ﬁnd the reported
price differences are positively (negatively) associated with the winter (summer)
quarters with statistical signiﬁcance.3 However, the sign of the correlation is the
opposite of that found for the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options. We
ﬁnd when aggregating all the quarters that the reported price difference is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. When focusing more on the seasonality of the reported
price differences, we ﬁnd the following. The results from the Wald test suggest that
the expected price difference of zero for the summer quarters cannot be rejected.
However, the results from the Wald test indicate that the this price difference can be
rejected at a 1% signiﬁcance level for the winter quarters. All together, these results
further support the earlier ﬁndings reported in Table 3, that is, the dynamic delta
option strategy that uses put options underperforms the static futures strategy during
the winter quarters, but not during the summer quarters. Moreover, some seasonality
effects can be found in the reported price differences for the dynamic delta option
strategies that use put options.
We ﬁnd there is no statistically signiﬁcant support that quarters with increas-
ing or decreasing electricity prices are generally associated with the reported price
differences.
2 The estimated coefﬁcients using “Summer” and/or “Up” dummy variables are not reported in
Table 4 but are available upon request.
3 See previous footnote.
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TABLE 5 Effects of moneyness on the dynamic delta option strategy with call options.
[Table continues on next page.]
(a) 5% OTM
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.17 0.00
(0.49)
0.01 0.38 0.01 0.54
(0.03) (0.79)
0.30 0.91 0.02 0.92
(0.73) (1.13)
0.41 0.28 0.87 0.02 1.04
(1.03) (0.60) (1.06)
(b) ATM
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.03 0.00
(0.10)
0.12 0.19 0.04 0.01
(0.40) (0.34)
0.72 1.32 0.11 1.47
(2.16) (2.50)
0.73 0.03 1.31 0.07 0.97
(1.98) (0.07) (2.52)
4.4 Multivariate analysis and moneyness levels
Table 5 reports regression estimates that are also from the model (see (3.3)); however,
it focuses more on the performance related to the different moneyness levels used in
the dynamic delta option strategy with call options.
For the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options, we ﬁnd the win-
ter (summer) quarters are negatively (positively) associated with the price differ-
ences, except for the OTM moneyness level.4 Results from the Wald test suggest that
the reported price difference for the winter quarters does not differ from zero with
statistical signiﬁcance. On the contrary, the results from the Wald test indicate that
the reported price difference is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the summer
quarters when the dynamic delta option strategy uses ATM and ITM moneyness
levels for option contracts.
4 The estimated coefﬁcients using “Summer” and/or “Up” dummy variables are not reported in
Table 5 but are available upon request.
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TABLE 5 Continued.
(c) 5% ITM
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.04 0.00
(0.09)
0.28 0.65 0.01 0.33
(0.96) (1.07)
0.84 1.68 0.15 1.87
(2.59) (2.73)
1.03 0.46 1.62 0.13 1.86
(2.65) (1.01) (2.72)
Here we report the estimates from the following model:
.Futures Pricet  Option Strategy Pricet / D ˇ0 C ˇ1 Dummyk;t C et ;
where Futures Pricet deﬁnes the hedging price achieved using the static futures strategy for a given time period t .
Option Strategy Pricet deﬁnes the hedging price achieved using the dynamic delta option strategy with call options
for a given time period t . Dummyk;t deﬁnes a set of dummy variables k (“Down” and “Winter”) for a given time
period t . “Down” is a dummy variable for the market state of decreasing electricity price. “Winter” is a dummy
variable for winter futures contracts (the ﬁrst and fourth quarter futures contracts). The number of observations is
twenty-ﬁve. “R2” is the adjusted R-squared. “F -statistic” reports the F -statistic from the Wald test, which tests the
null hypothesis that the estimated coefﬁcients are jointly equal to zero. Each panel represents a different moneyness
level used in the dynamic delta option strategy. All standard errors are corrected for both heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation using the Newey–West method. ,  and  represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05 and
0.01 levels, respectively.
These results further suggest that there is a seasonality effect in the price dif-
ferences. Further still, they seem to be mainly driven by the dynamic delta option
strategies that use ATM and ITM moneyness levels during the summer quarters. This
then implies that the static futures strategy performs better during the summer quar-
ters than the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options with ATM or ITM
moneyness levels. That, in turn, suggests the call options (ATM and ITM) might be
relatively underpriced during the summer quarters since we are writing call options.
Table 6 also reports regression estimates from the model (see (3.3)), focusing on
the performance related to the different moneyness levels used in the dynamic delta
option strategy with put options.
For the dynamic delta option strategy with put options, we ﬁnd that, generally, the
winter (summer) quarters are positively (negatively) associated with the price differ-
ences with statistical signiﬁcance.5 First, the reported price difference is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant when aggregating across all quarters. Second, the results from
the Wald test suggest that the price difference is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
5 The estimated coefﬁcients using “Summer” and/or “Up” dummy variables are not reported in
Table 6 but are available upon request.
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TABLE 6 Effects of moneyness on the dynamic delta option strategy with put options.
(a) 5% OTM
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.71 0.00
(2.41)
0.75 0.09 0.04 1.71
(2.77) (0.17)
0.01 1.38 0.19 9.41
(0.02) (2.67)
0.10 0.26 1.41 0.16 4.43
(0.28) (0.63) (2.83)
(b) ATM
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.71 0.00
(2.45)
0.86 0.31 0.03 1.22
(2.83) (0.55)
0.19 0.99 0.07 5.89
(0.59) (1.66)
0.37 0.43 1.05 0.05 2.25
(0.93) (0.83) (1.87)
(c) 5% ITM
Intercept Down Winter R2 F -statistic
0.58 0.00
(1.85)
0.93 0.73 0.00 0.11
(3.16) (1.14)
0.03 1.16 0.06 6.01
(0.06) (1.82)
0.34 0.89 1.27 0.09 1.32
(0.91) (1.43) (2.12)
See Table 5 note for details.
for winter quarters for all moneyness levels. However, the results from the Wald test
suggest that the reported price differences are not statistically signiﬁcantly different
from zero for the summer quarters for all moneyness levels.
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These results indicate the static future strategy performs better in all quarters, on
average, than the dynamic delta option strategy that uses put options and is not so
dependent on the moneyness levels used in the dynamic delta option strategy. The
static futures strategy also outperforms the dynamic delta option strategy that uses
put options during the winter quarters. This result is consistent across all money-
ness levels. However, this is not the case for the summer quarters, where the price
difference does not differ from zero with statistical signiﬁcance. This result is also
consistent across all moneyness levels.
Hence, these results support the previously reported ﬁndings of this study (see
Tables 3 and 4) that the static futures strategy performs better during winter quarters
than the dynamic delta option strategy with put options. However, the same cannot
be said about the performance difference during summer quarters. In addition, there
does not seem to be any cross-sectional variation depending on what level of money-
ness is used in the dynamic delta option strategy with put options, which was the case
for the dynamic delta option strategy with call options. These results may indicate
that the put option contract is overpriced during the winter quarters. This overpricing
could be due to two reasons. The ﬁrst is the potentially high risk awareness of put
option contract writers, since electricity prices are known to be highly volatile dur-
ing the winter quarters in Nordic countries. To mitigate the risk of volatile electricity
prices, put option contract writers want extra premiums. The second reason for this
overpricing could be that there is a high demand for put option contracts for winter
quarters, which then pushes the put option contract prices away from the equilibrium.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines how quarterly electricity option contracts traded in the Nasdaq
OMX Commodities Europe ﬁnancial market are priced compared with their corre-
sponding futures contracts. The comparison is achieved by constructing two alterna-
tive strategies that share the same risk level (measured by delta). The ﬁrst strategy
is a dynamic delta option strategy. It combines a position on a short call (long put)
option contract with a position on a short futures contract. The second strategy is a
static futures strategy, where only a position on a short futures contract is held. The
risk level of the dynamic delta option strategy is adjusted on a daily basis (due to the
time-varying delta of the option contract) by trading the option contract’s underlying
asset, the futures contract. Hence, the risk level of the dynamic delta option strategy
is able to be compared with the static futures strategy on a daily basis. Thus, we can
directly calculate the price difference between the dynamic delta option strategy and
the static futures strategy. In theory, both strategies should yield the same outcome
(a zero price difference), since their risk levels are the same. If a nonzero pricing
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Energy Markets
Acta Wasaensia 177 
46 A. Klemola
difference exists, it might offer an opportunity for practitioners to create a proﬁtable
trading strategy.
The results from the empirical part of our paper suggest that some price differences
and seasonality do exist. For the dynamic delta option strategy with call options, the
reported price difference is positive and statistically signiﬁcant during the summer
quarters (the second and third quarters of a given year). This result indicates that the
static futures strategy performs better during the summer quarters than the dynamic
delta option strategy with call options. In contrast, the reported price difference is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant during the winter quarters. This then implies
that the dynamic delta option strategy that uses call options outperforms the static
futures strategy during the winter quarters. These results, in turn, may imply the call
options are relatively underpriced (overpriced) during the summer (winter) quarters,
since in this scenario the dynamic delta option strategy writes call options. The possi-
ble reasons for this underpricing (overpricing) may come from two sources. The ﬁrst
is the low (high) risk awareness of call option contract writers during the summer
(winter) quarters, especially since electricity prices are known to be highly volatile
during winter quarters in the Nordic countries and less volatile during summer quar-
ters. To mitigate the risk of volatile electricity prices, call option contract writers
want extra premiums. The second source is the potentially high (low) demand for
call option contracts in winter (summer) quarters, which then pushes the call option
contract prices away from the equilibrium price.
For the dynamic delta option strategy with put options, statistically signiﬁcant
price differences and seasonality are found. First, the price difference is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant on average in all quarters. Also, the positive price difference
is relatively large during the winter quarters. Second, the price difference is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant during the winter quarters. This indicates that the static
futures strategy outperforms the dynamic delta option strategy with put options dur-
ing the winter quarters. However, no statistically signiﬁcant price difference is found
during the summer quarters. These results might imply that put options are rela-
tively overpriced during the winter quarters, since the dynamic delta option strategy
is buying put options.
In addition, it seems that the seasonal variation is more inﬂuential for the dynamic
delta option strategy that uses call options than it is for the dynamic delta option
strategy that uses put options.
We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant and universally consistent evidence that the
electricity price trends (ie, quarters with increasing or decreasing electricity prices)
are related to the reported price differences.
We also ﬁnd some cross-sectional variation in the reported price differences when
analyzing the level of moneyness used in the dynamic delta option strategies that use
call options. The results seem to mainly be driven by the performance of the dynamic
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delta option strategy that uses call options with ATM and OTM moneyness levels.
No similar conclusion can be made for the dynamic delta option strategy that uses
put options.
The reported ﬁndings suggest that the producers and consumers who are net sell-
ers of electricity and want to reduce electricity price risk during the winter quarters
should utilize the dynamic delta option strategy with call options. For the summer
quarters, however, they should utilize the static futures strategy.
The reported price differences between the static futures strategy and the dynamic
delta option strategy in the Nasdaq OMX Europe commodities are partially consis-
tent with the ﬁndings of Botterud et al (2010), Gjolberg and Brattested (2011), Lucia
and Torro´ (2011) and Weron and Zator (2014), who report that price differences exist
between forward/futures contracts and spot electricity prices in the Nordic region.
The reported price differences between the static futures strategy and the dynamic
delta option strategy are also partially consistent with the ﬁndings of Kristiansen
(2007), Wimschulte (2010) and Frestad (2012), who report that price differences
exist between forward/futures contracts with different maturities in the Nordic
ﬁnancial electricity market.
Finally, the reported seasonal patterns in the price differences are consistent with
the reported ﬁndings of Gjolberg and Brattested (2011) and Lucia and Torro´ (2011).
The results of this paper could also potentially explain those reported by Sanda et al
(2013), who document that Norwegian hydro-based electricity producers use option
contracts as hedging instruments relatively rarely.
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